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But because being here amounts to so much, because all
this Here and Now, so fleeting, seems to require us and strangely
concerns us. Us the most fleeting of all. Just once,
everything, only for once. Once and no more. And we, too,
once. And never again. But this
having been once, though only once,
having been once on earth— can it ever be cancelled?
Rainer Maria Rilke
INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study is to provide an understanding of the 
philosophies of history of Giambattista Vico and Kant from the point of 
view of their respective epistemologies. In order to achieve this end, I 
propose to draw an historical comparison of two basic epistemological con­
cepts used by Vico and Kant in their respective philosophies of history.
There has been very little philosophical literature written in 
English comparing anything of Vico's with anything of Kant's. This is es­
pecially true in the philosophy of history.' Rarely are these two men 
mentioned in the same breath in philosophical discussions. Why is this?
One might cite several prima facie reasons for this. On the one 
hand there is the difference in time. Vico was bom in 1658, approximately 
sixty years prior to Kant. When he died in 1744, Kant was but a young man 
of twenty. Hence, the time difference alone might account for why these 
two thinkers have seldom been compared. There is also the problem of 
language. Although Vico was fluent in Greek and Latin (Latin being the 
language of the learned in his day), he chose, nevertheless, to write his 
mature work. The New Science, in his native Italian. Kant, on the other 
hand, wrote his famous Critiques, along with his other works, in German. 
There is absolutely no evidence to indicate that Kant was or could have 
been familiar with any of Vico's work.
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However, more important than both of these points are the 
historical backgrounds of each philosopher; that is to say, one might 
readily point to each of these backgrounds as a reason for the distinct 
philosophical interests of each philosopher. On the one hand, there is 
Kant, whose personal heritage stems from German Pietism. He was nurtured 
in his philosophical development on the rationalistic systems of Wolff 
and Leibniz. Although his chief interests in philosophical matters seem 
to have been in moral philosophy, much of his task was concerned with 
providing a philosophical justification for the natural sciences. There 
is a tendency, therefore, to think of Kant as still another champion of 
the Enlightenment.
On the other hand, we have the case of Vico. Fundamentally,
Vico was a poet first and a philosopher second. He was largely self- 
taught in philology, classics, and law. While teaching rhetoric at the 
university in Naples, he also diligently studied history, philosophy, and 
literature. We think of Vico primarily as a representative of Classical 
Italian Humanism and thus as an advocate of the priority of the human 
sciences over the natural ones. In fact, his work in the philosophy of 
history can be viewed as an explicit indictment, of the rationalistic phil­
osophical systems that ruled the day, specifically the system of Descartes.
Therefore, it might be argued, Vico and Kant have not been com­
pared for the simple reason that they actually have nothing in common.
Their backgrounds and goals are different and both thinkers seem, in some 
cases, to be working at cross purposes.
Tliere is one final reason that we might cite to explain the lack 
of philosophical interest in comparing Vico's and Kant's philosophies of history.
iil
The philosophy of history has, in our day, been divided (by quite a 
number of philosophers) into two distinct projects. On the one hand, 
there is the inquiry referred to as "speculative philosophy of history" 
and, on the other hand, there is "critical philosophy of history. 
Modern-day philosophers usually mean by "speculative philosophy of history" 
that area of inquiry which concerns itself primarily with answering the 
following kinds of philosophical questions: (I) What is the actual course
or pattern of historical events? (2) What is the meaning and purpose of 
past human activity? and (3) What are those principles by which various 
historical successions are, in the words of Karl Lbwith ". . . unified and 
directed toward an ultimate meaning."?
"Critical philosophy of history," on the other hand, is said to 
concern itself with issues such as the nature of "historical fact," the 
uniqueness of "historical explanation" (as compared to other forms of 
inquiry, e.g., explanation in the natural sciences), and the various con­
nected problems of "historical truth," "objectivity," and "reconstruction." 
Critical philosophy of history is said by some to resemble philosophy of 
science in that its chief concern is with specific epistemological issues 
regarding such things as justification and explanation. Thus, it is op­
posed to the more general, metaphysical inquiry that constitutes the sub­
stance of speculative philosophy of history.
To return to the thread at last, most philosophers today would 
place Vico and Kant in the "speculative" rather than the "critical" phi­
losophy of history project. That is to say, most contemporary philosophers 
(if asked) would point out that, while it is true that Vico and Kant were 
concerned with the philosophy of history, they were only concerned with
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questions about the meaning of history or its pattern (i.e., merely 
"speculative" and not "critical” philosophy of history).  ^ Further, they 
would argue, since philosophy of history today is concerned with the 
"critical" questions, it would seem that there is really very little to 
be gained from consulting Vico and Kant on these matters."* Hence, not 
only is it the case that Vico and Kant are separated by barriers of time, 
language, and historical background (suggesting that there are simply too 
many natural barriers to be overcome for any informative comparison to be 
made), but also, and more importantly, their substantive philosophies of 
history actually have nothing to say to our own philosophical concerns.
It is at this point that I should like to propose that we take a 
second closer look at Vico's and Kant's philosophies, specifically their 
epistemologies, and more specifically still, their respective criteria of 
truth. It is my view that upon examining their criteria, we shall find 
some rather striking informative parallels. We shall find, for example, 
that both Vico and Kant epistemologically justify their respective claims 
to knowledge by making use of what 1, following J. Hintikka, refer to as 
a "maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth.® That is to say, both argue 
that one can have genuine knowledge of something, e.g., in geometry or 
physics, only if one has, in some sense, "made" the object of knowledge 
in question.
Further, both Vico and Kant use this "maker's-knowledge criterion" 
along with a concept of "teleological" explanation to justify their par­
ticular philosophies of history. This is of special interest because 
(contrary to the popular view) it indicates that the so-called "speculative" 
claims made by Vico and Kant in their particular philosophies of history
Vare actually justified by prior epistemological, e.g., "critical," claims. 
This is to say that unless their prior critical claims can be made good 
(concerning the appropriate criterion of truth and the appropriateness 
of teleological method of explanation), their speculative claims concern­
ing the pattern or meaning of history cannot be made good. It is also to 
say that Vico and Kant were aware (to some degree) of this relationship 
between their (so-called) "critical" and "speculative" claims.®
If this is the case (as it is), then at least three important 
points seem to result from it. First, we find that Vico's and Kant's 
philosophies of history contain important "critical" as well as "specula­
tive" argumentation. Second, after seeing how much argument ition supports 
their speculative claims, we are in a much better position to judge their 
speculative claims. Third, from seeing how these epistemic concepts "work" 
in both thinkers' philosophies of history (regardless of the truth of 
their speculative claims), we find ourselves in a better position to 
answer the following question: Is there indeed a parallel development in
Vico's and Kant's philosophies of history even though each philosopher, 
in other respects, has distinct, philosophical views and goals? In effect, 
this is to ask, "Will their respective philosophies of history come to any 
fundamentally similar conclusions because of a commitment made by each 
philosopher to similar basic epistemological concepts’?"
One of the conclusions of this study is that the above question 
is answered affirmatively. That is to say, because of their similar 
epistemological commitments, Vico's and Kant's philosophies of history do 
in fact share similar conclusions. One such conclusion is that history 
is seen as the story of man's own "self-making," i.e., his
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"self-development." Insofar as history is viewed in this way, a further 
commitment to a humanistic view of man is also shared by both philosophers.
Therefore, there is an important sense in which it is surprising 
that there exists this lacuna in the philosophical literature. This is 
to say, it is surprising that Vico's and Kant's philosophies of history 
have not yet been investigated in relation to each other since the primary 
epistemic concepts used by both to justify their respective philosophies 
of history are the same concepts. Our "problem," therefore, is clear- 
cut. In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of Vico's and 
Kant's philosophies of history, we must examine their respective uses of 
these two key epistemic concepts.
Our claim is a strong one: An understanding of Vico's and Kant's
philosophies of history requires that we first understand the epistemologi­
cal grounds for their respective theories. Part of our problem, there­
fore, is to show exactly in what manner these two concepts are 
"epistemologically basic" to their theories.
Specifically, to this end I proceed with an historical, exegetical, 
and systematic analysis of the use made of these two concepts (i.e.,
"maker's-knowledge criterion" and "teleology") by each philosopher in his 
respective philosophy of history. This is to say that I interpret cer­
tain key passages, I trace out the development of certain ideas (those 
directly related to the concepts in question), and finally, I show the 
relationship of these ideas to each other in Vico's and Kant's philosophies 
of history. The writings that are primarily investigated in Kant are his 
writings on history and those on teleological judgment, specifically the 
third Critique. I also give a cursory explanation of Kant's use of
vil
"maker's-knowledge" in the first half of The Critique of Pure Reason, 
specifically in connection with geometry and physics. The writings that 
are primarily investigated in Vico are De Antiquissima, The Autobiography, 
and The Hetr Science.
General Outline of Each Chapter
In Chapter I, I examine the origin of Vico's "maker's-knowledge 
criterion" as found in his early work De Antiquissima. I then show how 
his theory is contrasted (by him) to the Cartesian theory of truth. Next, 
I examine how Vico's theory is applied to the sciences of geometry and 
physics in order to show how it is epistemologically "basic" to those 
sciences. Finally, I offer an interpretation of Vico's early ideas con­
cerning the relationship of truth to certainty (specifically their pos­
sible synthesis). This interpretation, I believe, allows Vico’s early 
work to be viewed as developmentally consistent with The New Science.
In Chapter II, I show how Vico's "maker's-knowledge criterion" 
and his concept of "teleological explanation" are applied to history. I 
raise a problem here, namely the problem of [real] truth in history.
After examining and rejecting two distinct possible solutions to the 
problem, I propose a third solution. I then show how these concepts, 
i.e., the criterion of truth and teleological explanation "work" in the 
following contexts: (1) the "new art," (2) philology-philosophy, (3) the
ideal-eternal history, and (4) Divine Providence. Finally, I end the 
chapter by examining the relationships of the notions "making," "remak­
ing," and "self-making" to each other in the context of Vico's 
historicism.
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In Chapter III, I examine Kant's use of his "maker's-knowledge 
criterion" in relation to the possibility of geometry and physics. I do 
this in order to show (as I did with Vico in Chapter I) that Kant's 
"maker's-knowledge criterion" is also epistemologically "basic" to his 
philosophy of these sciences. I then examine Kant's notion of "teleologi­
cal" (i.e., reflective) judgment, specifically as it is related to his 
idea of "explanation" in The Critique of Judgement.
In Chapter IV, I examine Kant's use of the "maker's-knowledge 
criterion" and "teleological explanation" in his philosophy of history.
First, I trace out the manner in which nature, after having been "made," 
is "made" teleological. I then, following Kant, distinguish between moral 
and physical teleology and argue that Kant relies upon a "moral reflective 
(i.e., teleological) judgment" in order to unify his theory of history.
I then pose the question, not posed by Kant: "How is history as a science
possible?" I offer an answer to this question based on Kantian principles. 
Finally, I end the chapter by examining the relationships of the concepts 
"maker's-knowledge," "self-making," and "self-knowledge" to each other in 
the context of Kant's theory of history.
In Chapter V, I compare and contrast Vico's and Kant's philoso­
phies of history. I do so in the context of commenting on two papers by 
contemporary philosophers who have themselves compared Vico and Kant. I 
begin by examining and commenting upon several points made by Eugene T.
Gadol in his paper "The Idealistic Foundations of Cultural Anthropology:
Vico, Kant, and Cassirer." I then turn to Nathan Rotenstreich to comment on 
his paper "Vico and Kant." I conclude the chapter by first pointing out where 
these contemporary authors are right and where they are wrong in their
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respective comparisons. I end the chapter with a comment on Vico's and 
Kant's respective notions of teleological explanation.
In Chapter VI, I conclude my study by pointing out the basic 
difference and a basic similarity in Vico's and Kant’s philosophies of 
history. The difference, I argue, is that while Kant could see how his 
"maker's-knowledge criterion" could be directly applied to nature, he 
could not see how it was directly applicable to history. The direct ap­
plicability of the criterion to history was seen later by Dilthey. Vico, 
on the other hand, saw exactly how the criterion could be applied directly 
to history. He failed, however, to see its direct applicability to nature. 
The point of difference, therefore, is that in the case of Kant there is 
a lack of an explicit epistemology of history. In the case of Vico, there 
is not. The point shared by Vico and Kant is their unyielding commitment 
to humanism. I argue that Vico's and Kant's respective notions of human­
ism develop out of their respective "maker's-knowledge criteria" when they 
are applied to history. I conclude the chapter with the suggestion that 
there exist good reasons for us today to consult Vico's and Kant's cri­
teria in [the area of] philosophy of history.
The value of this study I take to be the raising of two questions; 
First, since we are attempting to contribute to a better understanding of 
Vico's and Kant's philosophies of history by examining them from an epistemo­
logical point of view, the question arises concerning the relationship of 
these two epistemic concepts to the philosophy of history in general. Sec­
ond, there is the question as to whether or not a commitment to certain 
epistemological concepts, like a "maker's-knowledge criterion," in the area 
of philosophy of history will result in a commitment to a humanistic view 
of man.
XThis is, in effect, to ask if some epistemological commitments 
in the philosophy of history are compatible with humanism and others not.
I have not offered an adequate answer to either of these questions, pri­
marily because an adequate answer would entail the [worthwhile] investiga­
tion of (1) the concepts in question in relation to the history of the 
philosophy of history itself; and (2) the history of the humanists' cri­
tique of "scholastic" science. Nevertheless, we could not ask for a 
better place to begin such an inquiry than the first thinker who explicitly 
formulated the "maker's-knowledge criterion," namely Giambattista Vico.
FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES 
INTRODUCTION
'I know of only two papers (in English) that compare Vico and Kant. One 
is Eugene T. Gadol's paper "The Idealistic Foundations of Cultural 
Anthropology: Vico, Kant, and Cassirer," Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 12 (1974):207-225. The other is Nathan Rotenstreich's paper 
"Vico and Kant," in Giambattista Vico's Science of Humanity, ed. Giorgio 
Tagliacozzo and Donald Phillip Verene (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 221-240. 1 comment on both of
these papers in Chapter V.
^1 am relying here on the distinction drawn specifically by Alan and 
Barbara Donagan in their book Philosophy of History (New York: Macmillan
Series, 1965). Other philosophers who accept this same kind of distinc­
tion are W. H. Walsh in his Philosophy of History; An Introduction (New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), pp. 14-16; Patrick Gardner in his
Theories of History (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 7-8;
and his The Nature of Historical Explanation (London: Oxford University
Press, 1961). Also there is W. B. Gallie in his Philosophy and the His­
torical Understanding (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), pp. 11-13; and
Arthur C. Danto in his Analytical Philosophy of History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 1-3.
^For example, P. Gardner in his Theories of History (an anthology of 
philosophers of history) places Vico and Kant under the heading "The In­
terpretation of the Historical Process." He then places other thinkers 
under such headings as "The Nature of Historical Knowledge" and "Explana­
tion and Laws."
''For example, Arthur Danto in his rather provincial Analytical Philosophy 
of History tells us:
Analytical philosophy of history, on the other hand, is not 
merely connected with philosophy: it is philosophy, but phi­
losophy applied to the special conceptual problems which arise 
out of the practice of history as well as out of substantive 
philosophy of history is not really connected with philosophy 
at all. . . . The first thing 1 shall analyse is what substan­
tive philosophy of history pretends to do in addition to giving 
an account of the past (p. 1).
Xll
®See Hintikka's "Transcendental Arguments; Genuine and Spurious," Nous 
6 (1972 September):274. Also see Practical Reason, ed. Stephan Korner 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974). There Hintikka also has an article,
"Practical Vs. Theoretical Reason: An Ambiguous Legacy", where he speaks 
of both Vico and Kant as espousing the "maker's-knowledge criterion." L 
Concerning Vico he says:
For Vico, the scope of epistemologically relevant maker's 
knowledge is not restricted to human thoughts, plans, decisions, 
intentions, hopes, and wishes but comprises also their concerte 
manifestations and results in the realm of culture and society 
(pp. 88-89).
And concerning Kant he says:
One of the most interesting variants of the tradition of "maker's 
knowledge" in effect suggests that we can have a priori knowledge 
of things only through imposing this kind of anticipatory frame­
work on them. "Reason has insight only into that which it pro­
duces after a plan of its own," says Kant (Critigue of Pure 
Reason, vxiii, trans. by Kemp Smith) (p. 93).
6I do not mean to suggest by my use of these words "critical" and "specu­
lative" that I approve of the distinction that these words are supposed 
to signify. The distinction is a bit too tidy and "neat" for my own 
thinking on the matter. My point is simply that even if we suppose the 
distinction, somehow or another, to hold good, we still must provide 
argument to show that (1) Vico and Kand did not "do" critical philosophy 
of history, and that (2) their speculative claims are false. These 
arguments and the evidence that would help to substantiate them have been 
missing from modern scholarship in the philosophy of history.
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CHAPTER I
VICO’S CRITERION IN GEOMETRY AND PHYSICS
In his early work De Antiquissima italorum sapienta ex linguae
originibus eruenda^ Giambattista Vico tells us . . the criterion of
truth, the rule by which we may certainly know it, is to have made it."*
Twenty years later, in his major work. The New Science,^ he tells us:
. . . the world of civil society has certainly been made by
men, and . . . its principles are therefore to be found within
the modifications of our own human mind."*
We can note from these quotations the following important points: 
first, in De Antiquissima Vico has laid down a general criterion of truth. 
Second, the criterion suggests that knowledge is intimately related to our 
"making" and further, that because of this relationship we can have access 
to knowledge. Finally, there is the important point that the criterion, 
first announced in the early De Antiquissima, is carried over to and re­
mains operative in the later work The New Science. Vico's criterion in
both works may be generally formulated as follows: "One can have knowl­
edge of something if one has made it."
We have stated in the Introduction that our objective in this 
study, in part, is to understand exactly how Vico's criterion of truth 
(along with his concept of teleology) functions epistemologically, in his 
philosophy of history. The New Science. Although in De Antiquissima the 
formulation and use made of Vico's "maker's-knowledge criterion"® has no
particular reference to the philosophy of history (being concerned instead 
with the sciences of mathematics and physics), it is our judgment that we 
shall have a better perspective and, therefore, a better understanding of 
how his criterion operates in his philosophy of history if we first see 
how it operates in the sciences of mathematics (specifically geometry) 
and physics. We hope this will become more evident as we trace out the 
career of Vico's criterion.
In this first chapter, therefore, we shall examine Vico's cri­
terion of truth in De Antiquissima in its relation to the sciences of 
mathematics and physics. To further this end, we shall look at the ori­
gin of Vico's criterion, the manner in which it is developed in response 
to scepticism and Cartesianism, and finally, the manner in which it is 
used to ground the sciences of mathematics and physics. We shall then, 
in Chapter II, examine Vico's use of the criterion in his philosophy of 
history. The New Science.
Let us begin by sketching an answer to the following two ques­
tions: first, from where does Vico derive his theory of truth? and second,
why is he so bothered about putting forth a "new" criterion of truth in 
the first place?
Concerning the first question, various commentators, e.g., B.
Croce, I. Berlin, and A. Funkenstein,® have pointed out that the general 
"verum-factura principle" did not, in fact, originate with Vico, but in­
stead has a rather long history dating back at least to the time of 
Aquinas. (For a detailed account of the history of verum-factum see 
"The Source of Vico's Theory of Knowledge" in The Philosophy of Giambattista 
Vico by B. Croce, trans. R. G. Collingwood (London: Howard Latimer,
Limited, 1910), Appendix iii.)
3Further, it is known that Vico was familiar with the work of the
English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who had declared rather brazenly as
early as 1662 in his Philosophical Problems that :
Of arts, some are demonstrable, others indemonstrable; and 
demonstrable are those the construction of the subject whereof 
is in the power of the artist himself . . . the science of every 
subject is derived from a precognition of the causes, generation, 
and construction of the same; and consequently where the causes 
are known, there is place for demonstration, but not where the 
causes are to seek for. Geometry therefore is demonstrable, for 
the lines and figures from which we reason are drawn and described 
by ourselves; and civil philosophy is demonstrable, because we make 
the commonwealth ourselves. But because of natural bodies we know 
not the construction, but seek if from the effects, there lies no 
demonstration of what the causes be we seek for, but only of what 
they may be.^
When we compare the above with Vico's remarks concerning the 
"maker's-knowledge criterion" vis à vis geometry, physics, and "civil 
philosophy," we come to see many prima facie similarities between Vico 
and Hobbes. In fact, it sounds very much as if Vico holds identically 
the same views as those of Hobbes. Vico tells us "We are able to demon­
strate geometrical propositions because we create them."® Concerning; 
physics he says ". . . were it.possible,for us to supply demonstrations
of propositions of physics we would.be:capable of creating them ex nihilo
as well."® And finally, concerning the "civil world" he tells us:
And history which includes the civil world cannot be more cer­
tain than when he who creates the things also narrates them.*®
. . . this world of nations has certainly been made by men and 
its guise must therefore be found within the modifications of 
our own human mind.
The similarities between Hobbes' and Vico's cr.^ ::eria of knowl­
edge exist. Nevertheless, while it is undeniable that Vico was in­
fluenced by other thinkers (specifically, Hobbes, Grotius, Tacitus, 
Spinoza, and Plato), Vico himself tells us that the origin of his
4"maker's-knowledge criterion" is to be found in the ancient wisdom of 
the Italians, specifically in their use of the Latin language. In De 
Antiquissima he says that "the truth is simply that which is made," 
because in ancient Latin the words "verum" and "factum," as the Schoolmen 
put it, convert.'^  Vico's idea here is that the origin of his maker's- 
knowledge criterion is to be found by tracing the etymology of the Latin 
words "verum" and "factum" within a traditional "philosophical" doctrine, 
namely the scholastic doctrine of the transcendentals.
Although not much can be made out of his rather questionable 
etymological analysis, the theme of the transcendentals plays quite an 
explicit role in his "maker's-knowledge criterion." The scholastics had 
argued that because of the transcendentality of being, truth, unity, and 
goodness, being is convertible with truth, unity, and goodness (verum- 
unum-bonum). ®^ Since the transcendentals are then themselves convertible 
with each other and since all being (except God) is "made," it follows 
that truth which is convertible with being is also "made." Therefore, 
argues Vico, verum-factum, i.e., truth, is that which is made.'"*
Now, although it is beyond the scope of this present study to 
trace out all of the particular influences on Vico's theory or to attempt 
an end to the debate concerning the "real" origin of his "maker's-knowledge 
criterion," there are two things (which are undoubtedly true) concerning 
Vico's distinctive criterion that should be kept in mind. First, Vico 
holds, following Aristotle, that knowledge is and can only be knowledge 
of causes (". . . la scienza è la conoscenza delle cause da cui nasce la 
cosa."^®) Second, he himself tells us in De Antiquissima that the origin 
of his criterion is to be found in the Latin language. ("In Latino Verum
e Factum hanno relazione reciproca, awero, nel linguaggio corrente delle 
Scuole, si convertono."*®) Since these two points are clearly Vichian 
(i.e., unborrowed) and, therefore, undebatable concerning the origin of 
his criterion, we shall take his word as an answer to our first question. 
Keeping this in mind, let us now proceed to answer the second.
Why, then, is Vico so concerned about putting forth a "new" 
criterion of truth in the first place? The answer is straightforward.
Vico believes that it is necessary to offer a new criterion of truth in 
order to have a defensible alternative to the views of the sceptics and 
to that of Descartes (both of whom he found unacceptable). This is to 
say that Vico believes the sceptics, on the one hand, must be adequately 
answered (if science is to have a secure foundation) and, on the other 
hand, that Descartes has failed to provide such an answer.
Disagreement with Descartes
The first four chapters of De Antiquissima are explicitly formu­
lated by Vico with the following idea in mind: he must offer an alterna­
tive theory of truth to the Cartesian theory (an alternative that could 
then be used to stand up to the critical attacks of scepticism) [and] which 
could also supply an adequate (philosophical) ground for the sciences of 
mathematics and physics.
Descartes' famous "Cogito" had declared to one and all that a 
firm foundation had at last been achieved whereby science could forever 
remain secure from doubt and the persistent threat of scepticism. In 
fact, Descartes argued that it was through the method of sceptical doubt 
itself, i.e., by pushing doubt as far as it could intelligibly be pushed.
that we would arrive at the one indubitable truth, namely that one cannot 
rationally doubt one's own existence . It was upon this truth, 
perceived so clearly and distinctly (in conjunction with the method of 
arriving at it, i.e., "methodological doubt,"*® that a secure foundation
for science was to be laid.
Vico claims in De Antiguissina that Descartes' attempt was a 
failure. It will benefit us at this point to examine closely Vico's 
criticism of Descartes because much of Vico's theory is clarified in his 
polemical reaction to the Cartesian theory as put forth in De Antiquissima. 
Vico, while assuming his own criterion of truth, criticizes Descartes' 
theory on two basic points: first, Vico says that Descartes does not
address himself to the sceptic's question, and second, Descartes confuses 
certainty with truth.*® Concerning the first point, Vico argues that the 
sceptics' claim is that reality is unknowable. He says that since knowl­
edge ". . . means knowing the causes from which a thing originates,"^®
the sceptic can readily admit the Cartesian claim that he cannot doubt
he exists while he thinks, but this (i.e., the sceptic's) certainty in 
no way results in any knowledge of reality. Descartes' indubitable truth, 
insists Vico, is actually a claim of mere awareness. Awareness of one's 
existence, while thinking of it [no doubt], produces certainty, but it 
does not follow from that certainty that one has knowledge.^*
It becomes evident that what Vico is actually doing in claiming 
that Descartes does not answer the sceptic's question is denying Descartes' 
criterion of truth. Let us here review Descartes' criterion so that we 
may better see Vico's point. Descartes had told us that when one arrives 
at a clear and distinct idea, one is at the same time arriving at
certainty. "For what can give it certainty, if what guides it had not
been clearly perceived.Further, if one arrives at certainty (for
Descartes), one is then guaranteed of the possession of truth.
To begin with, directly we think that we rightly perceive 
something, we spontaneously persuade ourselves that it is 
true. Further, if this conviction is so strong that we have 
no reason to doubt concerning that of the truth of which we 
have persuaded ourselves, there is nothing more to enquire 
about; we have here all the certainty that can reasonably 
be desired . . .  we have assumed a conviction so strong that 
nothing can remove it, and this persuasion is clearly the 
same as perfect certitude.
From this reasoning, Descartes evolves a general rale which instructs us to
seek certainty (and therefore truth) by perceiving clearly and distinctly.
. . . there is nothing that assures me of its truth, excepting 
the clear and distinct perception of that which I state, which 
would not indeed suffice to assure me that what I say is true, 
if it could ever happen that a thing which I conceived so 
clearly and distinctly could be false; and accordingly it seems 
to me that already I can establish as a general rale [my empha­
sis] that all things which I perceive clearly and very distinctly 
are true.^ '*
Vico holds that Descartes has here confused certainty with truth 
by erroneously making certainty the criterion of truth. He insists, 
therefore, that Descartes' criterion must be replaced by an alternative 
and avoids this error. The alternative is Vico's own. The true, says 
Vico, is that which is the object of Science (scienza), while the certain 
is that which is the object of consciousness (coscienza). (". . . la
sua certezza di pensare e la coscienza, non sc i e n z a , . . .  la scienza e 
la conoscenza delle cause da cui nasce la cosa."^®
As we have seen above, the sceptic, according to Vico, is in 
agreement with Descartes in not doubting that which is certain. He will 
quite readily agree that he thinks and that he exists,but his claim 
is that from his certainty, knowledge does not necessarily follow.
8Vico maintains that the "Cogito" does not give us the cause of
our existence but only the awareness of it, i.e., "coscienza." In other
words thinking is not the cause (and therefore, not the knowledge) of my
being but only an awareness of my existence.
A sceptic will deny that the knowledge of being can be obtained 
from the consciousness of thinking. For to know, he insists, 
is to be acquainted with the causes from which things are pro­
duced; but I who think am mind and body, and if thought were 
the cause why I am it would be the cause of body.^®
Nor can thought be the cause of my being a mind (i.e., a "thinking thing")
either:
. . . for while the mind apprehends itself, it does not make 
itself, and because it does not make itself it is ignorant of 
the form or mode in which it apprehends itself.^®
The gist of Vico's argument here is that Descartes has erroneously
taken certainty to be the criterion of truth. This is a mistake. The
Sceptic, says Vico, cannot be refuted by such a criterion for he does not
even challenge it.
There is no other way by which scepticism can be overthrown than 
by holding that the criterion of truth is to have made it. For 
the constant contention of sceptics is that things seem to them, 
but that they do not know what they really are. They confess 
effects, and consequently concede causes to them; but they deny 
they know these causes, because ignorant of the genera or forms 
according to which things are made.®®
He concludes:
From the whole of the preceding discussion, we may accordingly 
conclude that the criterion of truth, the rule by which we may 
certainly know it, is to have made it. Hence the clear and 
distinct idea of our mind not only cannot be the criterion of 
truth in general, but not even of that of the mind itself.
It is Vico's view then that only a "maker's-knowledge criterion" 
of truth, i.e., only a criterion that argues that the mind can have knowl­
edge only of what the mind has made, can overcome scepticism and thus
secure a foundation for scientific knowledge. It is here important to
note that Vico also tells us in De Rntiguissima that to . . know is
to combine the elements of things."^* He says that knowing is a process
which consists of combining and composing, and it is upon completion of
this process that one (man) arrives at the perfect idea of the thing
whose elements were composed. This notion of composition (and division)
is central to Vico's concept of science.
. . . human truth is what man in knowing composes and makes.
Thus science is the knowledge of the form of the mode in which 
a thing is produced, and by which the mind, because in knowing 
a thing it combines its elements, makes the thing.
Vico's notion of human, i.e., man's, science complements his idea 
that a "maker's-knowledge criterion" is necessary in order to justify knowl­
edge. That is to say, it seems clear that for Vico the mind must make 
the truths that the mind knows precisely because the necessary condition
for there being any truth (of science) is that it be composed. This is be­
cause science is the knowledge of causes, i.e., the consciousness of the 
composition of the elements by which the mind "makes" the things and, 
therefore, the thing can only be an object of scientific knowledge if it is 
made.
Finally, because truth and fact (i.e., that which is made) are 
convertible,^"* knowledge of reality is seen as an activity which is the 
work of a "making mind." (This would seem to suggest that in order to 
understand the fundamental principles of any science we should first have 
to understand, in a genetic manner, the principles which make that science 
possible, i.e., the principles of the human mind. Vico will argue this 
very thesis twenty years later in his major work. The New Science.
We should here pause and note that the gist of Vico's argument
so far seems to suggest that the notions "truth" and "certainty" are
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mutually exclusive. That is to say that because Vico's "maker's-knowledge 
criterion" is put forth against Descartes's certainty criterion, there is 
the suggestion that Vico's criterion must necessarily exclude any notion 
of certainty. As I shall later argue in this chapter, this interpretation, 
i.e., that Vico's criterion necessarily makes truth and certainty incom­
patible notions, is mistaken. The notions "truth" and "certainty" are 
incompatible as sufficient criteria of truth. However, as I shall later 
argue, Vico's doctrine in De Antiquissima should in fact be viewed such 
that the "maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth can be seen to be syn- 
thesizable with the notion of certainty (i.e., coscienza) resulting in an 
adequate idea of "genuine scientific truth."
An Important Analogy
Having criticized Descartes' criterion of truth and having of­
fered his own "maker's-knowledge criterion" in its place, Vico now sets 
out to show how his criterion can serve as a justifiable ground for the 
sciences of geometry and physics. To accomplish this end, he makes use 
of two other particular "philosophical" arguments. The first we shall 
hereby christen the "God-man maker's-knowledge analogy" argument. (Our 
choice of this particular name shall, we hope, become clearer as we ex­
plain the argument.) This analogical argument buttresses a second 
philosophical argument also used by Vico to ground the sciences, which he 
refers to as a "useful hypothesis of 'metaphysical points'." Let us begin 
with the first, i.e., the important analogy.
Vico proceeds to distinguish two different kinds of knowing which 
correspond to two different kinds of mind. On the one hand, there is the 
"knowing" which results from "maker's-knowledge" in its relation to God,
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whose mind is infinite. On the other hand, there is the "knowing" which 
results from "maker's-knowledge" in its relation to man, whose mind is 
finite. Man's knowing or knowledge is discursive and is, therefore, 
achieved by abstraction. God's knowing or knowledge is intuitive, and 
therefore:
God knows all things, because He contains in Himself the ele­
ments of which He composes all things; but man, on [the other 
hand] in endeavouring to know things, must have recourse to 
dividing them. Therefore, human science is a kind of anatomy 
of the works of nature.^®
This is in effect to say two things: (1) that since God has ab­
solute creative power, his knowledge is perfect, whereas ". . . human 
science is bom of a defect of the mind— namely of its extreme little­
ness . . . And (2) in God's knowledge ". . . truth is identical with 
the comprehension of all the elements which compose the universe.[my 
emphasis] That is to say that ". . . God, in his purest intelligence, 
knows things, and, by knowing them creates them."^® [my emphasis] This 
distinction between God's knowledge and man's is epistemologically im­
portant because, as we shall later see, it can be used by Vico as a device 
by which he can show how his "maker's-knowledge criterion" operates in 
its most "ideal" case.
Once again, Vico's claim here is that God knows all things because 
God's mind contains the elements of all things. This means that God has 
made all things and can, therefore, have knowledge of them. Further, this 
"ideal" kind of knowledge has an added feature, namely that the things 
themselves will be produced in the very act of their being known. This 
is to say that in the "ideal" case of knowing, making and knowing will be 
[thought of as] identical. In Kantian language we should say that God 
has intellectual intuition."*®
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Man, on the other hand, has no such intellectual intuition and 
is, therefore, limited in the manner of knowing and in the completeness 
of his knowledge. Man's mind is simply . . external to all things, 
contains nothing of what it desires to know, and so cannot produce the 
truth which it seeks to ascertain.""** The only truths which man can pro­
duce are those which contain the causes of things that are not outside 
man's mind. These, it turns out, are only abstractions.
It is evident here that in Be Antiquissima Vico's "maker's- 
knowledge criterion" is to be thought of as functioning in an analogous 
manner in man and God. [Hence, the title "God-man maker's-knowledge 
analogy.") The analogy, once again, is that man's knowledge is due to 
his making just as God's knowledge is due to his. The difference between 
the two [which accounts for the analogical character of the comparison) 
is that in man's making or knowing he never achieves that "ideal" intui­
tive kind of knowledge that God does. In the case of man there is merely 
discursive, abstract reasoning in knowing where the object of knowledge 
[specifically nature) must first be given and then analyzed through ab­
straction and then reconstructed so that it may be known.
God's knowledge, on the other hand, while due to his making, is 
the "ideal" kind whereby in merely thinking or knowing the object, he 
creates it. The importance of our stressing this distinction is that 
while this distinction holds good for Vico in Be Antiquissima, it does 
not hold good later (regarding history) in The New Science. That is to
say that Vico will later argue [in The New Science') that it is in precisely
the science of history that those causes for which we search in order to 
explain the social world are located completely within the "modifications
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of our own human mind.""*^  What is more, concerning historical knowledge 
we are, in fact, just like God.
As we've seen above, Vico's project in De Antiquissima. consisted 
of an attempt to (1) answer the sceptics; (2) replace Descartes' criterion 
of truth with his own "maker's-knowledge criterion"; and (3) provide a 
"philosophical" justification for knowledge in the natural sciences, spe­
cifically geometry and physics. He believed that he could achieve these 
ends if he could show how, metaphysically and epistemologically, his own 
criterion could adequately ground scientific knowledge. He attempted, in 
other words, to show exactly how knowledge in geometry and physics is 
possible metaphysically and epistemologically. Let us, therefore, now 
turn to his attempt at grounding each of these sciences beginning with 
geometry. It is precisely here, i.e., in his explanation of the possi­
bility of geometry, that we shall encounter the second important argument 
we spoke of earlier, i.e., the argument for the "metaphysical points."
Vico has told us that man's mind (as opposed to God's) can con­
tain only the causes of abstractions,**^ i.e., those things that are in­
ternal to his mind and which are not, therefore, external realities. He 
believes that the two primary examples of such abstractions are those 
demonstrations found in the worlds of mathematics and physics. Man can 
have a science of these two worlds precisely because he has made them.
In fact, concerning mathematical making, Vico claims that man is almost 
like God in that:
Arithmetic and geometry . . . demonstrate by causes because the 
human mind contains, and hence can order and arrange the elements 
of the truths; and from these ordered and composed things arise 
the truths which they demonstrate, so that demonstration is identi­
cal with the operation (operatio) and the true with the made.'"'
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Man is unlike God, however, in that in God's making the product 
is the "real" world, i.e., corporeal nature itself. In De Antiquissima 
Vico makes it quite clear that there is no sense in which man's making 
can actually produce the "real." The best man can achieve is abstractions 
of it. But at this point the question naturally arises: If physics and
mathematics (geometry) are only abstractions of the real world, how is 
it that man's sciences of that world are to be secured on a firm founda­
tion from sceptical doubts?
The problem, in other words, is how can Vico explain, in using 
a "maker's-knowledge criterion" that man secures certain knowledge for 
these two sciences if these sciences are not somehow about the "real" 
world? That is, if these sciences are merely abstractions, how then do 
they justify our knowledge claims concerning "real" nature? Vico's at­
tempted solution to this problem is to ground man's sciences (i.e., man's 
makings) in God's making, and it is here, i.e., in his attempt to explain 
this grounding that he turns to a discussion of the relation of geometry 
to what he calls a "metaphysical hypothesis,"'*® i.e., his doctrine of 
"metaphysical points." (It is also here that he discusses the relation 
of physics to the "experimental method" of Bacon.'*®)
Geometry and "Metaphysical Points"
In the case of geometry, the question Vico addresses is this: 
Precisely how are we to understand man's mathematical abstractions as 
being grounded in the real world? That is, if we cannot somehow relate 
mathematics to real nature, what right do we have to think of it as a 
"science" of the real world? Although we are anticipating our third 
chapter, it is here worth noting that Kant, while also making use of a
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"maker's-knowledge criterion,"-bothered his head over this very 
problem. He tells us in the first Critique that "Mathematical concepts 
are not, therefore, by themselves knowledge, except on the supposition 
that there are things which allow of being presented to us.""*’
Vico's answer relies quite heavily on his "God-man maker's- 
knowledge analogy" (discussed above). He believes that it is due to the 
different but analogous functions of the "maker's-knowledge criterion" 
in God and man that man can be said to be "God-like" in creating things 
whose truth he can then know. Because of his ability to know truths in 
a manner that is analogous with God's knowing, Vico thinks he can show 
that man's making will correspond to, and be grounded in, God's. That is 
to say that man's scientific makings or products will correspond with 
God's,which are, in turn, the real objects that make up the real world.
Vico next tells us that geometry is the science in which man has 
completely certain knowledge because in this area he has completely pro­
duced the elements of the science (i.e., the geometrical figures) out of 
his own created abstractions (i.e., the "geometrical points"). Hence, it 
is in geometry that man is most "God-like" because it is in this science 
that man's ". . . demonstrations are identical with his [intellectual] 
operations and [therefore] the true is [identical] with the fact."**
Vico's suggestion is that if the "God-man maker's-knowledge 
analogy" holds good, i.e., if God's making and man's making actually are 
similar, we should then be able to infer from the analogy the following 
as a "metaphysical hypothesis" (". . . ipotesi sul punto metafisico"**): 
Just as man has made the world of geometrical objects out of so many basic 
elements, i.e., geometrical points, so too God must have made the world
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of natural objects out of so many basic elements, i.e., metaphysical
points. As Professor Max Fisch cogently explains:
On the hypothesis that our making in mathematics is as near as 
we can come to God's making, but that what we make are fictions 
and what God makes are realities, we reach the hypothesis that 
the elements made by God, out of which He makes the world of 
extension and motion, are metaphysical points. As in geometry 
we construct the extended line, plane, surface, and figure from 
the unextended geometrical point by postulation or hypothesis, 
and, as in rational mechanics we construct motion in the same 
way, so, in metaphysics, our hypothesis must be, first, that 
God produces extended bodies from points that are unextended 
and undivisible but endowed with infinite power of extension, 
and, second, that the conatus or power of motion ascribed by 
physicists to bodies must be ascribed instead to these meta­
physical points.
For Vico, therefore, our geometry (which is an abstracted making, i.e., a 
kind of theoretical model of objects conceived spatially] can be seen as, 
on this hypothesis, corresponding to God's makings of the "real" objects 
in space. This is so insofar as our geometry is thought of as a mathe­
matical description of nature.
Armed with this "hypothesis," Vico believes that he can explain 
how man's science of geometry, while being an abstraction, is nevertheless 
grounded in God's making (i.e., the "real" world) and thereby explain how 
geometry as a science is possible. Both God and man have knowledge in an 
analogous way; that is to say that the maker's-knowledge criterion (which 
is the only criterion that allows us to answer the sceptic) applies to both 
divine and human knowledge. To say man's knowledge is analogous with God's 
is, in effect, to say that man's creations (i.e., his makings) are analo­
gous to God's. This, in turn, is to say that the "basic elements" out of
which man constructs his geometrical objects must have analogous "counter­
parts" which serve as the "basic elements" out of which God constructs
his natural objects. The "basic elements" in the case of God must be
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similar then to a geometrical point and yet different enough that 
it can "account for" (i.e., metaphysically explain) matter and extension.
Hence, the hypothesis of "metaphysical points."®*
Vico believes that his hypothesis surpasses Descartes' attempt 
to explain matter and its extension because, as we saw earlier, Descartes' 
clear and distinct ideas only render an awareness of things (e.g., mat­
ter and extension); they do not explain their causes (i.e., they do not 
produce "knowledge"). For Descartes, knowledge of matter in the real 
world ultimately depends on God's veracity. Knowledge, for Descartes, is 
an act of faith which,is finally to say, matter and extension are simply 
given, not accounted for. It is precisely here that Vico and Descartes 
disagree. "Give me extension and motion," said Descartes, "and I will 
construct the universe." "Neither can be given," replied Vico, "for both 
need to be themselves explained."
Vico thinks his theory can give a rational account of matter and 
extension in the real world. As Fisch puts it, Vico believes that with 
his hypothesis
We can descend from metaphysics to physics, that is from God 
and from the true Forms of things so they are in God, to the 
physical world (163, 259, 261); we escape dualism by taking 
the substance of bodies to be incorporeal, the causes of mo­
tion to be motionless; and thus, instead of taking the physi­
cal world as brute fact we explain its existence. (Fisch,
Vico Symposium, p. 410)®"*
.Descartes' theory, i.e., his "clear and distinct ideas" of matter 
(which he thought of as being identical with existence) and motion (as a mode of 
extension) really, for Vico, amounts to no explanation (i.e., a demonstra­
tion of the causes) of matter and extension at all. Instead, Descartes 
merely takes matter and extension for granted and thereby ".. .  exalts
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or substitutes [in an absolute manner] physics for metaphysics."
. . Renato che innalzo addirittura la fisica all metafisica . .
There is also another danger, which Vico thinks his theory avoids, 
and it is the opposite extreme of Descartes' error; namely, that of turning 
physics into "nothing but" metaphysics. This Vico believed to be Aristotle's 
error. (". . . Non la vide Aristotele, che introdusse direttamente la 
metafisica nella fisica . . Now, although the hypothesis of "meta­
physical points" is used by Vico to metaphysically ground our knowledge 
of the physical world, it cannot legitimately be used to explain anything 
about particular bodies or motions. For these particular explanations, we 
must rely upon an "experimental" physics. (". . . la diretta dimostrazione 
sperimentale . . .  In questo modo la fisica puo progredire."®^)
Before turning to an examination of Vico's notion of physics, 
let us here pause and quickly review his reasoning up to this point. Vico 
began by arguing that any rational account of knowledge must be prepared 
to answer the questions of the sceptic. He found that the only satisfac­
tory answer is the one which states that "since we have composed all of 
the elements of the object we can thereby know the causes of it and there­
fore have knowledge of it." Ideally, the very best kind of knowledge would 
be that in which the actual composition of the object would take place in 
the very act of mg thinking it. This is to say that knowing the object 
would be identical with making it.
Next, Vico argues that this, in fact, occurs in the science of 
geometry. However, our product is merely an abstraction. Man cannot 
make the "real" world, i.e., corporeal nature, only God can. Since man 
is limited in this way, we must be able to give an account of how our
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geometrical science, being only an abstraction, is nevertheless grounded 
in the real world. In giving this account, we shall take the "maker's- 
knowledge criterion" of truth and conjoin it with an analogical argument 
to substantiate a useful metaphysical hypothesis. This "hypothesis" will 
show first what elements the world is ultimately composed of and secondly, 
their cause. Third (and perhaps most importantly), it will show how it 
is that our science gains access to the "real" world. The hypothesis 
argues that the world is composed of "metaphysical points" which are 
caused by God and that we pass (by analogy) from these points created by 
the divine mind to man's science of them.
The end result of Vico's rather elaborate argumentation is that 
it claims to have justified the science of geometry and given a metaphysi­
cal basis for physics. Geometry allows us a kind of knowledge of the real 
world in that it is indirectly grounded in the real world. Nevertheless, 
because we have not created the real (i.e., corporeal) world of nature 
ourselves, there is a strong sense in which geometry, although completely 
certain, can never give us absolute real truth. Let us now turn to Vico's 
treatment of the question of the possibility of "real" truth. This ques­
tion in De Antiquissima is seen to be the same question as that of the 
possibility of physics. We shall, therefore, here examine Vico's treat­
ment of physics in relation to the "maker's-knowledge criterion."
Maker's-knowledge and Physics ■
Vico has made it quite clear that human knowledge can ultimately 
be justified only if it can be shown that it is analogous to God's knowl­
edge. This amounts, as we’ve seen, to showing that human knowledge can 
be rationally justified only if it can be critically grounded in human
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maker's-knowledge which is itself metaphysically grounded in the divine 
maker's-knowledge.^® Man is "God-like" par excellence in the science of 
mathematics, i.e., in geometry, because man knows all of the causes of 
the figures he produces. In fact, in his demonstration of his geometri­
cal knowledge, he thereby produces the cause ex nihilo. This is because 
geometry's elements are completely contained within the mind of man. "We 
are able to demonstrate geometrical propositions because we create them."®® 
However, the rest of the sciences are not in the same, seemingly 
privileged position. For example, Vico tells us "Were it possible for us 
to supply demonstrations of propositions of physics, we would be capable 
of creating them ex nihilo as well."®®
The fact is that although we have a useful hypothesis which meta­
physically explains the existence of matter and motion, we are not capable 
of demonstrating the particular propositions of physics by causes (in any 
absolute sense), for we are not capable of producing the elements of the 
"real" world out of nothing. If we could demonstrate the propositions of 
physics in the same way that we demonstrate the propositions of geometry, 
then the causes of the elements of the "real" world would be completely 
contained within our mind.
For Vico (as we will find it is not the case for Kant), this is 
absurd, for it results in our being able to completely produce nature.
To claim that the causes, i.e., the explanation, and therefore the possi­
bility of nature is mind is for Vico simply [too) extravagant.
(Actually, it is also [too] extravagant for Kant when he thinks of nature 
as Vico does, i.e., as a thing in itself.) Yet it is not extravagance 
alone which keeps Vico from following the totally subjectivists' route.
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His reasons seem to be rather realist in nature, i.e., quasi-Platonic.
He says:
Since human science owes its existence to abstraction, the more 
sciences are immersed in corporeal matter the less certainty 
have they. Thus mechanics is less certain than geometry and 
arithmetic, because it treats of motion, and of motion effectu­
ated in and through machines. Physics is less certain than 
mechanics, because it treats of the internal motion of centres, 
while mechanics treats of the external motion of circumferences.
And morals is still less certain than physics, because while the 
latter considers the internal motion of bodies, which belong to 
nature which is fixed and definite, the former investigates the 
motions of souls— motions the most abstruse, and which have their 
source largely in wilfulness which is unlimited. Besides, the 
things which are proved in physics are those to which we can 
perform something similar, and the views as to natural things 
which are universally received with the greatest admiration and 
approval are those to the support of which we can bring experi­
ments by which we so far imitate nature.®*
In any science other than mathematics, it is because of the 
adulteration of the ideas of the subject matter of that science with 
something corporeal that renders the causes of that subject matter in­
capable of being contained within our mind. Only God's mind could com­
pletely contain the causes of the subject matter of a science that invokes 
corporeality. Unlike man, God has created the corporeal elements, and 
therefore, his mind is not limited by them. God's mind, being infinite, 
contains all; man's mind, being finite, contains only fictions.
Yet, it is interesting to note that Vico sees these very limita­
tions of man's mind as having the following positive result. Knowledge 
will have degrees of certainty and truth. The status of the various sci­
ences will form a hierarchy according to a descending order of certainty 
and an ascending order of truth, and physics will be justified philosophic­
ally only if it is an "experimental" science.
According to Vico, the various sciences will contain various 
"mixtures" of truth and certainty. It is because of these various mixtures
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of truth and certainty that Vico sees his "maker's-knowledge criterion" 
producing a positive result for physics. Physics, in the end, must be 
seen as an "experimental" science. Why is this? In order to understand 
how Vico arrived at this idea, we must here examine more closely his no­
tions of truth and certainty.
Certainty, for Vico, is seen as the object of simple conscious­
ness, i.e., conscious awareness (coscienza). We can have complete aware­
ness, i.e., certainty, of those things that we can demonstrate completely. 
Truth, on the other hand, is seen as the object of science (Scienza). We 
can only achieve truth if we have composed the elements of the object in 
question. Truth without corporeality, such as in geometry, is abstract 
Truth with corporeality, i.e., the truth of the natural world, is real.
It goes without saying that both truth and certainty are necessary ideals 
for any science which claims to provide us with knowledge.
Now geometry, whose elements are completely made by us and is, 
therefore, totally demonstrable, will rank highest of the sciences in 
certainty. The assumption here is that we can be most certain about those 
things that are made by us completely. However, since the ideas of geome­
try are completely unadulterated with corporeality, geometry's figures 
cannot be thought of as real "trues” of this world. (In De Antiquissima 
Vico means by "verum" "the true" as in the transcendentals, that is to say 
that being, goodness, and beauty are all "true," i.e., they are all in­
telligible. This is opposed to "truth." Science's objective in De 
Antiquissima is, therefore, the true or plural, vera, the trues.) They 
are, rather, abstract trues, i.e., fictions (fittizie). Further, since 
all of the corporeal elements of the other traditional sciences are made
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by God, these elements are external to the mind of man. That is to say, 
they cannot be absolutely demonstrated, and therefore, they cannot be ab­
solutely known by man, which is to say that they cannot be known in the 
same manner that geometry can. Nevertheless, there is, as the last para­
graph in the above quotation indicates, knowledge in physics because there 
is something like demonstration involved in physics. Max Fisch describes 
Vico's account of this in the following manner:
. . .  he [Vico] finds something in physics that answers to 
demonstration in mathematics, namely experiment, lïhat is wanted 
in physics . . .  is not the deductive geometric method of 
Descartes but demonstration itself, which is inductive and which 
consists in "explaining particular effects in nature by particular 
experiments which are particular works of geometry." (184)
To say that we explain by experiments which "are particular works of
geometry" is not to say that geometry is also an experimental science.
It is instead to say that geometry lends certainty to experiment. In
modem terms we should describe this procedure as attempting to mathema-
tize our hypothesis into precise, manageable, formulae. Fisch interprets
these thoughts of Vico pragmatically:
. . .  to explain variations in natural phenomena, we vary our 
hypothesis and the experiments that are guided by them until 
we succeed in producing variations similar to those we are try­
ing to explain. Just as that which has the force of demonstra­
tion in mathematics is operation and construction, so, that 
which has the force of demonstration in physics is experiment, 
and what mathematics contributes to experiment, by way of 
mechanics, is definiteness of hypothesis and of experimental 
design and contrivance.®'*
The degree of certainty that man gets from an experimental sci­
ence like physics is not as high as that of geometry. This does not mean, 
however, that physics does not produce proofs, demonstrations, and knowl­
edge. Vico is saying, in effect, that we are still making but:
24
In physics those theories (ea meditate) are proven which allow 
us successfully to operate something similar to them: and the 
clearest and most commonly accept-d reasoning about natural 
things are supported by experiments in which we create imita­
tions of nature [ray emphasis].®®
Vico is fully aware that his'toker's-knowledge criterion"(and 
therefore, demonstrability itself) does not hold good in the same total 
way in physics as it does in geometry. In the case of geometry, the 
causes are completely contained in our mind. Since knowledge is the com­
position of those causes, we are, in geometry, like God. Our knowing is 
equal to our making. Since the "trues" of geometry are absolutely created 
by us, we can have absolute direct simple awareness, i.e., certainty, of 
them. But, it should be remembered, the abstract "trues" of geometry are 
not the real "trues" of the world of nature. The ideas of the science of 
geometry, since they are fictions, contain no trace of corporeality. They 
are, rather, "trues" which, by metaphysical hypothesis, are grounded in 
the real, corporeal world. One might think of them as real trues only of 
the "mathematical world," while they are abstract trues of the natural 
world. On the other hand, the knowledge of the world of nature that we 
gain from physics is possible because man, in his experiments, makes models 
of how he thinks nature behaves. In geometry the triangle, for example, 
is not seen as a model of some member of the real "mathematical world." 
Rather, the triangle is the member of the real "mathematical world." In 
mathematics the so-called model is the thing and to create the model is 
to create and thereby know the thing in the real "world of mathematics."
In physics, on the other hand, there are "genuine" models. This 
is to say that the model that is created in physics, i.e., our "experi­
mental hypothesis," is not a member of the real world of nature. It is.
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rather, a model of how some member or members of nature operate(s). In 
physics we get at the real truth (trues) of nature by experimentally 
demonstrating causes while relying on models. In physics, therefore, 
knowing is not the same as making. What we make is only a model of na­
ture whose elements, we hope, operate like our model. We must think of 
the world "as if" it were like our created model. By thinking of our 
models as being representative of nature, we can then demonstrate by 
causes and, therefore, have access to knowledge of nature.
However, because of the use of models, the knowledge that is 
gained in physics is partial only, i.e., it is not identical with "making" 
as was the case in geometry. Therefore, knowledge in physics is not 
totally certain. We are, for the most part, at the mercy of nature. As 
Fisch puts it:
That is, such quasi-truth or intelligibility as nature in part 
has for us, in spite of its being none of our making, lies in 
the control it exerts over our conjectures about it, as we as­
similate our makings to it in successive approximations, and 
the tools of this assimilation are mathematics and experiment.
It is precisely because of this difference between geometry and 
physics that Vico saw his "maker's-knowledge criterion" providing the im­
portant positive justification for the respective strong points of these 
two sciences. Both geometry and physics must be justified by the "maker's- 
knowledge criterion." In neither case can we have justifiable access to 
knowledge unless we can demonstrate by causes, i.e., in some sense, make 
the elements of the subject matter of that science. Further, it should 
not be thought that because physics and the rest of the traditional sci­
ences are only partially demonstrable (when compared to geometry) that 
they are, therefore, not truly sciences. Nor should it be thought that
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they somehow fail to give us knowledge. Vico's claim is just the 
opposite. That is to say that the knowledge we have in physics, for 
exançle, we have precisely because we have not totally created corporeal 
nature but have instead created experiments. In physics we know because 
we make and since what we make are experiments, our physics will be ex­
perimental. (This point will be important to keep in mind, especially in 
Chapter V, where we answer some critics' objections concerning Vico's 
scepticism in his knowledge of nature.) While geometry's strong point is 
its certainty, the strong point of physics and the traditional sciences 
is that they deal with real as opposed to abstract truth (trues). The 
real truth of the natural world can only be arrived at for man by the ex­
perimental method. "Let us conclude finally that it is not the geometric 
method that should be used in physics, but [experimental] demonstration 
itself."*?
There is, however, a price to be paid (when physics is justified 
by Vico's "maker's-knowledge criterion") for experimental physics. The 
price is that we gain access to real truth while, at the same time, for­
feiting the degree of certainty that we had obtained in geometry. However, 
Vico believes [that] this handicap, i.e., the loss of certainty, is really 
an asset. Certainty can only be achieved in those cases where the "maker's- 
knowledge criterion" functions in a "God-like" fashion. In man's sciences 
this means that certainty can only be achieved at the expense of real 
truth, i.e., knowledge of the particulars of nature. Therefore, Vico 
reasoned, since it is the job of physics to provide us with particular 
knowledge of nature, physics must strive to be unlike the mathematical 
sciences and experimental. Experiment does not totally deny our making.
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for it still remains true that we can only justify our [experimental] 
knowledge in physics because we have "made" the experiments which, in 
turn, provide us with the causes of that knowledge. It becomes clear 
that it is precisely in this give-and-take manner (i.e., giving up real 
truth and taking certainty and vice versa) in which Vico's "maker's- 
knowledge criterion" operates in relation to mathematics and physics 
that the positive justification for the sciences is demonstrated. The 
sciences will then line up in a descending order of certainty and an as­
cending order of real truth. One of the results of Vico's application 
of his criterion to physics is that only "experimental" physics (Vico 
clearly has Bacon in mind)' is justified philosophically.
Truth and Certainty in Be Antiquissima and The New Science
It has been pointed out by many commentators that Vico's notions 
of truth and certainty (especially as they are found in De Antiquissima') 
are not without ambiguity. They seem particularly confusing when placed 
alongside his treatment of them in his mature work The New Science. Be­
cause of this troublesome unclarity, various commentators have tried 
various ways of interpreting Vico in hopes of clarifying his meaning.
For example, in order to avoid this ambiguity Benedetto Croce has separated 
Vico's theory of knowledge into two distinct phases, that of De Ratione 
Studiorum and De Antiquissima and then that of The New S c i e n c e . In a 
similar vein Leon Pompa when speaking of De Antiquissima and The New Sci­
ence argues quite forcefully that the " . . .  kind of taxonomic scheme 
which arises from the theories contained in the two works is entirely 
different."®® And therefore, at very important points ". . . the theory 
of knowledge of the Scienza Nuova departs from the purely conventional
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theory of the De A n t i q u i s s i m a . Finally, Robert Flint in his early 
work on Vico has stated that in The Hew Science "Vico could not fail to 
perceive that there was thus another way of distinguishing truth from 
certainty than that which he adopted in the Metaphysics."^*
For the most part I am in agreement with the various points made 
by these commentators concerning the differences between Vico's early and 
mature theories of knowledge. One obvious reason that the notions of 
truth and certainty in these two works are particularly troublesome is 
that Vico himself never bothered to render them [particularly] clear. 
Nevertheless, what is clear is that the early De Antiquissima plays a 
foundational role for The Hew Science.All three of the above com­
mentators agree that the ground for Vico's "maker's-knowledge criterion" 
in The New Science is to be found in De Antiquissima.^^ However, in their 
pointing out the differences in these works (i.e., differences of epistemo- 
logical concern), the suggestion is that the foundation for Vico's ideas, 
specifically concerning truth and certainty in The New Science, is not to 
be found in De A n t i q u i s s i m a .It is with this point that I take issue.
What I should now like to argue is that the theory of knowledge 
in De Antiquissima can be plausibly interpreted to show that it already 
contained the seeds for the explicit synthesis of truth with certainty 
found in The New Science. That is of some import, for as we shall show 
in Chapter II, the synthesis of the concepts of truth and certainty is as 
fundamental to Vico's historicity thesis (i.e., the thesis that man's 
nature is somehow historical) in The New Science as is his "maker's- 
knowledge criterion." In fact, the synthesis of these concepts simply 
makes up the other side of that epistemological coin.
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Because of this relationship (i.e., it making up the other side 
of that epistemological coin), it would seem that the truth-certainty 
synthesis should have its beginnings in precisely the same place that 
the "maker's-knowledge criterion" does, namely in De Antiquissima. I 
should like, therefore, to suggest an interpretation of De 
Antiquissima which consists of relating and perhaps developing Vico's 
concept of certainty in conjunction with his concept of truth. I wish, 
therefore, to propose the following way of looking at Vico's early work:
Let us assume that for Vico any genuine science (e.g., geometry, mechanics, 
physics, etc.) will contain the three following concepts: (1) the concept
of a "maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth; (2) the concept of certainty; 
and (3) the concept of corporeality. (There is a sense in which even 
geometry will indirectly contain the concept of corporeality in that for 
geometry to be a "science" of the real world, it will need to make use of 
the "metaphysical points hypothesis" even though its primary elements are 
fictions and, as a result, it is [even if by analogy] related to the 
corporeal.) This is to say (1) that science must have a criterion by 
which it can secure itself from scepticism, (2) that it (science) must be 
more or less certain, and (3) that it must, in some way, relate to the 
natural corporeal world if it is to legitimize its claim to be "science."
In De Antiquissima we saw that Vico's criticism of Descartes 
rested to a large extent on the accusation that Descartes had erroneously 
accepted certainty as the criterion of [scientific] truth. Vico's view 
seemed to be that certainty is one thing, the true is another. He argued 
(rather polemically) that certainty could not possibly be the criterion 
of [scientific] truth because among other things although I am certain 
of my existence, it is obvious that I did not make my existence.
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On the other hand, as I pointed out earlier, it would surely be 
a mistaken interpretation to take Vico as saying that truth and certainty 
are actually imtually exclusive'. Surely we should be able to say that we 
can be certain about things that are true! In fact, as we shall see later 
in Chapter II, Vico himself points out in The New Science that because 
the common language of mankind in its entire history has always suggested 
such a relationship (i.e., of being certain of what is true), it would 
benefit philosophers in their pursuit of truth to make use of philology, 
which is the study of the certain.However, that claim is made twenty 
years later, and our problem presently is De Antiquissima.
It is my view that it would be a mistake to interpret Vico as 
saying (in De Antiquissima) that whenever one has truth one does not 
therefore have any certainty, just as it would be a mistake to read him 
as saying that whenever one has certainty, one therefore has truth. Vico's 
claim is simply this: the mind can have truth when the mind has made
truth. The mind cannot have truth when the mind has not made it. The 
mind has certainty, on the other hand, only when it has a direct, simple 
awareness of its activity. This certainty, however, is not science 
(scienza) but is instead conscious awareness (coscienza). Certainty is 
a fact of coscienza, and coscienza (unlike scienza) is not capable of 
demonstration by causes.^®
If we keep this (the above) in mind, we shall have no difficulty 
in thinking of the truth (i.e., the trues) of science and the certainty of 
consciousness as mutually compatible. That is to say, there is nothing 
contradictory in our being directly aware (i.e., having coscienza) of 
something that we have made, for example, having Scienza.
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The rather modest point that I am trying to make is that Vico's 
notions of truth and certainty in De Antiquissima can be plausibly inter­
preted (without distorting anything that he explicitly says there) to shew 
that when one has scientific truth one can also have certainty. There­
fore, it is my view that De Antiquissima can be plausibly viewed as the 
source of the idea (later explicitly stated in The New Science) that [in 
history] there is a necessary unity (i.e., a synthesis) of truth and 
certainty.
Let us here pause and review the problem which gives rise to my 
interpretation. It (the problem) most sharply presents itself when we 
try to understand the relation of truth to certainty (in De Antiquissima) 
vis à vis the various sciences. For example, in our examination of physics, 
it did seem to be the case that Vico was arguing the following: if we
have any knowledge of real truth, then we cannot be absolutely certain 
about that truth. His reasoning I took to be this: certainty, i.e.,
direct simple awareness (coscienza) can only be absolutely attained in 
those cases where we have completely, in some sense, made the thing. In 
physics, because of the necessary role played by corporeality, we only 
make models of the thing, not the thing itself. In physics, therefore, 
we do not have absolute certainty of the things themselves. Yet we do 
have some certainty to the degree that our models have been composed with 
the aid of that science of which we are absolutely certain (i.e., in the 
case where we have completely made, in some sense, the thing), namely 
mathematics.
On the other hand, when we take mathematics as our example sci­
ence, we find that although we have absolute certainty (for here our
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composition is the thing itself), we therefore do not have any real truth. 
We merely, instead, have abstract truth. In mathematics it is precisely 
because of the necessary absence of corporeality (directly) that we can 
have absolute certainty.
It is at this point that the problem becomes acute. Earlier, we 
had said that for Vico the aim of a "genuine" science is to know truth 
with certainty. At the same time, however, we see that this notion of 
a "genuine" science is not guaranteed in the two-paragon examples of 
physics and geometry. Further, it seemed clear that Vico's criticism of 
Descartes had traded on the very notion that when one has certainty, one 
does not thereby have truth. Hence, given what we have maintained was 
Vico's implicit notion of a "genuine" science, it seems (at the very 
least) that he must show that although the true and the certain are not 
to be identified, there must nevertheless exist a necessary unity between 
them.
The problem, therefore, is this: can we plausibly justify the
claim that De Antiquissima can be viewed as the source of the idea that 
there is a necessary unity of truth with certainty in spite of their hav­
ing been radically distinguished there? In other words, can Vico be read 
(in De Antiquissima) as saying that although certainty is one thing and 
(contra Descartes) truth another, truth and certainty are, nevertheless, 
necessarily unitable?
We cannot turn to De Antiquissima for an answer to this diffi­
culty, for Vico nowhere there addresses himself to it. Twenty years later 
in the second edition of his major work. The New Science, he will claim 
to have solved this problem by having synthesized truth with certainty.
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He says in that work that he . . reduces to certainty human choice 
which by its nature is most uncertain— which is as much to say it reduces 
philology to the form of a science.
Further (and this is quite important for our interpretation), in
his Autobiography written twenty-one years after De Antiquissima in the
third person, Vico does suggest that he was thinking of the synthesis of
truth with certainty in De Antiquissima. He tells us, in the Autobiography,
while speaking of this very problem:
By this insight Vico's mind arrived at a clear conception of what 
it had been vaguely seeking in the first inaugural orations and 
had sketched somewhat clumsily in the dissertation On The Method 
of the Studies of Our Time and a little more distinctly in the 
Metaphysics [De Antiguissima].
It seems clear from this statement that Vico thought of his ideas 
concerning this problem as having a developmental character. By the time 
The New Science was written the problem was solved. However, in that 
solution the polemic against Descartes is missing and a "new" subject 
matter, namely history, is introduced, bringing along with it a modifi­
cation of the old criterion of certainty. (The new criterion for cer­
tainty is the common sense of the human race, see N.S. #348.)
On the other hand, in De Antiquissima the problem had only just 
arisen. It came about because Descartes' theory of truth, which was based 
on the certainty of consciousness, had to be refuted, while geometry, the 
paradigm of sciences, demanded that whatever the criterion of truth, cer­
tainty must somehow be included.
Once again, our specific difficulty is this: Can we view the
relation of truth to certainty within the context of De Antiquissima as
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one which is able to provide a consistent ground for the explicit
synthesis of these concepts in The Wet/ Science? This is not to say that
truth and certainty raust be seen in De Antiquissima as explicitly synthe­
sized or even that the concept of certainty must retain totally the same
meaning in the two works. All that is required is to show that the syn­
thesis of these concepts in The Wcw Science can be viewed in such a way 
as to suggest the developmental character of the concepts developing 
from an earlier use made of them (or aspects of them) in De Antiquissima, 
without contradiction.
Robert Flint in his book on Vico suggests that this cannot be
done. Flint says that Vico in restricting:
. . . the sphere of truth . . . widens that of certainty, and 
to the sphere of certainty ho relegates all truths which he deems 
incapable of demonstrative proof, but which he believes are to be 
accepted on tlic authority of the individual or the common con­
sciousness of divine or liiurian testimony . . . His certainties are 
therefore, from one point of view, just truths to which he calls 
the criterion of truth does not apply, and for which he finds 
other criteria in consciousness and common sense.’®
Although Flint's account of the relation of truth to certainty is designed
to argue for the conflict of the theory of De Antiquissima with that of
The Wet/ Science, I believe that the solution to our difficulty is to be
found within his basic insight.
The solution is simply this: we should view Vico's notion of
certainty (i.e., Flint's "truths" of coscienza) in De Antiquissima as a 
necessary element of "genuine" scientific truth. This is to say that I 
propose that wo think of the notion of a "genuine" scientific truth (which 
I earlier attributed to Vico) as being incomplete if it does not contain 
any "IruUut" of co.scionza. Once again, this is not to say that if one has 
coscicnza of something that one therefore will have scientific truth. It
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is rather to say that if one has scientific truth, one will therefore 
have some degree of certainty (coscienza).
If we view the relation of truth to certainty in this way, we 
shall also avoid the problem pointed out by Flint that Vico's . . cer­
tainties are therefore . . . just truths to which what he calls the cri­
terion of truth does not apply . . ."®*' For what we are suggesting is 
that in Be Antiquissima (although he nowhere explicitly says this) Vico's 
criterion of truth is by itself simply incomplete. Our interpretation 
argues that the "maker's-knowledge criterion" alone cannot produce "genu­
ine" scientific truth. It must, therefore, be aided by Flint's so-called 
"truths" of consciousness, i.e., certainty (coscienza). It should be 
noted that Flint's choice of the word "truth" here is unhappy, for these 
so-called "truths" of consciousness cannot by themselves (given Vico's 
criterion) possibly constitute knowledge. This is because they do not 
allow us any information concerning the particular subject matter's 
genesis, i.e., its causes. Hence, Flint's use of this word "truth" is at 
best misleading. (The criterion for something being certain is merely its 
accessibility to the common consciousness of our individual affirmation, 
nothing more.*^ In this definition of certainty there is no mention of 
"truths" of any kind.)
The certain, which is an awareness of those things not demon­
strated by causes, can nevertheless be viewed as a necessary feature of 
scientific truth. It is necessary because it helps us decide whether or 
not to accept something as a scientific truth. That is to say, if I neces­
sarily could not be certain of a proposed truth of science, surely that 
would be good reason to suspect it as a candidate.
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Another way of making our point is to say that in De Antiquissina 
the "maker*s-knowledge criterion" could have, and perhaps should have, 
been synthesized with the criterion of certainty (i.e., the appeal to 
consciousness) in order that "scientific truth" might have been adequately 
grounded. No such synthesis ever took place. However, our claim is that 
it would not have been inconsistent if it had. In other words, our claim 
is that Vico says nothing in De Antiquissima that explicitly contradicts 
his argument in The Dew Science, In De Antiquissima Vico only tells us 
that to have truth we must make the object and that certainty does not 
guarantee the possession of knowledge of the object. This is because cer­
tainty is only conscious awareness.*^
Now R. Flint has viewed these early claims of Vico as inconsist­
ent with those of The New Science. Flint sees the theory of knowledge 
of De Antiquissima to be in conflict with the thesis of The New Science 
and that, therefore, Vico had to rework the notions of truth and certainty 
to achieve consistency. "Vico could not fail to perceive that there was 
thus another way of distinguishing truth from certainty then that which 
he adopted in the Metaphysics."®^ It is Flint's contention that Vico
. . .  By brooding over the comingled truths and errors which 
have been indicated . . . brought forth the idea of a general 
development of human thought from consciousness to science,
from authority to reason [in The New Science].®"*
We have argued, contrary to Flint, that Vico's early work can be 
seen to form part of one consistent theory in its relation to The New 
Science. This is not to say that there isn't a prima facie conflict. It 
is to say rather that the conflict arises only if we assume that the 
earlier theory was fully and completely developed. We have argued that
it was not. The result is that we had to attribute to Vico an implicit
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notion of "genuine" scientific truth. With this notion we could then 
show that the theory of De Antiquissima can be viewed as consistent with 
the synthesis of truth with certainty twenty years later in The New Sci­
ence. Finally, I should argue that this is a desirable way to interpret 
Vico for two reasons. First, Vico himself makes no reference to this 
(i.e., Flint's alleged conflict of the two works, but instead tells us 
that his " . . .  mind arrived at a clear conception of what it had . . . 
sketched . . .  in the Metaphysics."®® Secondly, this interpretation pre­
serves the force of Vico's criticism against Descartes (i.e., that cer­
tainty is not the criterion for truth) while it (at the same time) argues 
for the developmentally consistent nature of Vico's theory of knowledge. 
(Flint's interpretation, e.g., preserves the arguments against Descartes 
but argues that Vico's thought in De Antiquissima is inconsistent with 
that of The New Science.)
The result is the following: "genuine" scientific truth must be
made and must be more or less certain, i.e., it must have some degree of 
certainty. (It also must be related, somehow, to the "real" world, either 
directly or indirectly.) These truths, therefore, will be capable of 
being affirmed by our individual common consciousness. This is to say 
(in Flint's language) that the so-called "truths" of conscienza must help 
to make up the truths of scienza. Without the truths of coscienza, the 
truths of scienza will be incapable of commanding assent. On the other 
hand, without the truths of scienza the truths of coscienza will be merely 
subjective certainties based on our individual consciousness, producing no 
knowledge whatsoever.®®
Twenty years later in The New Science Vico will explicitly argue 
that the idea of a "genuine" science (whose idea itself we can know because
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we have made it) can only be that which synthesizes truth with certainty.®^ 
It is our belief that the seeds of this synthesis were already sown in De 
Antlquissiaa.
With this interpretation in mind we are now in a better position 
to understand the full meaning of Vico's "maker's-knowledge criterion" in 
its relation to the sciences of geometry, physics, and morals. We said 
earlier that the ranking of the various sciences follows a descending 
order of certainty and (concerning geometry and physics) an ascending 
order of "real" truth. The ideal of knowledge is to have complete cer­
tainty necessarily united with complete real truth. But (in De Antiquissima 
only God has this. Man comes closest to this ideal in his mathematical 
sciences in which he has complete certainty and complete abstract truth.
This is because man can be consciously aware of completely making the 
elements of the mathematical world.
When we come to physics, however, we find that the truth and 
certainty arrangement of mathematics changes in opposite degrees. In 
physics we move from abstract to real truth. However, since we did not 
make the real elements of nature but only models of them, our certainty 
will correspondingly change. It cannot now be as great when our concern 
is the real elements of the physical world. This is to say that in physics 
we are more or less certain of what nature is "like."
Thus, two things seem clear in Vico's early theory of knowledge: 
first, the "maker's-knowledge criterion" is directly responsible for the 
truth status and indirectly responsible for the certainty status of the 
various sciences. It is directly responsible for truth in that only by 
making can we have access to truth. (Therefore, concerning truth Descartes
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is wrong.) It is indirectly responsible for certainty, on the other hand, 
in that we are more certain to the degree that we have done more of the 
making and likewise Jess certain where there has been less making on our 
part.®® Nevertheless, in our interpretation both truth and certainty are 
needed for what we have called "genuine" scientific truth. Secondly, the 
"maker*s-knowledge criterion" will be seen as justifying the Baconian in­
ductive method over the Cartesian deductive method as the correct proce­
dure for the natural sciences to follow.®® It follows as a necessary re­
sult of the use of this so-called inductive method that none of the 
traditional sciences, although attaining some certainty, will be able to 
produce absolute certainty (as in geometry) in conjunction with real truth. 
This is because complete or absolute certainty is seen to be incompatible 
with induction, and induction provides real truth. (Vico claims here to 
be following Bacon's method which deals with probabilities.) Nevertheless, 
the knowledge that we do attain will be justified by the "maker*s- 
knowledge criterion."
As we pointed out above, Vico viewed the traditional sciences as 
forming a hierarchy of certainty. First came mathematics in which we are 
completely aware of all of our making; next mechanics where we are less 
aware, then physics, and finally the least certain of all (because of its 
individuality and inability to be formalized) morals. The place in the 
hierarchy obtained by morals (which includes the historiographical sci­
ences) was at the very bottom because science (so it was believed at the 
time and perhaps still is) is concerned with only that which is universal.®® 
History, therefore, could not be a science, for the very nature of the 
enterprise is to investigate only the particular (i.e., the particular
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deeds of particular men). In De Antiquissima, therefore, Vico joins 
voices with a long tradition of thinkers who had held that history could 
not properly be considered a science.®*
In the next twenty years, Vico's views on this subject go through
a fundamental change. The change reaches fruition in his major work The
New Science. In this work because of his discovery of a "new world" which
he had not thought of in De Antiquissima, Vico now divorces himself from
the tradition. He tells us
But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest 
antiquity so remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal 
and never failing light of a truth beyond all question: that
the world of civil society has certainly been made by men . . .
and . . . the world of nations, a civil world, which, since 
men made it, men could come to know.®^
Now, in addition to the "world" of mathematics and the "world" 
of nature found in De Antiquissima, we have in The New Science a third 
"world," namely the civil "world" of men. Now, Vico wishes to add to the 
science of mathematics and the science of physics a "new science of
humanity which will be able to produce both absolute certain and real
knowledge. Vico wishes in this new work to do what he (and the tradition 
had considered impossible), i.e., to show that history, the story of the 
particular, can in fact be a science.
To this end he will make us of a new "metaphysical art" of 
criticism which will methodologically involve the use of Topics instead 
of (the Cartesian use of) Critics. The criterion of certainty used in 
the "new art" will be the "... common sense of the human race determined 
by the necessary harmony of human institutions, . . ."®® The criterion of 
truth will remain, as it was in De Antiquissima, the "maker's-knowledge 
criterion." We shall see that in his new work Vico is still formally
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dealing with the same kinds of problems that he was in De Antiquissima.
That is, in The New Science he again attempts to show how it is that the 
"maker's-knowledge criterion" functions in relation to certainty and 
truth. Although the application of the "maker's-knowledge criterion" to 
the civil "world" produces qualitatively different results (i.e., from 
those of geometry or physics), the foimal character of the epistemologi- 
cal problems involved remains the same.®"*
The main qualitative differences (arising from the application 
of the "maker's-knowledge criterion" to human affairs) are twofold. First, 
in The New Science man will be able to achieve complete "God-like" knowl­
edge. That is to say that in his knowledge of the historical world man 
will be able to acquire both absolute certainty and real truth. Second, 
the "maker's-knowledge criterion" (when applied to the moral-historical 
world) will now result in a demonstration of man's own teleological self- 
development. This is to say that by gaining "genuine" scientific knowl­
edge of human history, man becomes aware of the various modes in and 
through which he has made himself human. Therefore, historical knowledge 
necessarily becomes self-knowledge. In order to understand these epistemic 
notions of "maker's-knowledge" and teleology in Vico's new science, we 
shall now trace out these (above) different results.
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Arts, 1965). The citation is from p. 23. Hereafter referred to as 
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*^Max Fisch has succinctly stated this argument in his essay "Vico and 
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"ce Antiquissima, p. 68.
Antiquissima, pp. 72-74.
Antiquissima, p. 62.
*^The entire essay is anti-Cartesian in tone as was most of Vico's early 
work. See Study Methods.
'^Descartes, for example, tells us: "That is why I consider that I shall
not be acting amiss, if, taking the set purpose a contrary belief, I allow 
myself to be deceived, and for a certain time pretend that all these 
opinions are entirely false and imaginary . . . "  Haldane and Ross, The 
Philosophical Works of Descartes (London: Cambridge University Press,
1972), Vol. I. p. 148.
'®0f course, it is irrelevant whether Descartes actually ignored the sceptics' 
questions or if he actually confused certainty with truth. What is at
issue for us is what Vico took to be Descartes' errors.
^®". . . la scienza e la conoscenza delle cause da cui nasce la cosa." De 
Antiquissima, pp. 72-74.
^^As Vico puts it:
But the sceptic does not doubt that he thinks; indeed, he professes 
himself as sure of it as if he were [literally] seeing it . . . 
nor does he doubt that he exists . . . However, he maintains that
his certainty is not knowledge but consciousness, a common
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cognition found even in the unlearned . . . not a rare and 
exquisite truth such as to require for its discovery a medita­
tion by such a great philosopher [as Descartes]. For to know 
means to possess the genus or form by which the thing is made: 
but consciousness is of those things of which we are notable 
to demonstrate the genus or form."
De Antiquissima, p. 72. Here I have used the translation of Leon Pompa, 
Vico: A Study of the "New Science," (London: Cambridge University Press,
1975), footnote, p. 78. Vico's idea is that knowledge (i.e., scienza) is 
consciousness (i.e., conoscenza) of the genus or form or mode by which it 
was made, i.e., its cause. However, one can be conscious of something 
without being conscious of its genus, or form, or mode, i.e., the cause
by which it was made. In this latter case one does not have scienza,
only conoscenza.
^^Haldane and Ross, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. II, p. 43. 
^’Ibid., p. 41.
^“Ibid., Vol. I, p. 158.
Antiquissima, p. 72.
^^De Antiquissima, p. 74.
^^Ibid., p. 72. "Ma lo scettico non dubita di pensare . . . non dubita di 
essere . . . "  etc.
^®Flint, Vico, p. 92. De Antiquissima, pp. 72-74.
^^Flint, p. 90. Also see in the same passage :
That I think is not the cause but the sign of my being a mind,
and a sign is not a cause. A sceptic of sense and discretion 
will not deny the certainty of signs, but he will deny the cer­
tainty of causes.
^°Flint, p. 106 (De Antiquissima, p. 74).
Flint, p. 90 (De Antiquissima, p. 68).
. . a conoscere quel modo in cui compone gli elementi, fa la cosa."
De Antiquissima, p. 62.
^^Flint, p. 87 (De Antiquissima, p. 62).
Antiquissima, p. 62 (see footnote 12 above).
^®This notion becomes clarified later in The New Science (see paragraph #331, 
N.S.). ". . . principles are therefore to be found within the modifica­
tions of our own human mind."
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^®Flint, p. 88 [De Antiquissima, pp. 64-66):
Thus to illustrate this by examples it has dissected man into 
body and soul, and soul into intellect and will; and it has 
selected, or, as it is termed, abstracted from the body figure
and movement, and from these as from all other things, it has
drawn being and unity.
” Flint, p. 87.
®^'*. . . the wisdom of God, in which are contained the ideas of all things,
and therefore the elements of all ideas, the Word; seeing that in it
truth is identical with the comprehension of all the elements which com­
pose the universe." Flint, p. 87 (De Antiquissima, p. 64).
^^The New Science, paragraph 376.
. . in thinking an object [God], who not only can never be an object 
of intuitions to us but cannot be an object of sensible intuition even 
to himself, we are careful to remove the conditions of time and space 
from his intuition— for all his knowledge must be intuition, and not 
thought, which always involves limitations." B71, Critique of Pure 
Reason.
‘‘Flint, p. 87 (_De Antiquissima, p. 68).
'*^ The New Science, paragraph 331
. . human science owes its existence to abstraction." Flint, p. 90 
(De Antiquissima, p. 68).
P-ompa, Leon, Vico, p. 79 (De Antiquissima, p. 68).
‘*^De Antiquissima, Chapter IV, part 2, pp. 84-94, ". . . per ipotesi sul 
punto metafisico," titled I Punti Metafisic E I Conati.
‘*®See, for example. The New Science, paragraphs 163, 359, and 499. See also 
Leon Pompa's translation: "In physics those theories (ea raeditata are
proven which allow us successfully to operate something similar to them: 
and the clearest and most commonly accepted reasonings about natural things 
are those supported by experiments in which we create imitations of nature." 
(Vico, p. 80 footnote, and De Antiquissima, p. 68).
'*’8147, Critique of Pure Reason. We later learn that for Kant the status 
of those things that make up the world of nature are governed by necessary 
laws of combination which prescribe " . . .  laws to nature, and even of mak­
ing nature possible (8160). The difference between Kant and Vico is that, 
for Kant, since the world of nature is also made by man (i.e., "However 
exaggerated and absurd it may sound, to say that the understanding is it­
self the source of the laws of nature, and so of its formal unity, such 
an assertion is nonetheless correct. . ." A127), he does not have Vico's
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immediate problem of grounding human maker's knowledge in the real world.
He must simply relate one's "making" (i.e., mathematics) to another 
(physics). In the first Critique man's abstractions are the world, in 
Kant's special sense of "world," namely the world of appearance. The 
"real" world, i.e., things in themselves, need only be "negatively" ac­
knowledged in order for us to be "affected" and thereby "presented" with 
something.
By applying the "maker's-knowledge criterion" even to the world of nature 
(i.e., appearance), Kant has seemingly bridged the gulf between man's ab­
stractions and reality. However, the cost of this bridge is paid for in 
transcendental idealist coin; i.e., nature, although empirically real, is 
transcendentally ideal. This notion is foreign to the thinking of Vico.
In the third Critique and in the Prolegomena Kant finally attempts to 
ground man's maker's knowledge (of nature) in the real (i.e., noumenal) 
world. He does so by using a "God/man maker's-knowledge analogy" argu­
ment, as did Vico. That is, Kant argues that there is a supreme under­
standing who has "made" the world of noumena just as our understanding 
has "made" the world of phenomena. God's understanding "makes" intui­
tively while ours "makes" discursively. Our phenomena will correspond 
to the noumena, although with merely this "metaphysical assumption" (i.e., 
the "God/man maker's-knowledge analogy"), we may never have "theoretical" 
knowledge of such a correspondence. (See, for example, the passages A2S1/ 
A252 and B30S/B309, Critique of Pure Reason.)
'*®". . . La dimostrazione si identifies cosi con I'operazione e il vero col 
fatto." (My translation. De Antiquissima, p. 82.)
**De Antiquissima, p. 84.
sopisch. Max, "Vico and Pragmatism," in Giambattista Vico: An International 
Symposium, ed. Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Hayden V. White (Baltimore, Maryland: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), p. 410.
®^This Vichian point is parallel to a Kantian one, namely that geometrical 
figures and physical objects share the same mathematical space, i.e., the 
space of Euclidian geometry. In Kant's case, the mathematical objects 
are constructed by us as are, to a large extent, the "physical" objects.
For Vico, the physical objects, in a sense, construct themselves. God 
creates his metaphysical points with a "built-in" drive, i.e., conatus, 
for developing themselves into objects. " . . .  the point which is not 
extended gives birth to extension" (Flint, p. 120). Also, see all of 
Part 2, Chapter IV of De Antiquissima, pp. 84-94. It is clear that Vico's 
doctrine of "metaphysical points" works hand and glove with his "maker's- 
knowledge criterion." The conatus which underlies the metaphysical points 
is actually God's thought. That is to say that it is God's thought that 
actually sustains matter. Since God's thought creates and sustains the 
natural world, he knows it.
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^^"Descartes, che alla maniera degli analitici concepisce la materia come 
creata e la divide, non si accorge di questa verita," (De Antiquissima, 
p. 92).
"Flint, p. 118.
^‘Fisch, "Vico and Pragmatism," p. 411.
®®De Antiquissima, p. 92 (my translation).
"Ibid.
®^De Antiquissima, p. 124.
®®The parallels between Vico's and Kant's doctrines are quite remarkable.
For example, not only do both Vico and Kant use the "maker's-knowledge 
criterion" to ground their respective "new sciences," but they also do 
so in very similar ways. In both philosophers there is an "intelligible 
world" that is made by a God who knows it through intellectual intuition, 
and a corresponding world which is made by man who can, therefore, know 
it by discursive reasoning. Vico's claim is that there is an intelli­
gible world, i.e., the metaphysically "real" which is made and, therefore, 
known by God, and which corresponds to the world known by man, i.e., the 
world that man's mathematical and physical sciences are demonstrations 
of. (An important difference between Vico and Kant is that Vico does 
not claim that we "make" nature per se.) For example, Vico says "Geometry 
takes from metaphysics the virtue of extension, which, because the virtue 
of extension is prior to extension, and is consequently unextended. In 
like manner, arithmetic takes from metaphysics the virtue of number, 
namely the unit, which being virtue of number is not a number." Flint, p. 
120 (De Antiquissima, p. 86). Also see Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 
"Doubtless, indeed, there are intelligible entities corresponding to the 
sensible entities." (B309).
®®study .Methods, p. 23 (De nostri, p. 803 " . . .  dimostriamo le cose 
geometriche perche le facciamo.").
^^Studg Methods, p. 23 (De nostri, p. 802)
®^Flint, p. 90 (De Antiquissima, pp. 66-68). Kant in the Dissertation of 
1770 had a similar notion of "abstraction," see, for example, paragraph 6 
of the Dissertation.
"Therefore, when man starts inquiring into the nature of things, he be­
comes aware that it is uterly impossible for him to attain it. This im­
possibility id due to the fact that he does not possess in his mind the 
elements of which things are made, and, furthermore, to the fact that 
the powers of his intellect are limited. The totality of objects is ex­
ternal to his senses. Nevertheless, man succeeds in turning a shortcoming 
of his mind into an advantage. By means of that operation which goes by 
the name of abstraction, he fashions two terms: the point, which can be
noted, and the unit, which is susceptible to multiplication. Both are
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fictitious entities, figvaents. If you note down the point, it is no 
longer a point, if you multiply the unit, it is no longer a unity. 
Furthermore, man took it upon himself to proceed from these two principles 
ad infinitum, so as to prolong the line unlimitedly and so as to repeat 
the unit innumerable times. And in this fashion (hos pacto) he was able 
to construct a certain world of his own, such a world as he was able to 
contain, in its entirety, within himself. Thus, by prolonging, shorten­
ing, or combining lines, by adding up or substracting or calculating num­
bers, man was able to accomplish countless operations. It is evident 
that he had cognizance, within himself, of infinite truths." De 
Antiquissima, p. 66. Translated by Antonio Corsano in "Vico and Mathe­
matics," Vico Symposium, 1969, p. 433 footnote, [my emphasis]
®^Fisch, "Vico and Pragmatism," Symposium, p. 409.
^"Ibid.
Pompa, Leon, Vico, p. 80 (De Antiquissima, p. 68). Here again man's 
model-making is thought of as analogous to God's in that "The archetypal 
forms, the ideal patterns of reality exist in God alone. The physical 
nature of things, the phenomenal world, is modeled after those archetypes.” 
Study Methods, p. 23 (De Nostri, p. 802). It seems clear that Vico sees 
the world of nature as a kind of mediation point between the mind of man 
and the Divine mind.
®®Fisch, Symposium, p. 409.
Pompa, p. 80 (^ De Antiquissima, p. 124).
®®Croce, Benedetto, The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, tran. R. G. 
Collingwood (London: Howard Latimer, Ltd.), Chapters I and II.
®®Porapa, p. 81 (see also pp. 82-83).
^“ibid., p. 157, footnote 2.
’‘Flint, p. 96.
’’Some authors, e.g., Guido Fasso, have argued that the actual synthesis of 
the "true" with the "certain" first explicitly appears in Vico's Dritto 
Universale, Vico's Science of Humanity, ed. Tagliacozze and Verene, p. 8. 
The entire essay is very informative. However, I am only concerned with 
showing that the synthesis of the "true" with the "certain" can be seen 
to have had its foundation in the essay written ten years earlier, i.e..
De Antiquissima.
’’For example, see Croce, pp. 28-29; and Flint, pp. 96-97; and Pompa, pp. 
72-75.
Croce, pp. 22-24; Flint, pp. 99-101; and Pompa, pp. 81-85.
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New Science, paragraphs 138, 139, and 140.
^®"In fact, having a science of something signifies that one can, in 
principle, possess the -enus or form by which the thing was made; on the 
other hand, to have consciousness of a thing only, refers to precisely 
those things whose genus or form we cannot demonstrate." "Infatti avere 
scienza significa possedere il genere, o forma del farsi della cosa; in- 
vece 1'avere coscienza si riferisce a quelle cose di cui non possiamo 
dimostrare il genere o forma." (My translation, Di Antiquissima, p. 72)
^^The New Science, paragraph 390.
Autobiography of Giambattista Vico, tran. Max Harold Fisch and Thomas 
Goddard Bergin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1953), p. 156.
” Flint, p. 95.
®*Ibid.
®^ ". . . coscienza, una cognizione comune, accessibile, . . . cosi, ci 
accade spesso nella vita practica di chiamare la coscienza a testimonio 
di affermazione." . . the certain, i.e., consciousness is a common 
thinking, something ascertainable in everyday life, known, i.e. called 
to mind, through individual witnessing or testimony." (My non-literal 
translation. De Antiquissima, p. 72). See also The New Science, para­
graph 145.
. . certezza di pensare e coscienza, non scienza, . . . "  (De 
Antiquissima, p. 72).
” Flint, p. 96.
®-lbid., p. 97.
^^Autobiography, p. 156.
®®Once again Vico's "maker's-knowledge criterion" leads him t.. make distinct­
ions which parallel distinctions found inKant. Kant tells us there are, 
on the one hand, judgments of experience (the truths of science in Vico), 
and, on the other, judgments of perception (Vico's truths of coscienza). 
Kant tells us "The latter require no pure concept of the understanding." 
Prolegomena, p. 55-56.
®’See "Seven Principal Aspects" of The New Science, p. 121. Especially note 
the Second Principal Aspect, "Philosophy of Authority." (paragraph 386).
®®"E cosi la scienza e la conoscenza del genere o modo in cui la cosa fa; 
per mezza di essa la mente, al tempo stesso in cui viene a conoscere quel 
modo in cui compone gli elementi, fa la cosa." ". . .at the same time 
in which the mind comes to know the mode of the thing it composes the 
elements and makes the thing." (My translation and emphasis. De 
Antiquissima, p. 62)
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®®"Concludiajno infine osservando che non si deve introdurre nella fisica 
il metodo geometrico, ma la diretta dimostrazione sperimentale." (De 
Antiquissima, p. 124)
®°Morals, for Vico, was that area of study that was concerned with human 
choice. The people who study the institutions that depend on human choice 
are philologists (which includes the historians). See paragraphs 7 and 
139 of The New Science. That which makes Morals so uncertain is the 
unlawlike behaviour of a being, i.e., a human, which has free will.
Actions coming from a being with free will are too individual to be made 
universal and demonstrable.
"And morals is still less certain than physics, because while the latter 
considers the internal motions of bodies, which belong to nature which is 
fixed and definite, the former investigates the motions of souls-motions 
the most abstruse, and which have their source largely in wilfulness, which 
is unlimited." (Flint, p. 90, De Antiquissima, p. 68)
®*For example, Aristotle tells us when speaking of history and poetry 
respectively, ". . .  the one describes the thing that has been, and the 
other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is something more 
philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are 
of the nature rather of universels, whereas those of history are singu­
lars." (On Poetics, Chapter IX, 1451b)
And Descartes says, ". . . even the most accurate of histories, if they 
do not exactly misrepresent or exaggerate the value of things in order to 
render them more worthy of being read, at least omit in them all the cir­
cumstances which are basest and least notable; and from this fact it fol­
lows that what is retained is not portrayed as it really is." (Discourse 
on the Method, p. 85, Haldane and Ross, Vol I)
And finally, Vico himself in his third Inaugural Oration, while still 
under the influence of the Cartesian philosophy, chides his fellow human­
ists by saying, "You boast, philologist, of knowing everything about the 
furniture and clothes of the Romans, of being more intimate with the 
streets, tribes, and quarters of Rome than with those of your own city; 
why this pride? You know no more than did a potter, a cook, a cobbler, 
a summoner, an auctioneer in Rome." Quoted from Isaiah Berlin's Vico 
and Herder; Two Studies in the History of Ideas (New York: Vintage Books,
1977), p. 18.
^^The New Science, paragraph 331.
®^Ibid., paragraph 348.
®‘*For example, concerning the "maker's-knowledge criterion," Vico in The 
New Science says, "For the first indubitable principle posited above [331] 
is that this world of nations has certainly been made by men, and its 
guise must therefore be found within the modifications of our own human 
mind." (paragraph 349)
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And concerning certainty he tells us his "new method," " . . .  reduces to 
certainty human choice, which by its nature is most uncertain— which is 
as much as to say that it reduces philology to the form of a science." 
(paragraph 390)
Concerning "real" truth he says, "Now as geometry, when it constructs the 
world of quantity out of its elements, or contemplates that world, is 
creating it for itself, just so does our Science, but with a reality 
greater by just so much as the institutions having to do with human af­
fairs are more real than points, lines, surfaces, and figures are." 
(paragraph 349)
And finally, concerning the distinction between God's maker's knowledge 
and man's, the same lines are again drawn in The New Science; however, 
the change in subject matter, i.e., from geometry to history, produces 
the following heretical claim: "Indeed, we make bold to affirm that he
who meditates this Science narrates to himself this ideal eternal history 
so far as he himself makes it for himself, . . . And this very fact is an 
argument, 0 reader, that these proofs are a kind divine and should give 
thee a divine pleasure, since in God knowledge and creation are one and 
the same things." (paragraph 349)
CHAPTER II 
VICO AND HISTORY
We have seen in Chapter I that Vico in De Antiquissima held that 
the only criterion of truth which could withstand the attacks of the 
sceptics was a "maker's-knowledge criterion." We saw also that truth was 
divided into two kinds, abstract and real. That which marked the real 
from the abstract was that element of corporeality which makes up the 
"world of nature." Vico had contrasted man's maker's knowledge to God's 
by showing that God could have absolute certainty and complete real truth, 
whereas man at best could have only absolute certainty or partial real 
truth.
Twenty years later in The New Science (Vico's mature work in the - - 
philosophy of history) we find that the criterion of truth is still the 
"maker's-knowledge criterion."' Truth is again divided into two kinds, 
namely abstract and real. Abstract truth continues to be thought of as 
the kind man makes completely, and it continues to remain a fiction, e.g., 
in the case of geometry.^ However, we now notice a fundamental change in 
Vico's conception of "science"— a change which carries with it a correspond­
ing change in his conception of "real truth."
In this new work Vico narrows his conception of science such that 
the only subjects capable of absolute scientific demonstration are those 
which can be known in the manner in which God is said to know. God's know­
ing requires that there be complete knowledge of all the causes of the
S2
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object in question. Further, God's knowing brings about the existence of 
the object in the very act of knowing it. Because of this new conception 
of absolute demonstration, the "world of nature" becomes (in this absolute 
sense only) "scientifically" unknowable to man. Now, in The New Science 
Vico laments the fact that in the past philosophers should have " . . .  bent 
all of their energies to the study of the world of nature, which since God 
made it. He alone can have science of it."^ (It is important here to note 
that Vico is not saying that nature simply cannot be known; he is instead 
saying that man cannot know nature in the same manner as God knows nature, 
i.e., absolutely.)
With the world of nature excluded, the only subjects left that may 
be worthy of the term "science" (in that they may be known in the same man­
ner as God knows) are the worlds of mathematics and history. In fact it 
is just this feature (i.e., "God-like" knowing) that Vico points to as the 
unique similarity that allows these two subjects to be sciences. He says 
that his new science of history is like geometry in that just as geometry 
when . . it constructs the world of quantity out of its elements, or 
contemplates that world, is creating it for itself, just so does our Sci­
ence create for itself the world of nations . .
The principles of the new science will allow historians to re­
create the elements of the civil world in such a way that the historical 
world is "created for itself" in the same manner that the geometrician 
creates the geometrical world for itself, i.e., completely. Yet there is 
one fundamental difference. Vico tells us that the creation of the his­
torian, i.e., the history of the civil world, is one which is "more real" 
than the creation of the geometrician. The historian's civil world contains
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" . . .  a reality greater [my emphasis] by just so much as the institutions 
having to do with human affairs are more real than [my emphasis] points, 
lines, surfaces, and figures are."®
Now in order for us to understand how Vico's "maker's-knowledge 
criterion" functions in The New Science, it will be necessary for us to 
understand precisely what is meant by the idea that the history of the 
civil world has a "greater reality" and is "more real" than the mathemati­
cal world. Undoubtedly, Vico wishes to point out, among other things, 
that the historian's science of the world of nations, in some sense, 
deals with "real truth," whereas the mathematician's science deals only 
with "abstract truth." Our problem, however, is to understand precisely 
what Vico has in mind by his use of the phrase "more real."
Since Vico nowhere explicitly addresses himself to this issue 
, (i.e., what it means to say that "institutions having to do with human af­
fairs are 'more real' than geometry."), we shall have to resort to inter­
pretation. In the first part of this chapter, therefore, I shall sketch 
two distinct lines of interpretation that one might opt for and then as­
sess the merits of each. I shall then offer a third line of interpreta­
tion which I think incorporates the best suggestions of the previous two 
while it excludes their particular deficiencies. These first two lines 
of thought I shall label realist and idealist versions respectively. It 
may be noted that I am not interested whether, in fact, any realist or 
idealist actually holds the views that I here put forward concerning Vico. 
My aim and, therefore, my only concern is to distinguish these two distinct 
interpretations from each other. I use these labels, therefore, for their 
suggestive value and as a matter of convenience for that purpose.
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Let us begin with the realist version. The realist would argue 
that Vico's work. The New Science, is an historical account of human in­
stitutions. In it he gives us the principles, both philosophical and 
historical, of how a valid method of historical investigation (through 
which we are able to gain complete certain knowledge of human institutions) 
is to proceed. He tells us that we must "Compare the institutions with 
one another and observe the order by which those are now bom in their
proper time and places . . .."® Thus, The New Science is in effect one
sustained " . . .  argument which embraces all human institutions . . ."’ 
and which shows by certain proofs that institutions serve an overriding 
purpose or end, namely . . the preservation of the human race."® The 
project for the philosophical historian then
. . . consists in comparing and reflecting whether our human 
mind, in the series of possibilities it is permitted to under­
stand . . ., can conceive more or fewer different causes than 
those from which issue the effects of this civil world.®
We can see from the above that Vico is simply saying that the
philosophical historian must look for causes. He looks for the causes 
of the development of institutions by examining the institutions in their 
developmental stages, i.e., genetically. The guidelines by which he shall 
proceed with his investigation are to be found in The New Science. Man’s 
sciences will always divide man into two parts, namely mind and corporeality. 
(". . . la Scienza umana ha sezionato I'uomo in corpo e animo." De An- 
tiquissima, p. 64)*® The same is true concerning the science of human in­
stitutions. An institution like marriage, for example, while obviously 
being a spiritual institution (i.e., as defined by the various rituals ac­
companying the actual ceremony), nevertheless contains its corporeal elements. 
The parties involved, for example, have corporeal bodies, the ceremony may
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take place in a particular ceremonial corporeal dwelling; it may he
essential for the use of particular ornaments^  ^ such as rings or gifts; etc.
The point is that all of these properties are of a corporeal nature. It
is, therefore, the job of the philosopher-historian to trace out these
observable elements that comprise the institution in question.
The inseparable properties of institutions must be due to the 
modification or guise with which they are bom. By these 
properties we may therefore verify that the nature or birth 
(natura o nascimento) was thus and not otherwise.*^
Vulgar traditions must have had public grounds of truth by 
virtue of which they came into being and were preserved by 
entire peoples over long periods of time.
And finally:
It will be another great labor of this Science to recover these 
grounds of truth--truth which, with the passage of years and 
the changes in languages and customs, has come down to us en­
veloped in falsehood.
The elements of Vico's new science, therefore, while concerned
with mind, are "more real" than the elements of geometry precisely because
they are concerned with the observable properties which make up [the 
nature of] institutions. They are, in other words, the material causes
of social institutions. The world of civil life is involved in a world
of corporeal things. Therefore, that which makes the creation of the his­
torian "more real" than the creation of the mathematician is the corporeal 
element in the institutions of the civil world.
There is further textual support [in The New Science] for this 
interpretation. The text shows beyond question that (at least in certain 
contexts] Vico meant by "real" the corporeal just as he did in his earlier 
work De Antiquissima. For example, in The New Science Vico argues that 
since the first gentile nations were mute in their beginnings they must
57
have expressed themselves by gestures or by using physical objects. He 
offers the following example as evidence to support his thesis: 
"Idanthyrsus, king of the Scythians .... used five real words to an­
swer Darius the Great who had declared war on him. These were a frog, 
a mouse, a bird, a ploughshare, and a bow."'® [my emphasis] Vico then 
contrasts these so-called "real" words with spoken and written words.
He says ". . . real words (. . . as we shall later show, the first 
peoples must have used before they came to vocal words and finally to 
written ones.)"'®
It seems obvious in this example that Vico is thinking that that 
which distinguishes the "real" words from the written and spoken ones is 
that the real words are simply the gross corporeal objects. Again in 
Book I, "Establishment of the Principles," while arguing that the first 
peoples were not sages or philosophers but posts, Vico tells us:
. . .  all the arts of the necessary, the useful, the convenient, 
and even in large part those of human pleasure, were invented in 
the poetic centuries before the philosophers came; for the arts 
are nothing but imitations of nature, and in a certain way "real" 
poems [made not of words but of things].
Finally, in Book II, "Poetic Wisdom," he repeats another form of the above 
argument : " . . .  poetry is nothing but imitation, and the arts are only
imitations of nature and consequently in a certain sense real poetry."'* 
These examples indicate that here in his mature work Vico con­
tinues to accept the notion of the "real" as that which is in some sense 
corporeal nature. This seems to be the case in spite of his announcement 
that only God can have science of the corporeal. The meaning, therefore, 
of Vico's claim that his new science contains "greater reality" than 
geometry is that his new science concerns itself in part with corporeality
58
whereas geometry does not. This conclusion seems plausible for three 
reasons. First, the contexts wherein Vico talks about "real" things 
such as, e.g.. Poetic Logic, indicate that he is thinking of these things 
as corporeal objects. Second, this interpretation remains consistent with 
and supports Vico's earlier thinking in De Antiguissima, i.e., that "real" 
truth deals with corporeality. And third, only if the real is the cor­
poreal can the historian, through evidence, trace out those elements he 
must in order to have a science of human institutions.
Let us now turn to an assessment of this realist interpretation. 
The strong points of the interpretation is its textual evidence and its 
claim to establish a continuity between the earlier and later works. 
Nevertheless, as we shall soon see, the interpretation is unsatisfactory 
as it stands because it counts against Vico's major claim. That claim is 
that only his "new science," i.e., an "historical science," can give the 
kind of certain knowledge desired in the area of human affairs. We may 
state our objection in the following two ways: first, as we pointed out
in the beginning of this chapter, Vico's conception of science in The Sew 
Science has narrowed from that of De Antiguissima. Although he is still
working with the same analogy in The New Science that he was in De An­
tiguissima (namely the "God-raan maker's-knowledge analogy"), his use of 
it is now restricted to only geometry and history. He now tells us, e.g., 
when speaking of nature that ". . . since God made it. He alone has sci­
ence of it."19 And when speaking of the "civil world," he says, "since 
men made it men could come to have science of it."^°
Now if that which marks off the new science's creation as being
"more real" than the creation of geometry is simply the element of
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corporeality, then the "God-man analogy" quotation above would no longer 
hold good. It would no longer hold good precisely because man would 
then be able to have a science of corporeality, thus reducing the first 
part of the analogy to a falsehood. If the first part of the analogy is 
false, then the point of the analogy is lost. In other words, it is pre­
cisely because man has not made corporeal nature that the above analogy 
has any merit. This is to say that Vico's new science is unique only if 
man is like God in that man has made the world of nations completely [and 
unlike God concerning the world of nature] and, therefore, can have sci­
ence of it. The new science is, therefore, to be seen as a kind of di­
vine example, i.e., it allows knowledge [of history] through creation.
The result of this creation, however, as opposed to that of geometry, is 
that it contains "real" truth. Vico tells us when speaking of the "proofs" 
for his thesis: ". . . these proofs are of a kind divine and should give
thee a divine pleasure, since in God knowledge and creation are one and 
the same t h i n g . H e  further claims that the reader of The New Science 
himself, if he carefully studies the work, will also be recreating and, 
therefore, knowing in a God-like fashion the civil world. "Indeed, we 
make bold to affirm that he who meditates this Science narrates to himself 
this ideal eternal history so far as he himself makes it for himself . .
If the realist version of "more reality than geometry" is correct, 
then the point of this "God-man" analogy (i.e., that man is perfectly "God­
like" in his knowledge of history, where he wasn't in physics and geometry) 
is lost. It is lost because although man can (in a weak sense) demonstrate 
in physics, he cannot know in physics by absolute creation, i.e., he can­
not create or re-create corporeality per se. Therefore, if the realist
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is right, man could not use the "maker's-knowledge criterion” in a 
perfectly "God-like" fashion which is precisely how Vico claims that it is 
used in his new science of humanity.
Second, if that which is "more real" than geometry in the new 
science is the corporeal, then it would seem that Vico ought to explain 
why it is that this "real" could not be adequately dealt with by [the 
science] physics whose job it is to deal with corporeality. (". . . la 
fisica studia i moti intemi dei corpi, pertinenti alia natura, . . ."
De Antiguissima, p. 6 8 . That is to say, if we were to grant the 
realist interpretation, why then if the "real" essentially consists of 
corporeality should human affairs not be the proper object of study of 
physics (or at least a science base on the same principles of physics 
as opposed to the principles of Vico's new science)
The answer is clear. Vico believed that his new science dealt 
with a "new" reality, i.e., a new world that uniquely fitted his "maker's- 
knowledge criterion." Physics is unable to deal with this new world be­
cause (epistemologically) the "maker's-knowledge criterion" functions 
differently with the world of nature than it does with the world of human 
affairs.
In physics man's maker's knowledge is always limited. It is true 
that Vico's "maker's-knowledge criterion" justifies the inductive method 
(see, e.g.. De Antiguissima, p. 124) of investigating corporeality and thus 
gives us the best knowledge of the real truth of nature that we can hope 
to have. However, it is also true that we ourselves have not made corpo­
real nature, and therefore, our knowledge of it is seriously limited.
This is to say that physics is not "Science" in the sense that Vico now 
thinks of the term in his "new science."
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When Vico turns to the study of human affairs, i.e., to history,
a new world emerges and along with it so too does a new "real." It is for
this reason that he believed a "new" science was required, i.e., to make
intelligible this "new real." Ths historical civil world had been ignored
by philosophers in the past, e.g., Aristotle, Descartes, because of its
particularity and, therefore, unscientizability. But now (due to its
unique relation to Vico's "maker's-knowledge criterion") the historical
world becomes the one subject that can result in absolutely certain and
real "scientific" truth. Vico says:
. . . there shines the eternal and never failing light of a truth 
beyond all question: that the world of civil society has cer­
tainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore 
to be found within the modifications of our own human mind.^®
When we ask how certainty is possible in the science of geometry 
(which is in essence to ask how geometry is possible), we find that it is 
due to the "maker's-knowledge criterion." At the same time, however, we 
see that geometry results in no real truth, only fictions. When we ask 
how knowledge of real truth is possible in physics (which is to ask how 
physics is possible), we also see that it is due to the "maker's-knowledge 
criterion" justifying induction. And if we then ask whether there is any 
subject with which the "maker's-knowledge criterion" works completely, i.e., 
where we may gain complete certainty and also real truth, Vico answers yes 
and proceeds to offer us an explanation of how history is possible.
However, while showing how history is possible as a science, Vico 
must also show that history is unique. He attempts to do this by arguing 
that its subject matter, i.e., human affairs, is qualitatively different 
from that of geometry or physics. While history shares the same
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problematic as geometry and physics (i.e., the problem of a satisfactory 
account of the relationship of real truth to certainty), it is, he thinks, 
unique.^® The episteraological proof of this uniqueness is simply the 
fact that history can be known in a "God-like" way (i.e., on the basis 
of the "maker's-knowledge criterion").
This is a second reason then why the realist version of "more 
real truth" must in the end fail. It fails because of its incompatibility 
with Vico's main aim in The New Science. That aim is to establish the 
civil world, i.e., the world of human affairs, as unique. The proof of 
this uniqueness is that man (because, epistemologically, of the total com­
patibility of the "maker's-knowledge criterion" with history) has direct 
and intimate access to the "real" truth and certainty of the historical 
civil world that he cannot have with the worlds of mathematics and physics.
The realist version would ultimately be committed to reducing 
history to physics and thereby denying the uniqueness of the civil world. 
However, it is clear that Vico thinks of his new science as one which 
deals with a different order of reality than corporeality when it investi­
gates man. If we then ask what is this something else that cannot adequately 
be dealt with by physics but can be completely known by a science such as 
Vico's, he will tell us that the answer is mind. And if we further ask how 
is this intimate connection between man and history to be conceived, Vico 
will answer by offering an explanation in terms of his "maker's-knowledge 
criterion" and mind.
We must, therefore, now look at a second interpretation of the 
notion of "more real truth" in The New Science, namely the idealistic ver­
sion. We have seen that one criticism of the realist interpretation was
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that if "more real" simply means corporeality, then physics (or a 
discipline modeled on it) would be the appropriate science to investigate 
history. We have also seen that this line of thought is explicitly denied 
by Vico, and therefore, we need not examine it further. A more promising 
interpretation may be stated in the following idealist version.
The task of the new science is to understand man. To approach 
this task, Vico holds, we must study the nature of man's institutions for 
it is his institutions which reflect the "more real truth" with which The 
New Science is concerned. That real is mind. In Principle 14, Bl. L,
Vico tells us: "In search of these natures of human institutions our
Science proceeds by a severe analysis of human thoughts about the human 
necessities or utilities of social life."^^ Also: "Our Science is there­
fore a history of human ideas on which it seems the metaphysics of the 
human mind must proceed."^®
It is precisely because the "more real" that the New Science is 
concerned with is the reality of mind (which is noncorporeal) that physics 
cannot adequately investigage it. Mind, not bodies, is the real subject 
matter of history. What Vico uniquely contributes with his new science, 
therefore, is the principles of mind with which the historian can investi­
gate mind's activity through time, i.e., history.^® The result of the in­
vestigation, if done correctly (i.e., according to Vico's method and 
principles), will be an "ideal eternal history" traversed by all nations 
at all times. This "ideal history" includes both the formal, scientific 
conditions necessary for understanding the affairs of man and the substan­
tial conditions that his institutions actually contribute to his own 
historical development.^®
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For example, the ideal eternal history is supposed to demonstrate 
how Providence has ordered human affiars through its institutions in such 
a way that human passions become moderated. Because o£ the institutional­
izing effect of, say, an institution like marriage, man's behavior becomes 
that of a man of the "famuli" as opposed to an independent, totally self- 
interested individual. A historical result of this institutionalizing 
effect is that parents do not then:
. . . separate at any time, the children, abandoned by both, . . .
exposed to be devoured by dogs. It is also for this reason that 
the . . . world of nations, enriched and adorned by so many fine
arts of humanity . . . does not . . . revert to the great
ancient forest through which in their nefarious feral wanderings 
once roamed the foul beasts of Orpheus . . .  ^*
The point is that these things would occur if it were not for a Providen­
tial mind. What's more, Vico believes that he has provided a means (namely 
the ideal eternal history) by which we may have scientific knowledge of 
the activity of this Providential mind.
In order to understand why the creation of the historian is "more 
real" than that of the geometrician, it is necessary to understand what a 
Providential mind is.^^ The only way, in turn, to understand a Providen­
tial mind is to understand how it functions in human institutions. Our 
task then is to get at the nature of human institutions.
It is Vico's belief that the nature of things can be seen only 
when the thing in question is studied genetically, which is to say his­
torically. Vico makes it quite explicit that the important sense of "na­
ture" in The New Science is genesis. Talking of institutions, he says:
The nature of institutions is nothing but their coming into being 
(nascimento) at certain times and in certain guises. Whenever the 
time and guise are thus and so, such and not otherwise are the in­
stitutions that come into being.
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Further, as we've seen earlier, the nature/genesis of an institution will
display certain "birth-right" properties which will indicate the "time-
sect" or stage of development appropriate to that institution.
The inseparable properties of institutions must be due to the 
modification or guise with which they are bom. By these prop­
erties we may therefore verify that the nature or birth (natura 
o nascimento) was thus and not otherwise.^ "*
Let us here sketch the various steps of (this idealistic inter­
pretation of) Vico's argument. Men make the institutions that form their 
nation states or commonwealths. Civil commonwealths, like the men and in­
stitutions that compose them, are themselves composed of "mind and body."®® 
History, the subject matter of the new science, is the story of the de­
velopmental stages of mind as seen in man's institutions and civil common­
wealths. The new science, therefore, concerns itself with the developmental 
stages of languages, jurisprudence, authority, etc., in any and all com­
monwealths. These institutions will in turn correspond to different 
stages of rationality, i.e., mind (for example, "Divine reason," "Heroic 
reason," and "Natural reason"®®). Next Vico tells us that "All of the 
aforesaid institutions have been practiced through three sects of time."®^
It is the job then of the philosopher-historian to match up these three 
repeatable "time-sects" (we shall examine these more closely later in the 
chapter) with the various civil institutions according to their appropriate 
developmental stage.
This matching process, however, can take place only because the 
subject matter that the historian is ultimately dealing with is mind. In 
other words it is the activity of mind, manifested through man's needs 
and utilities, which is investigated in the various "time-sects." Hence, 
in investigating, e.g., a religious time-sect we recreate a religious.
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barbarie frame of mind and thereby discover that that particular time-sect 
had evolved a particular type of government and law peculiar to it. For 
example, "The guarding of the confines began to be observed with bloody 
religions under the divine governments, . . Of course, these same
kinds of relationships (i.e., the relationship between mind and , say, 
government) will develop in the time-sects and ages following. For ex­
ample, Vico goes on to say in this same passage, "This guarding of the 
confines is naturally practiced in the aristocratic commonwealths . . . 
This and no other must be the reason why the Law of the Twelve Tables did 
not recognize simple possession .. . "
It is because Vico's new science gives us the principles by which 
we are able to understand the various stages of mind that we are able to 
understand the various stages of man's institutional development, which 
is to say his history. Finally, Vico explicitly says, when speaking of 
this Providential course that human institutions take in order to "pre­
serve the human race," that what ". . . did all this was mind, for men did 
it with intelligence; it was not fate, for they did it by choice; not -, 
chance, for the results of their always so acting are perpetually the 
same."3*
We may conclude, therefore, that that which makes the creation 
of the historian "more real" than the creation of the geometrician is the 
fact that the ultimate subject matter of the historian is mind. Also, we 
should here note that this conclusion is in keeping with the aim of Vico's 
new science in an important epistemological sense. That sense is that 
mind is the one phenomenon for Vico which, when studied historically, dis­
plays complete compatibility with the "maker's-knowledge criterion."
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This is to say that there exists a relationship between the historian 
and the historical agent (whose activities make up the civil world of 
men) that is unique when compared to the relationship that exists between 
the geometrician or physicist and their respective subject matters. The 
historian's ultimate subject matter is mind. His investigations are 
(again ultimately) concerned with discovering the principles of mind as 
it (i.e., mind) manifests itself historically. Because the historian 
himself is a human mind, he shares a certain "identity-feature" with the 
historical agent.
It is this "identity-feature" (which the historian and the his­
torical agent have and which the geometrician or physicist and their sub­
ject matters do not have, namely being human) that allows the "maker's- 
knowledge criterion" to produce the complete "God-like" knowledge for man 
in the case of history and not in the cases of geometry and physics. This 
is to say that since the historian is himself a mind, he has "an inside 
track" (so to speak) with his subject matter that the geometrician and 
physicist (as a matter of principle) could never have with theirs. The 
historian can, by the proper principles and appropriate sel£-reflection,'*'^ 
achieve complete scientific knowledge of history (i.e., knowledge in a 
"God-like" way) because the historian's knowledge of his own humanness 
allows him access to certain knowledge of the development of other human 
beings in the past. The historian, e.g., when asking "what would a human 
being in such and such a situation do?" or "how would such and such cir­
cumstances affect a human being'!" is able to "reflect" on his own human­
ness and thereby gain an invaluable advantage in attempting to answer his 
question. The geometrician and the physicist simply lack this advantage.
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History, therefore, can be rendered completely scientific only 
if that which is seen to be the ultimate subject matter of history, i.e., 
that which makes it "more real" than geometry, is mind. Without this as­
sumption Vico's "maker's-knowledge criterion" will not work in the unique 
way that he suggests that it will in the area of history. Further, he 
would then be unable to make good his claim that his new science can re­
duce ". . .to certainty human choice, which by its nature is most uncer­
tain which is as much to say that it reduces philology to the form of a 
science.
Let us now assess this idealist version of "more real." The in­
terpretation has two important points in its favor. First, it correctly 
argues that the primary concern of Vico's new science is mind. Second, 
it shows how the "maker's-knowledge criterion" works in the study of his­
tory. The criterion allows man "God-like" knowledge in history because 
in history there is the presence of a common link between the historian 
and historical agent, namely mind. Because of this common link, man can 
know the causes completely in history where it was impossible to do so in 
physics.
Although these points are essentially correct, this version must, 
nevertheless, be rejected unless it is modified. First, the above inter­
pretation, as it stands, simply ignores the textual evidence offered by 
the realist interpretation. The realist put forth several passages from 
The New Science in which Vico explicitly indicated that (at least at cer­
tain times) he was thinking of the "real" in terms of the "corporeal."'*^ 
Secondly, the God-man analogy (considered by the idealist to be so essen­
tial to Vico's argument because of its relation to the "maker's-knowledge
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criterion") by itself does not uniquely aid the idealist version. That 
is, it does not by itself establish that mind is the unique subject of 
history and not, e.g., the subject of geometry. In both cases, i.e., in 
history and geometry, the God-man analogy satisfies all of the require­
ments it is supposed to. Man can know both history and geometry in a
God-like way, i.e., completely, because the elements of both are made by 
man in a God-like way, i.e., completely. Therefore, by dismissing the 
corporeal the idealist is left with no way of distinguishing between his­
tory and geometry.
The idealist might here wish to point out that since the identity- 
feature of mind, discussed above, is unique to history, the historian's
"making" will, therefore, be more real than that of the geometrician for
it is only the former's making that is concerned with mind. However, 
this line of argument must be resisted. For since the first premise 
claims that the identity-feature of mind is unique to history and since 
this identity-feature of mind analytically implies the identity of mind, 
it is illegitimate then to use this premise to establish the desired con­
clusion, i.e., that mind is unique only to history.
Finally, the idealist version, when taken at face value, is faced 
with the problem of explaining how it is that we actually acquire histori­
cal knowledge in the first place. The idealist thesis seems to be that 
the past can be made intelligible only because the subject with which it 
deals is mind. This is to say that a human institution (e.g., a court of 
law) can be rendered completely intelligible only because the essence of 
that institution is or was at some time composed of human intentions which 
are themselves the purposeful activity of mind. The question that naturally
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arises here is how are we to actually become acquainted with those 
intentions which display this purposeful activity of mind?**^
Suppose that we take the institution of a court of law in Pub- 
lilian Rome as our historical example. Let us perform the following 
thought-experiment: we abstract everything corporeal from this institu­
tion in order to "get at" the intentions, i.e., mind, which compose the 
institution's nature. But now the problem becomes evident: precisely
where are we to find those " . . . inseparable properties of institu­
tions . . . "  that Vico tells us were ". . . due to the modification or 
guise with which they are born?" It is imperative that we locate these 
properties for they are the very properties that will enable us to 
". . . verify that the nature or birth (natura o nascimento) [of the in­
stitution in question] was thus and not otherwise."'*'*
In other words we must have a means of verifying this or that 
property of an institution in order to judge what particular purpose the 
institution in question serves or served. It is clear that Vico's in­
tention is to provide us with such a means of verifying these necessarily 
"public" properties,"*® for this is the function of his "new critical art 
of criticism."'*® But the question forces itself upon us "how can public 
properties be verified if everything which is corporeally involved in 
the properties is excluded?" What could possibly count as historical evi­
dence once all corporeality has been excluded? It seems obvious that to 
argue the "more real" of the historian's creation is mind to the exclusion 
of corporeality leaves us with no way of verifying the inseparable prop­
erties'*^  of institutions and, hence, no way of knowing their nature.
The inescapable burden of the idealist version, therefore, is 
twofold: he must first show, while relying on Vico's basic epistemological
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concepts (i.e., the "maker's-knowledge criterion," the God-man analogy, 
and the identity-feature of the historian and historical agent), that 
history and not geometry has for its ultimate subject matter the purpose­
ful activity of mind. This is a real problem for the idealist interpre­
tation, for it is not obvious why history but not geometry embodies the 
intentions of mind. Further, if we rule out the appeal to corporeality 
as the differentia, the problem is aggravated. Secondly, the idealist 
must show how it is that knowledge of mind, which is the "more real" of 
history, can be acquired. That is to say, he must show, e.g., what sorts 
of things would count as evidence for various historical claims and what 
sorts of things would not.
It is important to note that if this second condition cannot be 
met then neither can the first. For if the idealist cannot in principle 
show what counts as evidence for the claim that certain institutions have 
certain properties, neither will he be able to show what the nature of 
those institutions are and, a fortiori, that they ultimately display the 
workings of purposeful mind."*® It seems quite clear that as long as the 
idealist version excludes corporeality from its interpretation of "more 
real," it will not be able to fulfill the above conditions. This is be­
cause it will have no way of showing that the subject matter of history 
is really mind (working through human institutions), for there will be 
nothing which will count as evidence for divining the particular proper­
ties which ultimately compose the particular natures of the institutions 
in question. As a consequence the idealist is in no position to argue 
that the historian's creation contains "more real truth" than does that 
of the geometrician (for there is no way of telling). Therefore, the 
idealist version, too, must be rejected.
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The promise of the realist version was that it offered us a way 
of distinguishing the creation of the geometrician from that of the his­
torian. The historian's creation was said to be "more real" precisely 
because its subject matter dealt ultimately with corporeality, whereas 
that of the geometrician did not. However, the failure of the realist's 
version rested on this very same claim. If the "more real" of the his­
torian's creation is merely the corporeal, then there is no need for a 
"new science," for there is no good reason why physics (or a social sci­
ence based upon the precepts of physics) should not be able adequately to 
account for the past actions of man."*’ This line of thought, however, is 
explicitly rejected by Vico.®°
On the other hand the idealist version excludes the notion of 
corporeality as the real and argues positively that a new science is 
needed to allow for "scientific" knowledge of history. However, it, too, 
fails in the final analysis, for it offers no adequate way of distinguish­
ing between the creation of the geometrician and that of the historian. 
Both the geometrician and the historian, according to idealist principles, 
make use of the "maker's-knowledge criterion," and both have access to 
their respective knowledge in a God-like way. The idealist, in pointing 
out that the subject matter of history is the purposeful activity of mind, 
excludes anything independent that would count as evidence for his claim.
I should now like to propose an amended version of the idealist 
interpretation of "more real truth" which (although it is not without dif­
ficulties of its own) I believe to be the most plausible account of what 
Vico had in mind when thinking of the "real truth" of history.
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It was Vico's belief that his new science, i.e., the science of 
history (which was actually a science of humanity), was in fact the para­
gon of all the sciences. He held this view because he thought that only 
his new science could render knowledge of its subject matter, i.e., the 
human past, completely intelligible and completely certain. To achieve 
such intelligibility and certainty, Vico's science would Have to incorpo­
rate the deductive features of geometrical reasoning, the inductive pro­
cedures of physics, and the necessary metaphysical truths of philosophy.®^
Concerning the former, he says: " . . .  and history cannot be
more certain than when he who creates the things also narrates them."
(349 N.S.) Because of the "maker's-knowledge criterion" and the identity-
feature of the historian and the historical agent, the historian will be
in a unique position to deduce with conscious certainty various truths
(from Vico's axioms) concerning man's nature and his past.®^ However,
Vico also tells us that ". . . Bacon, great alike as philosopher and
statesman, proposes, commends, and illustrates the inductive method,"®®
And that we, therefore:
. . . shall be able to see in fact [my emphasis] this world of 
nations which we have studied in idea [my emphasis], following 
the best ascertained method of philosophizing that of Francis 
Bacon, Lord Verulam, but carrying it over from the institutions 
of nature, on which he composed his book Cogitat [et] Visa, to 
the civil institutions of mankind. ®‘*
It can be seen from Vico's insistence on the use of the inductive 
method that the subject matter of the new science must necessarily involve 
some element of corporeality. This is because the collection of evidence 
used to support this or that particular claim requires by its very nature 
nonvacuous alternatives.®® If The New Science did not necessarily involve 
in its subject matter corporeal elements, then the inductive method of
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Bacon could not be used, evidence could not be collected, and the truths 
of The New Science would be vacuous (or.false insofar as they purport to 
be about the "real").
The shortcomings of the idealist and realist versions now begin 
to appear more evident in their mutual contrast. Each version used some 
of Vico's conceptual machinery while excluding some. For example, the 
idealist could make history completely certain (using the "maker's- 
knowledge criterion," the identity-feature, and deductive method) by argu­
ing that history's "more real truth" was that of mind. On the other hand, 
the realist could make history completely real (using the maker's-knowledge 
criterion and the inductive method) by arguing that history's "more real 
truth" was that of corporeality. However, as we have seen, neither the 
idealist nor the realist succeeds in making history completely intelligible 
and completely real. Because of this, these versions fail to establish the 
science of history (i.e., the science of humanity) as the paragon of the 
sciences that Vico envisaged it to be.®®
Finally, the failure of these versions to satisfy completely the 
criterion of scientific knowledge (i.e., to achieve complete truth and 
complete certainty) in the area of history indicates an important point 
concerning the nature of the subject matter with which Vico (in The New 
Science) is concerned. The subject matter of the historical world is seen 
by Vico to be of a metaphysically different nature from that of the "world 
of mathematics" or of the "world of physics." The subject matter of mathe­
matics, it will be recalled, is the point and the unit, the mataphysical 
nature of which are fictions only,®^ connected with the real world by a 
metaphysical hypothesis.®* That of physics is the movements of bodies,®*
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and God can have science of their metaphysical natures, for he has made 
them.®** Man's knowledge of nature, i.e., his physics, is probable only, 
for the world of nature is infinite and man is finite.®*
However, the subject matter of The New Science is history, i.e., 
making intelligible the social institutions of man. Vico's novel claim 
is that it is only in this area, i.e., only in the investigation of the 
"nature" of human institutions (which is at the same time an investiga­
tion of the human natures of the men that made them), can truth that is 
both certain and real be achieved. We must, therefore, briefly examine 
here what Vico has to say concerning the "metaphysical nature" of this 
new subject matter, i.e., man's humanity vis-à-vis its institutional his­
tory. We must examine this new nature if we are to come to some conclu­
sion as to his meaning of "more real truth."®^
Vico tells us, when speaking of the first primitive men, that his 
new science " .. . must take its start from the time these creatures began 
to think humanly."®® When we inquire into the natures of these first men 
we learn that:
. . . the founders of gentile humanity in a certain sense gen­
erated and produced in themselves the proper human form in its 
two aspects [my emphasis]: that is, . . . they brought forth
from their giant bodies the form of our just corporature [my 
emphasis] and how by discipline of their household economy 
they brought forth from their bestial minds the form of our 
human mind. ®‘*
These two necessary elements of human nature are not new; Vico had told 
us as early as De Antiguissima that man was divided into two basic ele­
ments, body and soul.®® However, now in The New Science where Vico's con­
cern is history he reinforces this claim by adding that the nature of human 
institutions is also necessarily composed of those same basic elements.
76
. . when the commonwealths were to spring forth, the matters [my 
emphasis] were all prepared and ready to receive the form [my emphasis] 
and there issued from them the format of the commonwealths, composed of 
mind and [my emphasis] body . .
Vico goes on to tell us that the "matters" of the institution 
of, say, agrarian law were the actual people that made up the community 
of nobles and plebeians. These "matters" then set the stage for a cer­
tain "form" of commanding and obeying orders.®’ This form evolved into 
various government institutions which themselves could come about only 
because of the particular relationship of the form and matters given 
above. In this example the particular form was an aristocratic kind of 
rule;
. . .  so that people newly come to humanity might, by the very 
form of their governments, continue for a long tinie to remain 
enclosed within these confines and institutions, and so forget 
the infamous and nefarious promiscuity of the bestial and feral 
state.®®
The point is that the nature of man as well as his institutions 
is seen by Vico to contain two metaphysically necessary elements, namely 
mind and body. Further, we believe that Vico must be taken at his word; 
this is to say that to understand the meaning of his "more real" it is 
necessary to take him to be saying that history (i.e., the story of man's 
developing nature vis-à-vis his institutions) is itself composed of these 
two elements. The metaphysical nature of the history of man and his in­
stitutions is a combination of mind and corporeality. Historical explana­
tion, therefore, will contain reference to both of those elements. The 
idealist w;s right in saying that the ultimate subject matter of the new 
science is mind in the form of purposeful activity. His error was in ne­
cessarily excluding corporeality from the nature of mind.®®
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The kind of mind that Vico is concerned with in The New Science 
is very similar to Hegel's Geist in his philosophy of history. It is 
similar in two respects: first, Vico holds that the very nature of mind
is such that it must be embodied,’” and second, he thinks of mind as an 
activity in history which is directed by "something more" than any of the 
particular desires or wishes of particular human b e i n g s . I t  is this 
notion of a metaphysically necessary, embodied, institutional, social 
mind that Vico believes to be the ultimate subject matter of the new 
science.
Therefore, the realist was also right in a qualified sense. The 
history of man does involve as one of its essential elements corporeality, 
and therefore, it will have " . . .  a reality greater by just so much as 
the institutions having to do with human affairs are more real than points, 
lines, surfaces, and figures are."”  The error of the realist was his 
failure to understand the metaphysical status of the corporeality with 
which Vico is concerned in The New Science. This is, as we have seen, 
the corporeality which is necessarily involved in man's process of human­
izing himself. It includes ". . . men's religions, their own languages, 
their own lands, their own nuptials, their own names (clan or houses), 
their own arms, and hence, their own dominions, their own magistrates, and 
finally, their own laws."’”
In De Antiguissima we saw that the conception of corporeality 
espoused by Vico was governed by the physicist's ideas. In that work cor­
poreality was thought of as that which moved through space. It is clear 
that this is not the notion working in The New Science. In The New Sci­
ence Vico sees corporeality as playing a sociohistorical role, i.e., that
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of being the socially prepared "matters ready to receive various 
institutional f o r m s . Further, that these matters must receive their 
forms, and that form and matter (mind and body) are both metaphysically 
necessary’® elements of institutions are now, for Vico, beyond dispute.
It is for these reasons that the historian's creations contain "more 
real truth" than the geometrician's. Geometry deals only with arbitrary fic­
tions, completely made by man and, therefore, containing no "real" truth. 
History, on the other hand, is also completely made by man. However, the na­
ture of its subject matter is not arbitrary but, rather, metaphysically neces­
sary, involving both form and matter (mind and corporeality). It was Vico's 
belief that only history could give us knowledge of real truth and certainty. 
His contention was that because of his new science man will come to see the 
particular pattern or "ideal order" that the various forms of "prepared 
matters" necessarily follow. The result is that one will thereby be able 
to achieve certainty concerning historical claims made about particular 
"matters." This is so because one will have the pattern of forms which dis­
plays the purposeful order that those matters necessarily follow.
Having achieved some idea of wh' t Vico had in mind when he claimed 
that history is "more real" than geometry, we must now try to understand 
his conception of the relationship of this "more real" (vis-à-vis his 
"maker's-knowledge criterion") to certainty. In order to do so we must now 
turn to an examination of his idea of teleology which he refers to as 
"Divine Providence."
Teleology
We have seen the manner in which Vico argues that his new science 
achieves real truth. The new science has as its ultimate subject matter
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mind, whose nature necessitates embodiment in corporeality. Truth is 
still secured from the attacks of the sceptic in The Hew Science in es­
sentially the same way as it was in De Antiguissima, i.e., it is epistemo­
logically secured by the notion of "maker's-knowledge." What remains to 
be seen, however, is the kind of argument that Vico will use in order to 
achieve the other necessary element of every science, namely certainty.^®
Vico's argument that certainty can be achieved in the science of 
history is basically an argument for the existence of an overriding teleol­
ogy in human affairs. Although he presents various forms of this teleo- 
logical argument throughout The New S c i e n c e I think it can be better, 
i.e., more clearly, understood if it is divided into three distinct stages. 
Stage or may be seen as involving an argument for a particular method by
which one can come to know that there is an "ideal plan" that determines
the pattern which all human institutions follow. Stage two may be seen 
as an actual description of the plan itself. Finally, stage three may be 
seen as an argument involving various examples of teleological activity 
in human affairs vis-à-vis the "ideal plan" upon which those affairs are 
based.
In this section, therefore, we shall first examine each of these 
stages, i.e., the "new metaphysical art of criticism," the "ideal eternal 
history," and "Divine Providence," in order that we may better understand 
Vico's argument for teleology in history. Afterwards, we shall examine 
the formal relationship between the epistemological justification for 
teleology and the "maker's-knowledge criterion." We should then be in a 
position to understand Vico's conception of truth and its relation to cer­
tainty in The New Science.
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Vico tells us that in one of its "principal aspects" his new
science is a history of human ideas7^ He also says that:
To determine the times and places for such a history— that is, 
when and where these human thoughts were b om— and thus to give 
it certainty by means of its own (so to speak) metaphysical 
chronology and geography, our Science applies a likewise meta­
physical art of criticism [my emphasis] with regard to the 
founders of these same nations.®
Vico thinks of his "metaphysical art of criticism" as new be­
cause for the first time it enjoins a synthesis of two distinct fields 
of study, namely philosophy and philology.®* Vico held that it was be­
cause these areas had always seemed to be antagonistic to one another in 
the past that there had never been a method by which the facts of history 
could be accounted for p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y Philosophy, the queen of the 
sciences, had always dealt with the necessary and the universal. The re­
sult of philosophical meditation was knowledge of eternal truth.
Philology, on the other hand, concerned itself with only contingent, 
particular facts, the certainty of which depended solely upon the indi­
vidual consciousness that witnessed them. On the other hand, philosophy 
was said to deal with the (eternally) true which it (philosophy) could 
show to be true through rational demonstration. On the other, philology's 
business was with the contingent fact which, although lacking in demonstra­
tion, was nevertheless made certain by appealing to individual experience.®^ 
In his earlier work De Antiguissima Vico had argued for a simi­
lar distinction regarding truth and certainty. In The New Science, how­
ever, these two notions (i.e., truth and certainty) are paired off with 
philosophy and philology. Vico now explicitly argues that truth and cer­
tainty should be synthesized so that they will be seen as necessary com­
plements of one another. Further, in The New Science Vico thinks that it
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is precisely due to this complementary relationship of philosophy to 
philology that history can be made s c i e n t i f i c I t  is because of this 
synthesis then that Vico's art of criticism is new.
Vico holds the view that the actual past affairs of mankind (i.e., 
man's history) is itself a synthesis of eternal truths and contingent • 
facts. For that reason he thinks of his new art of criticism as the only 
method by which one may gain access to certain knowledge in history. This 
is to say that history can become a science only if we adopt Vico's new 
method. Vico holds that the conceptual structure of his new method re­
flects the actual synthesis of truth and certainty in the world. This is 
the meaning of his claim, e.g., that his . . Science applies a likewise 
metaphysical art of criticism with regard to the founders of these same 
notions . . [my emphasis] And that whoever uses this art of criti­
cism and ". . . meditates this Science narrates to himself this ideal 
eternal history . .
Vico is arguing two things: First, that the truths of philosophy
must be seen in the historical facts. That is to say, there is a deeper 
purpose to be discerned in the facts than just the facts themselves. The 
facts, in other words, are to be read and narrated philosophically.®’ 
Second, Vico believes that he has provided us with the required new art 
with which we may complete this task.®® But here the question quite 
naturally arises, precisely what is it that is needed to achieve this syn­
thesis of philosophy and philology? That is, what third thing must exist 
if these two antagonistic things (i.e., philosophy and philology) are to 
be synthesized thereby allowing us to see eternal truth in historical 
facts? Vico's answer is twofold. First:
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There must in the nature of human institutions be a mental 
language common to all nations, which uniformly grasps the 
substance of things feasible in human social life and ex­
presses it with as many diverse modifications as these same 
things have diverse aspects. A proof of this is afforded 
by proverbs or maxims of vulgar wisdom, in which substan­
tially the same meanings find as many diverse expressions 
as there are notions ancient and modem.
This common mental language is proper to our Science, by 
whose light linguistic scholars will be enabled to construct 
a mental vocabulary common to all the various articulate 
languages, living and dead.
Second, there must be a criterion for certainty which Vico takes to be
" . . .  the common sense of the human race, determined by the necessary
harmony of human institutions."
Vico believes that the synthesis of the true and the certain 
(i.e., philosophy and philology) can be achieved if in examining the facts 
we can establish the necessary order that human institutions follow. We 
shall be able to establish such a necessary order because there is a uni­
versal mental language. We can be certain of the meaning of this uni­
versal mental language because it is based upon the common sense of 
mankind.
Vico's argument may be summarized as follows: "Uniform ideas
originating among entire peoples unknown to each other must have a common 
ground of truth. This common ground is the common sense of the race 
which, as we've seen, is the criterion of the certain. That is to say, 
the common sense of peoples determines (with respect to their needs and 
utilities) what is certain. This holds true even in the case of their 
own so-called "natural" law.®^ Therefore, all nations, because of their 
uniform ideas, will have the same "natural" law.
The question then arises concerning the possibility of knowing 
the particular historical order of human institutions. Vico here argues
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that the (philosopher) historian should in his investigations construct 
a "mental dictionary." By means of this dictionary he (the philosopher- 
historian) can then assign origins to the various nations' diverse lan­
guages.^^ He will be able to assign these origins because first the 
origins will have "public grounds" of truth, and second they will be the 
same from society to society.** Vico claims that in assigning these ori­
gins, the historian will be able to discover a common mental language 
which expresses what is and is not feasible concerning necessity and 
utility in social life.** The particular order of human institutions will . 
then be traceable because the order of ideas expressed in the common mental 
language is traceable. How is this possible?
Vico has told us that the origins of the ideas concerning man's 
necessities and utilities are to be found in the "common sense" of man­
kind. That is to say that upon examining the "common sense" of mankind, 
we find that the ideas of early man were primarily concerned with practi­
cal necessity and utility. Further, we find that these concerns were ex­
pressed in various ways and in various languages. For example, early man 
expressed himself about needs and utilities in myths, poetry, and proverbs. 
Now with the aid of the historian's mental dictionary we shall come to see 
that the apparently different ideas (expressed in myths, poetry, and pro­
verbs) are really expressions of common concerns in a common (i.e., uni­
versal) mental language. Further, because Vico considers it axiomatic 
that "the order of ideas must follow the order of institutions,"** the 
philosopher-historian will (by tracing the order of ideas), therefore, 
be in a position to discover the order of institutions. That is, the 
historian will be able to trace the order of ideas by examining (with his
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mental dictionary) the common mental language, and once he has the order 
of ideas, he will also thereby have the order of institutions. Therefore, 
because the "common mental language" is universal and expresses the uni­
versal order of ideas, the historian should be able to discover the uni­
versal (historical) order of human institutions. Vico tells us that this 
history will be ". . . an ideal history traversed in time by the history 
of every nation in its rise, development, maturity, decline, and fall."®’
It is in this manner that Vico argues that the true and eternal is to be 
found in the certain and factual. Because he postulates a "universal 
mental language,” he is able (he believes) to synthesize philosophy with 
philology and thereby provide a "new critical art” for the study of history.
Having achieved the synthesis of philosophy with philology and 
thus provided the historian with a method of investigation, Vico next tries 
to demonstrate knowledge of the general causes of historical facts. That 
is, he believes that the primary task of his "new critic" is to establish 
those general conditions which have brought about the multitude of his­
torical facts that constitute the civil world. These conditions, he 
thinks, will themselves correspond pari passu with the necessary order of 
the genetic development of social institutions.
Once again, therefore, it is the knowledge of the necessary de­
velopment or order of human ideas which places the philosopher-historian 
in the position of being able to "reduce to certainty human choice" (and 
thereby make history scientific).®® Vico is quite aware of the fact that 
he must show (i.e., philosophically explain) why the particular order of 
institutions discovered by his "new critical principles"®® is a necessary 
one. To demonstrate this necessity, he relies upon the rather paradoxical 
notion, which we shall now briefly examine, of an "ideal eternal history."
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"Ideal-eternal History"
Vico believes that his new method will succeed where others have 
failed. He thinks that his method can take the "deplorable obscurity of 
causes and the almost infinite variety of effects . . . ° ° and reduce 
them to scientific history, i.e., to ". . . the form of a science by dis­
covering in it a design of an ideal eternal history traversed in time by 
the history of all nations."^ *** It is this introduction of an "ideal- 
eternal history" that allows Vico to view as necessary the particular 
order of human institutions in their development. He tells us that we 
come to the realization of this "ideal-eternal history" ". . .at the 
same time . . that we reconstruct the various histories of nations.
This happens in two (logically) distinct stages. First, we "meditate in 
idea"^°^ upon the various philological (i.e., historical) facts. This is 
simply to say that we philosophically reflect on the (philological) facts 
by making use of Vico's "new art of criticism." Second, after having ar­
rived at the order of human Ideas (from which we also get the order of 
institutions), we then see that we were able to achieve knowledge of this 
order only because we had first thought of the facts philosophically, i.e., 
"in idea."^”'* This, Vico thinks, is in effect to say that our discovery 
of a purposeful order of ideas (and thereby a purposeful order of insti­
tuions) is possible only because there exists a corresponding purposeful, 
ideal, necessary order.^Further, it is precisely this other "ideal 
necessary" order that Vico thinks his "new art" provides.
The "new art" allows us access to knowledge of the "times and 
places"**'® that were the developmental stages of man's ideas. His ideas 
follow his institutions which were in turn established because of certain
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necessary conditions. Now it is the laws or principles which govern these 
conditions that Vico is interested in. He believes that these laws or 
principles are universal and necessary. They are not arrived at by merely 
examining the facts but instead by "meditating the facts in idea." It is 
these laws or principles that govern the stages of the "ideal eternal his­
tory." Because of his knowledge of the ideal-eternal history and its 
principles, the historian will be able to "scientifically” reconstruct 
the history of mankind. (Book Two, "Poetic Wisdom" of The New Science is 
an example of this reconstruction.)
The particular pattern or stages of the "ideal eternal history" 
that reduces history to certainty and, therefore, to a science,^may be 
briefly sketched as follows: the pattern consists of three parts, each
reciprocally involved with the other. These parts are the nature of man, 
the ages of history, and the stages of man's institutional development.
Upon examining the natures of man in general, we find that at one time- 
sect'°*man had a poetic nature; at another, a heroic nature; and at still 
another, a human nature. Further, we come to see that these natures have 
been going through a developing process, which is to say that the seeds 
for a later nature were sown in an earlier one. Corresponding to these 
natures— poetic, heroic, and human— are ages accompanied by their appropri­
ate institutions.
The upshot of this developmental pattern is that man's institu­
tions will reflect the times he lived in, while the times will in turn 
display the particular natures. Further, the natures of man are determined 
by social conditions, and it is a combination of the social conditions and 
the natures which give rise to and shape man's institutions. In other
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words, in "making" his institutions man thereby "makes" himself.^This
briefly is the pattern which constitutes Vico's "ideal eternal history."
He says of it that it is an
. . . ideal eternal history traversed in time by the histories
of all nations, tïherever, emerging from savage, fierce, and
bestial times, men begin to domesticate themselves by religion, 
they begin, proceed, and end by those stages [my emphasis] 
which are investigated here in Book Two, to be encountered 
agin in Book Four, where we shall treat of the course the na­
tions run, and Book Five, where we shall treat of the recourse 
of human institutions.
Divine Providence
We have seen that for Vico history can become a science only if 
it can be made certain. Further, it can be made certain only if one could 
see "in the facts" an ideal order or plan. Yet it is obvious that it is
not enough that there simply be seen a necessary plan in the facts. Some­
thing further is needed to secure the notion of certainty in history, and 
that is that the facts be seen as unfolding according to the plan. That 
is to say that the institutional history of man must be able to be viewed 
such that it can be seen as being, in some sense, forced to follow the 
"ideal eternal history." Vico says:
The decisive sort of proof in our Science is therefore this: 
that, since these institutions have been established by divine 
providence the course of the institutions of the nations had to 
be, must now be, and will have^ t^o be [my emphasis] such as our 
Science demonstrates . . .. "
Vico believes that he must show that divine providence is at work in the 
institutions of man if he is to "reduce to certainty human choice" and 
make history a science. We shall conclude our discussion of Vico's con­
cept of certainty in history, therefore, by briefly examining his notion 
of "divine providence." For Vico, it is this teleological concept of
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divine providence which is finally used to unite or synthesize the 
particular facts of various histories with the universal stages of the 
"ideal eternal history."
Vico's notion of providence was first developed in his early 
works on natural law and jurisprudence.^'^ Space does not here allow us 
to examine the details of this early development. However, commentators 
tend to agree that Vico's theory of providence in The New Science is es­
sentially the same as that of his earlier works on Roman jurisprudence."^ 
The problem in the earlier work was to understand the precise relation­
ship between the principles and ideals of universal law on the one hand 
and the particular historically determined causes which produced positive 
laws on the other.""* As Professor R. Caponigri has pointed out:
The function which Vico, in his interpretation of Roman law and 
jurisprudence, assigns to the concept of providence is precisely 
the function of reconciling the ideal and the temporal orders. . . 
the function of determining a natural law which arises within 
and with the movement of the actual formation_,of structures of 
positive law and which is therefore, an ideal process transpir­
ing through time. The natural law is one which has arisen and 
arises with the customs of the peoples. It is an eternal law,
. . . The concept of providence which is operative in the 
Vichian theory of history is the extension of the concepp^gf 
providence which he associates with Roman Jurisprudence.
Further, it is also clear (as another commentator has pointed 
out,"® that the general problem of the relationship between historial and 
ideal law (i.e., positive law and universal law) is actually the same prob­
lem that exists in The New Science concerning the synthesis of the true 
with the certain. Because of the similarity of these problems, the solu­
tion to the "problem of law" is later seen by Vico as (basically) the same' 
solution to the "problem of history." The problem is to reconcile the 
universal with the particular. The solution is to make use of the concept
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of providence in such a manner (i.e., epistemoiogically) that one can 
achieve coherence and certainty (for the science of history) by linking 
particular historical facts to an ideal universal pattern. Vico, borrow­
ing a page from Plato, emphasizes the similarity between law and history. 
Just as divine providence guides man's actions in history so too it guides 
his actions through legislation.
Legislation considers man as he is in order to turn him to good 
uses in human society. Out of ferocity, avarice, and ambition, 
the three vices which run throughout the human race, it creates 
the military, merchant, and governing classes and thus the 
strength, riches, and wisdom of commonwealths . ... This axiom 
proves that there is a divine providence and further that it is 
a divine legislative mind (The New Science, #132-33).
We may summarize Vico's notion of providence in the following 
three points: first, providence is a teleological activity, i.e., it is
an activity which displays an overriding purpose operating in the affairs 
of man. The purpose is also to be seen as "forced," i.e., as legislative, 
because many times it goes directly against the particular intentions of 
the particular men involved. Often, " . . .  without human discernment or 
counsel, and often against the designs of men, providence has ordered this 
great city of the human race."'^^ Vico further believes that the preser­
vation of the human race can only be accounted for if we assume that man's 
immediate actions do indeed follow an overriding purpose.
Secondly, providence is to be thought of as divine. By "divine" 
Vico means that his new science provides us with the means of discovering 
things, i.e., finding out, " .. . from divinari, to divine, which is to 
understand what is hidden from men--the future--or what is hidden in them—  
their consciousness."^^® Divine providence is a providence, therefore, 
which, although it has been hidden from men, can now be discovered by our
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historical examination of the ideas of men using Vico's "new critical 
method."
Finally, providence is to be thought of as mind. This is because 
the only real alternative to fate (i.e., the physical determinism of the 
stoics) or to chance (i.e., the indeterminism of the Epicureans) is the 
purposeful activity of mind. Vico believes that we must assume this pur­
poseful activity if we are to explain the affairs of men. "That which 
did all this was mind, for men did it wilh intelligence; it was not fate, 
for they did it by choice; not chance, for the results of their always so 
acting are perpetually the same.'!*^ *
It is by his use of the concept of a "divine legislating mind" 
operating in the affairs of men, that Vico is able to show how a science 
of history is possible. Certainty in history can be achieved only be­
cause history is seen to be a teleological process. The affairs of men 
when viewed teleologically are seen to follow necessarily the sequence 
of stages demonstrated in "the ideal eternal history." The ultimate im­
petus for this teleological force itself is mind (i.e., God) whose pur-
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pose it is to "preserve the human race." It is, therefore, because 
of Vico's epistemic use of the concept of teleology (in conjunction with 
his epistemic use of the "maker's-knowledge criterion") that he can claim 
to have achieved the synthesis of truth with certainty, the universal 
with the particular, and the various empirical histories of nations with 
an ideal eternal history. In this way Vico claims to have demonstrated 
with his new science the manner in which the science of history is 
possible.
I should like to conclude this chapter by examining three dis­
tinct, yet related, ideas that occur in The New Science and that seem to
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follow from Vico's "maker's-knowledge criterion" in its relation to 
history. The ideas I have in mind are "making," "re-making,and "self- 
making,"*^ ** as they occur in the context of historicism.*^^ In order to 
understand more precisely the relationship of these ideas to Vico's 
"maker's-knowledge criterion" 1 shall offer a sketch of what 1 consider 
to be the formal pattern of Vico's argument for the possibility of history 
being a science. 1 shall then show how the ideas mentioned above are re­
lated to this "formal" argument.
We shall begin by letting V stand for the "verum factum thesis," 
i.e., the thesis which states "what is true and what is fact (i.e., the 
made) are convertible."*^® It was because of this thesis and because of 
his acceptance of the theory of transcendentals that Vico arrived at his 
"maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth. To be a fact is to be One, True, 
and Good. All facts are made; therefore, truth is made. To know is to 
produce the causes; hence, "one can only know if one makes."
Next, let 2  stand for the "identity thesis"; this is the stronger 
version of the "maker's-knowledge criterion" (i.e., God's maker's knowl­
edge) in that it claims that "when one knows, one is thereby making" and 
conversely "when one makes, one is thereby knowing." Vico arrived at this 
thesis by his God/man analogy, and he asserts that this is the thesis which 
holds for the sciences of geometry and history. This thesis claims that 
man has "God-like" knowledge in the sciences of geometry and history be­
cause his (man's) knowing also is equal to his making.*
Finally, let £ stand for the "synthesis thesis"; this is the 
thesis that states "philosophical truth, i.e., the eternal and universal, 
may be seen in philological certainties, i.e., the contingent and
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p a r t i c u l a r . T h e  synthesis thesis relies upon identifying those acts 
of men (i.e., the acts by which men have made their institutions) with 
the criterion of certainty, i.e., "the common sense of the human race." 
(This is, in effect, to identify the "made" with the "certain.") Because 
of this identity Vico is able to reconstruct the particular acts of men 
(i.e., the causes for the institutions) by his knowledge of man's common 
sense ideas. Having thus identified the certain with the made, Vico can 
then synthesize the true with the certain by relying upon the verum-factum 
thesis stated above. This then is the logical framework of Vico's claim 
that "because one makes history one can know it with truth and certainty."
From the above three theses we can construct Vico's argument as 
follows: Knowledge of anything is justified by the "maker's-knowledge
criterion" (Thesis V, this is the argument of the first part of Ve Anti- 
guissima'). There exists some human knowledge which is classified as being 
identical with its making (Thesis I; for man this includes geometry and 
history). Knowledge which is classified as I necessarily comes under 
thesis S because of the identity of the "certain" with the "made" and 
because of thesis V. Add to this the argument of The. New Science that 
histo;:y is "more real" than geometry and, therefore, is a genuine science, 
and we get the following conclusion. Since in historical knowledge V, I, 
and therefore, S obtain, history can be known with complete (real) truth 
and certainty. Therefore, it is a genuine science.
With this formal argument in mind let us now examine the three 
previously mentioned ideas. First, the making and knowing that Vico is 
referring to in the identity thesis is not the actual "first-order" mak­
ing and knowing of the people being investigated. That is to say, Vico
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does not mean, in claiming that "we can know the civil world because we 
have made it." that we will precisely have the same kind of conscious 
awareness of the world that the original historical agents themselves had. 
That is, he does not mean to say that because they "made" the world and
knew it, so too we "make" the world and can, therefore, know their world.
He cannot mean this or anything like this because that kind of awareness, 
if at all achievable, would simply amount to an immediate psychological 
awareness of the historical agent's world which is mere consciousness 
(coscienza), not science (scienza).
On the contrary, Vico's notion is that The New Science explains
the historical conditions (i.e., the causes) that determine human nature
itself. It is human nature in turn which allows for the various kinds of
consciousness that a people may have. As Max Fisch correctly observes:
. . . the science of the world of nations has not come, ipso 
facto and pari passu with the [1st. order making], . . . The 
new science comes rather with a [2nd. order] remaking, a re- 
construcing, which could not even begin until Vico had made a 
certain discovery.'
That discovery was of certain eternal principles'^' which would allow the
historian to reconstruct the conditions and thus know the causes of the
development of man's institutions.
A science of history becomes possible because the principles 
by which the civil world has been "made" (in the first-order sense of 
"made") are to be found within the modifications of the human mind.'
Since the historian himself is a human mind, he will, therefore, be able 
to discover these same principles (within himself) that governed the mak­
ings of the original historical agents. It is precisely because of this 
identity-feature'®^ of the historian with the historical agent that the
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historian can scientifically re-make (by reflecting on and re-thinking the
history of human ideas according to Vico's principles) the past and thereby
create and know history. This point is summed up well by Leon Pompa:
The identity between historian and historical agent, upon which 
the possibility of history itself depends, is therefore more than 
purely formal . . . for Vico, the peculiar intelligibility of 
history rests upon insights into our own nature which are access­
ible to us by virtue of our capacity to reflect upon ourselves in 
our various social and historical activities, so that we can be 
aware not merely of the different ways in which we see and react 
to our world but also of the different conditions which cause 
us to see and react thus. ^ ^
The "making" of the civil world of affairs and the "making" (i.e., 
(remaking) of its history, although epistemoiogically connected by the 
identity-feature of the historical agent and the historian, are thus two 
quite distinct kinds of "makings." It is because of the difference of these 
two "makings and knowings" that science of the original making is possible. 
The very functioning of the "maker's-knowledge criterion" and its strong 
identity-thesis use in history necessitates this difference. If the "mak­
ing and knowing" of the historical agent were literally the same as the 
"making and knowing" of the historian, then the identity thesis set out 
above would justify only consciousness (coscienza) of the civil world of 
affairs (as experienced by the original historical agent). It would not 
justify science (scienza) of that world (i.e., its history) as constructed 
and experienced by the historian.
The second important point, which is related to these distinct 
senses of "making," is that there emerges in Vico's philosophy of history 
(as a result of applying the "maker's-knowledge criterion" to history) the 
notion of a developmental self-makxng.^^^ This is to say that Vico views 
historical development as self-development. The notion of self-development
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is arrived at by our reflecting upon the "making" of the civil world by 
the original historical agent. Upon reflection we find that the histori­
cal agent's actions have caused whatever social changes that have 
occurred in the civil world. These social changes in turn are reflected 
by and take place in the agent's own institutions, e.g., laws, customs, 
etc. Hence, the result of the historical agent's actions is that his in­
stitutions bring about fundamental changes in his oivn nature, i.e., the 
creator of the institutions is shaped by his own creation. This is simply 
to say that the institutions which can be and are changed by men also 
change men.
It is in light of his "ideal eternal history" that Vico sees this 
reciprocal change as a developmental process '(#239-245). He holds, 
therefore, that the original "making" of the historical agent should be 
viewed as the activity which is responsible for developing man. IVhen 
speaking of this developmental process, he tells us that men have made this 
world and ". . . in a certain sense created themselves [my emphasis]
(also see #367, 692, 520).
It is in this sense that the "making" of the civil world is seen 
as developmental and as a "self-making." The relation of the idea of "de­
velopmental self-making" to Vico's "maker's-knowledge criterion" (in theories 
of history) now becomes more apparent. Given Vico's epistemological theses 
concerning history (i.e., verum-factum thesis, identity thesis, and syn­
thesis thesis), he has no alternative but to view historical development 
as the story of man making himself rational. We can see this most clearly 
by asking what would happen if Vico were to deny that this developmental 
self-making concept was a necessary concept for his doctrine of history.
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The result would be an account of the development of human nature in 
non-human-made, i.e., ahistorical terms. This view would imply that the 
nature (or natures) of a thing is something that is totally independent 
of its historical circumstances. Vico could obviously not accept such a 
view since it is his theory that nature and nascence are one and the same.
To know the nature of anything is simply to know " . . .  that the nature or 
birth (natura o nascimento) was thus and not otherwise,"* and that the 
thing in question came " . . .  into being at certain times and in certain
14 0guises."
IVhat Vico is arguing then is that to know the nature of anything 
one must know its history. The only way in which we know (i.e., scientific­
ally ascertain with truth and certainty) a thing's history is by making 
use of the epistemological theses contained in Vico's maker's-knowledge 
theory. Upon making use of this theory in the area of history where the 
subject matter is human beings, we find that human nature exists solely 
within the context of human institutions and that the history of these in­
stitutions is actually the history of man making himself human. This 
is to say that man's humanity is itself a human artifact. It is because 
man makes institutions, which in turn develop his own nature, that Vico 
sees the historical "making" of institutions as a process of man's own self­
making and self-development.
Since the nature of man is "nothing but" his own historical past, 
genuine self-development is simply historical development. Therefore, the 
notion of "developmental self-making" is a necessary one for Vico because 
it is merely the other side of the coin of historical development. The no­
tion of historical development, as we have seen, is epistemoiogically 
grounded in the maker's-knowledge theory of history.
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Our third and final point concerns Vico's historicism. We have 
seen that it is Vico's anti-Aristotelian view of the "natures" of things 
(i.e., his denial that a nature or essence is something above and beyond 
its genesis or history) and his (own, original) positive ontogenetic 
view'"*^  that accounts for his commitment to historicism.^'*^ Further, we 
have seen that it is because of his "maker's-knowledge" theory that his 
particular form of historicism is decidedly idealistic. For Vico the "mak­
ing" in the Verum-Factum thesis (i.e., the "remaking" which is done by the 
philosophical historian) is actually the literal creation of history. In
other words Vico is claiming that history simply and finally is this
"re-making."
This is finally to argue that the historian reflects upon the his­
torical facts according to philosophical principles (thereby providing a 
philosophical justification of his interpretation of those facts). Also, 
in his meditating the historian at one and the same time re-makes the facts 
in such a way that he thereby creates history. Vico further insists that 
not only the historian, but anyone who "meditates this Science" according 
to Vico's principles will be creating history much in the same manner as 
God creates nature.*'*'' Let us here conclude our study by pointing out
briefly how this idealistic historicism is related to Vico's own work, i.e..
The New Science as a work.
We have seen that Vico simply considers it axiomatic that "Doc­
trines take their beginnings from that of the matters of which they t r e a t .  
This axiom, combined with what Vico has said concerning the identity of 
nature and nascence, gives us his controlling methodological postulate.
This postulate says that to get at the essence of a thing we must uncover
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its origin, for it is precisely within its origin that the thing's essence 
is constituted. Vico makes it clear in Tfie New Science that the above no­
tion is . . universally used in all the matters which are herein dis­
cussed."*'*® It seems, therefore, that discovering the essence of any 
matter discussed in The New Science must involve inquiring into the origins 
of that matter, i.e., into its history. Now one such matter discussed 
throughout The New Science is science itself. Hence, it should follow 
that to understand the truth of science (including Vico's own "new" sci­
ence) we must understand the history of science. We can now begin to see 
what this claim involves.
In order to understand the history of science, according to Vico's 
"maker's-knowledge thesis," we are required to see that first, science is 
one of the things made in the original "making" of the civil world of na­
tions. *'*^ This is a necessary condition to be fulfilled in order that the 
essence of a science might eventually become known. This is to say that 
it is only by being a member of the "made" (first-order) civil world that 
something can have or be eligible to have, so to speak, an essence (i.e., 
a history). Further, it is only by having a history that the thing in 
question can be a possible object for scientific knowledge. Secondly, 
we must also see that the thing in question cannot have a history unless 
it is meditated by, i.e., seen in the "light of," Vico's principles. Hence, 
to achieve the truth of a science, including the science of history itself, 
i.e.. The New Science, one must "meditate" it according to Vico's principles.
Where does this leave us? The essence of science (or anything 
else) is its history. This is Vico's historicist claim. To know the 
history of science (or anything else) requires that science be amenable
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to the "maker's-knowledge criterion" and the other intricate epistemological 
arguments of The New Science. This is Vico's idealist claim. The essence 
of the thing is its history which is remade by mind. However, the "maker's 
knowledge criterion," as we have seen, also requires that that which it pro­
duces the truth of be first "made" in the world of civil nations. The result 
is that to know the essence of a particular science we must create its his­
tory, i.e., we must trace its development in the civil world of nations. 
Vico's claim is that the history of science is actually the science of 
science.*"*® It is necessary, therefore, to trace out the history of physics, 
logic, astronomy, geography, economics, and metaphysics in order to have 
science of them. It is to Vico's credit that he saw that the essence of 
his own "new science" must be justified in this same manner. (One may even 
view his autobiography as concerning itself with just this task.)
The manner in which Vico's maker's knowledge theory functions in 
The New Science makes it impossible for man to achieve an absolutely cer­
tain science of nature. In order to have a science of nature, nature must 
have a history. In order for nature to have a history (according to Vico), 
it must be made by man. But nature cannot have a history, for nature was 
not originally made by man. Now, approximately sixty years later, a great 
German philosopher will argue that while it is true that history is the 
story of man making himself human, it is also true that nature can be known 
precisely because man has made it. The philosopher, of course, is Kant, 
and it is to his theory of maker's knowledge and nature that we now turn.
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root of the other sciences, i.e., the other sciences could be fully under­
stood only if it is understood how they are epistemoiogically legitimized. 
As we've seen, science can only be epistemoiogically legitimized if it is 
the case that "we know because we make.” However, this maker's-knowledge
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criterion means human beings "make" the sciences possible, so to understand 
the nature of that possibility we must understand the nature of humanity.
. This is to say that we must achieve self-understanding, which we can do 
only in history. In this sense the study of humanity is prior to and more 
basic than the study of the other sciences.
. . il punto . . . el'uno . . . sono due entita fittizie." (Sansoni, 
p. 66), De Antiquissima.
®®". . . per ipotesi sul punto metafisico." (Sansoni, p. 86, Be Antiquissima) 
This hypothesis acts in much the same way as Kant's regulative ideas of 
reason. Further, Vico's metaphysical analogy concerning the generation 
of geometrical objects from geometrical points, and that of real objects 
from metaphysical points, has a striking parallel in Kant's discussion of 
the same issue, i.e., the extension of matter. In the "Axioms of Intui­
tion" Kant tells us, "I cannot represent,to myself a line, however small, 
without drawing it in thought, that is, generating from a point all its 
parts one after another." (B203/A163)
Antiquissima, Flint, p. 90.
New Science, paragraph #331.
®*Sansoni, Be Antiquissima, p. 82, and Fisch, Symposium on Vico, p. 409.
"In physics the elements of natural things are outside us; we cannot demon­
strate by causes, what we make is not what we seek to know but only some­
thing like it . . ."
®^That Vico's new science is a science of humanity is appropriately recognized 
by Georgio Tagliacozzo and Donald Phillip Verene, the editors of a new col­
lection of writings on Vico, Giambattista Vico's Science of Humanity 
(Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
®^rhe New Science, paragraph #338.
®‘*Ibid., paragraph #692.
. . la scienza umana ha sezionato I'uomo in corpo e animo." Sansoni,
Be Antiquissima, p. 64.
^^The New Science, paragraph #630.
®’lbid., paragraph #629.
®®Ibid.
®®See Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenonologg of Mind and Introduction to 
Philosophy of History.
^®It is clear that Vico thinks of mind as (1) embodied in matter and (2) some­
how superior to matter, for it is mind that directs mind/body, e.g., see 
Be Antiquissima, trans. Flint, p. 90. Also see paragraphs #130, #597, #630
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o£ The New Science. Vico and Hegel differ fundamentally, however, in that 
for Hegel all of nature and thus all of corporeality is ultimately mind in 
the form of "the other." (Hegel makes use of a doctrine of "estrangement" 
to attempt to make this argument cohere.) For Vico corporeality is in some 
sense seen to be united with form in Platonic-Aristoteiian manner that is 
never made quite explicit.
. . there is divine providence . . .  a divine legislative mind. For 
out of the passions of men each bent on his private advantage, for the 
sake of which they would live like beasts in the wilderness, it has made 
the civil institutions by which they may live in human society." The New 
Science, paragraph #153 (also see #342, #1106).
’^The New Science, paragraph #349.
’^Ibid., paragraph #630.
74 Ibid., paragraph #629-630.
 ^^ Concerning the priority and necessity of metaphysical truth over physical 
truth, see XLVII paragraphs 204-5 of the "Elements," in The New Science. 
Concerning form and matter, see #33 of the "Principles" ". . . now in order 
to make trial whether the proposition . . . can give form to the materials 
prepared . . .", etc.
. . by that property of every science, noted by Aristotle, that science 
has to do with what is universal and eternal (scientia debet sees de uni- 
versalibus et aetemis." The New Science, paragraph #163.
’’See, e.g., paragraphs #2, #5, #133, #342, #343, #1108, #1109, and #948 in 
The New Science.
’®See, e.g., paragraph #7, ". . . and reduces it to the form of a science by 
discovering in it the design of an ideal eternal history . . . "  And see 
paragraph #2, "The conduct of divine providence in this matter is one of 
the things whose rationale is a chief business [my emphasis] of our Science, 
which becomes in this aspect a rational civil theology of divine providence.' 
The New Science.
’®See paragraph #347 also for seven principal aspects of The New Science; see 
"Corollaries Concerning the Principal Aspects of This Science," pp. 121-6.
®°rhe New Science, paragraph #348.
®^lt has been pointed out earlier that Vico uses the term "philology" to mean 
the " . . .  histories of languages, customes, etc. . . . "  See paragraph #7, 
The New Science.
®^ ". . . to see in fact [i.e., in the facts] this world of nations which we 
have studied in idea . . . "  The New Science, paragraph #163. Also see 
paragraph #140 " . . .  the philosophers failed by half in not giving cer­
tainty to their reasonings by appeal to the authority of the philologians.
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and likewise how the latter failed by half in not taking care to give 
their authority the sanction of truth by appeal to the reasoning of the 
philosophers ..."
New Science, paragraph #138.
®'*The following passages are explicitly concerned with this synthesis: para­
graphs #137 through #143, The New Science
®®Ibid., paragraphs #348.
®®Ibid., paragraphs #349.
®^ ". . . a veder in fatti questo mondo di nazioni quale I'abbiamo meditato 
in idea." Sansoni, p. 438; see quote #7 above for translation. The sense 
of Vico's claim here is more readily seen in the Italian. The point is 
that the "idea" is immanent in the facts and with the proper method can be 
"seen" in the facts. Vico's further claim is that the history of ideas 
actually follows the facts, i.e., the order of institutions (238). But, 
history is confirmed by the history of philosophy (499), which in turn 
itself is told philosophically (1043). It seems that Vico shares the 
idea with Hegel and Husserl that the history of philosophy when seen phil­
osophically tells us something important about history itself and truth.
®®Vico's "new critical art" is thought by him to be different from other 
critical methods in at least two ways. First, it deals with Topics rather 
than Critics, #498, "Topics has the function of making minds inventive, as 
criticism has that of making them exact." Second, Vico believed his method 
was a better method because it was more comprehensive in that it grounded 
knowledge philosophically, i.e., metaphysically (#348, #392, #493, #662, 
and #839), where those "other" methods of the philologians did not.
New Science, paragraphs #161-2.
®®Ibid., paragraph #348. It should be noted that the criterion of certainty 
here is a broader version than that found in De Antiquissima in that it now 
includes the common sense of a people at a given "time-sect."
®^Ibid., paragraph #144.
®*Ibid., paragraph #145.
®®Ibid.
®‘Ibid., paragraphs #141-144. This. is simply to say that human beings exposed 
to the same historical and social conditions concerning their needs and 
utilities will be conditioned in the same ways. (IVhile there may be ex­
ceptions, the claim seems quite reasonable.)
®®Ibid., paragraph #161.
®®Ibid., paragraph #238.
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Ibid., paragraph #349.
9*Vico's argument is basically this: to demonstrate the facts of history
we need to know the conditions which established, or allowed for the es­
tablishment of, social institutions. This is because these institutions 
gave rise to the ideas which historical agents acted upon, thereby caus­
ing particular historical facts.
s^Vico's "new art of criticism" contains a body of principles (referred to 
earlier) which are supposed to provide a procedure of verifying the con­
tent of various historical claims. He uses these principles to examine 
precisely what conditions would have been sufficient for the occurrence 
of particular facts. These principles then make up the philological 
part of the "new art" and they allow for the new sources of historical 
information. "For by virtue of new principles of mythology herein dis­
closed as consequences of the new principles of poetry found herein, it 
is shown that the fables were true and trustworthy histories of the cus­
toms of the most ancient peoples . . .", paragraph 7. See also paragraph 
#357.
The "new method" must then give a philosophical account of those theories 
which establish historical facts. This is the philosophy part (there are 
also philosophical principles) of the method. Therefore, the presupposi­
tions of any historical theory that claims to establish the conditions 
which are the causes of particular historical facts (e.g., the theories 
of natural law theorists such as Seldon, Hobbes, or Pufendorf). Thus, 
presuppositions concerning human nature, or the nature of the relationship 
of human ideas to human actions, must themselves be philosophically justi­
fied in order that the particular theory in question may be accepted or 
rejected.
The point to see is that Vico requires that both philological and philo­
sophical principles are necessary for history to become a science. For 
an example of certain facts established by his method, see paragraphs #727-8, 
#352-9, The New Science.
looy^g ffew Science, paragraph 7 
lo'lbid.
paragraph #349.
lo^lbid., paragraph #7, e.g., "And here, by the principles of this new critical 
art, we meditate upon what determinate times and what particular occasions 
of human necessity or utility felt by the first man of the gentile 
world . . . "  1 have used here Leon Pompa's translation, for he better cap­
tures the sense of meditatio than does Fisch (Pompa, p. 100; Sansoni, p. 382).
10‘See reference #12 above.
10 spor the principles upon which the order of the ideal eternal history is 
based see paragraphs #241-295 in The New Science (Lxvl-xcvll). Vico is in
109
effect saying that the philosophical elucidation of the presuppositions 
which underlie his reconstruction of the histories of nations amounts to 
stating various necessary philosophical truths. He gives as an illustra­
tion the example of how the new Publilian law set the stage for a change 
from aristocratic government in Rome to a popular commonwealth. He says:
If we read further into the history of Rome in the light of this 
hypothesis, we shall find by a thousand tests that it gives sup­
port and consistency to all the things therein narrated that 
have hitherto lacked a common foundation and a proper and par­
ticular connection among themselves . . . wherefore this hypoth­
esis should be received as true. However, if we consider well, 
this is not so much a hypothesis as a truth meditated in idea 
which later will be shown with the aid of authority (conl* 
autorita) to be the fact .... This hypothesis gives us also 
the history of all the other cities of the world in times we 
have so far despaired of knowing. This then is an instance of 
an ideal eternal history traversed in time by the histories 
of all nations" (The New Science, paragraph #114).
(I owe acknowledgement to Leon Pompa for pointing out this passage and its 
philosophical import in his book on Vico, p. 149.)
^°^The New Science, paragraph #348.
'o?Ibid., paragraph #348, #349, and #390. It is important to note that Vico 
believed all other attempts at making history a science had failed for two 
primary reasons. First, there was no adequate philosophical account given 
as to how truth was to be secured from the sceptic (paragraph #331, #349). 
Vico, of course, remedied this with his "maker's-knowledge criterion." 
Second, there was no adequate philosophical account of how the truths of 
history were to be made certain. He remedies this with his "new art." He 
says :
We trust therefore that we shall offend no man's right if we 
often reason differently and at times in direct opposition to 
the opinions which have been held up to now concerning the 
principles of the humanity of nations. By so doing we shall re­
duce them to scientific principles, by which the facts of cer­
tain history may be assigned their first origins, on which they 
rest and by which they are reconciled. For until now they have 
seemed to have no common foundation or continuous sequence or 
coherence among themselves (The New Science, paragraph #118)
'°®The New Science, paragraphs #975-8.
lo^Ibid., paragraphs #367, #520, #692. For a complete list of the institutions 
and times that correspond to the three natures which the course of every 
nation follows, see paragraphs #916, #979. Also see a list of principles 
in the first part of this chapter.
ii'Ibid., paragraph #393.
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111 Ibid., paragraph #348.
li^Sinopsi del diretto Universale and De imiversi iuris uno principio et fine 
uno, Sansoni edition (Firenze, 1974), Vico Opere Giuridiche.
11^Commentators, e.g., such as Flint, Croce, and Caponigri,
11‘•See Autobiography, pp. 120-1.
ii®Caponigri, Time and Idea, pp. 93-94.
ii®See, e.g., Guido Fasso, "Law and the Historical Origin of the New Science," 
in Vico's Science of Humanity, ed. Tagliacozzo and Verene (Baltimore, Mary­
land: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 12.
11’The New Science, paragraph #342 (also see paragraph #1108).
11®Ibid., paragraph #341, e.g., "Therefore it is only by divine providence that 
he [man] can be held within these institutions to practice justice as a mem­
ber o f . . .  mankind."
And again, " . . .  a divine argument which embraces all human institutions, 
no sublimer proofs can be desired than . . . the naturalness [of the means] 
the [unfolding institutive] order [in which they are employed] and the end 
[thereby served] which is the preservation of the human race." (paragraph 
#344)
11®Ibid., paragraph #342
12“Ibid.
i2ilbid., paragraph #1108, see also paragraphs #341-2.
i22ibid., paragraphs #1107-8.
i2®At the bottom of Vico's notions of "re-making" and "re-constructing" is the 
important doctrine of "reflection" as is pointed out by Pompa (Vico, pp. 
165-9).
i2‘*For the notion of "self-making," see paragraphs #367, #520, and #692 of 
The New Science.
i2®By "historicism" I mean the combination of two distinct doctrines: First,
that the truth of anything is to be found only by knowing the history of 
the thing in question, i.e., its genetic development (#147, #148). And 
second, that history actually is and can only be the creation of the his­
torian in the present (#349). As Collingwood puts it, "The paradoxical 
result is that the historical past is not past at all; it is present. It 
is not a past surviving into the present; it must be the present." Idea 
of History, p. 155. Vico's idea of history involves both of these points. 
Whether his historicism also involves relativism is a different question.

Ill
*^®"Verum e factum sono la medesima cosa." Sansoni, p. 62.
*^ ”^And this fact is an argument 0 reader, that these proofs are of a kind 
divine and should give thee a divine pleasure, since in God knowledge and 
creation are one and the same thing [my emphasis]. The New Science, para­
graph #349. Also see paragraph #376 and #430.
^^®Ibid., see paragraphs #137-145.
'^*Ibid., see paragraphs #331 and #349.
'^Giambattista Vico; An International Symposium, p. 413. Leon Pompa makes 
much the same point:
The knowledge which the new science is to make available could 
never, therefore, be just an account of the historical or social 
situation as appreciated by the historical agents themselves.
It would also have to involve an account of those historico- 
sociological conditions under which such appreciations arise, 
i.e., an account of the historical and sociological conditions 
under which common sense itself receives its content" (Vico, 
p. 84).
^^^The New Science, paragraph #7.
*^^lbid., paragraph #331.
^^%ee the idealist interpretation of "more real truth" in the first part of 
this chapter for an explanation of the identity-feature. This feature, 
although related, is distinct from the identity-thesis which equates know­
ing with making.
'^^Pompa, p. 167.
^^^is is not to deny that some aspects of the historical agent's conscious­
ness can be identical with that of the historian's consciousness. In some 
cases they might very well be identical. In fact one philosopher, Emil 
Fackenheim, points out that ". . .if human is qua being and qua human 
historical, there can be no ontological divorce between the historical 
consciousness of the historian and the consciousness of the historical 
agent who is involved in history, and geared to the future." "Metaphysics 
and Historicity," Aquinas Lecture 1961, footnote #25, pp. 39-40.
Vico's implicit point 1 take to be this: if the historian merely recreates
the identical consciousness of the historical agent's world, then he (the 
historian) will not be in a position to look at and explain, according to 
the standards of explanation of his own culture, the historical facts of 
the society that he is investigating. At the same time, however, he can­
not simply explain everything in terms of his own culture (consciousness), 
for then he would be unable to point out the distinctively unique features 
of one society as against another, e.g., that of, say. Classical Greece and
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medieval France. As Pompa aptly puts it "Thus on the first view history 
would cease to be a species of contemporary knowledge, and on the second 
it would cease to be historical." "Vico and the Presuppositions of His­
torical Knowledge," Giambattista Vico's Science of Humanity by Tagliacozzo 
and Verene, p. 127.
This means that the historian must be able to provide a philosophy of his­
tory which will establish the necessary connection between the historian's 
makings and those of the people he is investigating. This is what I take to 
be Vico's aim.
*3®For an excellent discussion of the dialectic of historicity and self- 
making see Emil Fackenheim, Metaphysics and Historicity, Aquinas Lecture 
1961 (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1961). E.g.,
Fackenheim claims that "only a self-constituting process can be in its 
ontological constitution historical" (p. 34). ". . . And it will be seen
that the concept of self-making marks historicity off from tempor­
ality; . . . "  (p. 37).
^^’The New Science, paragraphs #239-245.
i38lbid., paragraphs #367, #520, #692.
i3*Ibid., paragraph #148.
'‘“ibid., paragraph #147.
i^^Ibid., paragraph #338, e.g., Vico tells us: "This is the science the
philologians and philosophers have given us of the principles of humanity.
Our treatment of it must take its start from the time these creatures 
began to think humanly. . . .  To discover the way in which this first 
human thinking arose in the gentile world, . . . "  Also see three kinds of 
natures, paragraphs #916-918.
^'•^"Ontogenetic" here refers to what Max Fisch calls "The controlling methodo­
logical postulate of Vico’s new science . . . "  Namely that " . . .  doctrines 
or theories must begin where the matters they treat begin. This is to as­
sume that genesis, or becoming, is of the essence of that which the new 
science treats: that, at least for the new science, nascence and nature
are the same." The New Science, Introduction, pxx.
'"•^ See footnote #50 above.
'‘•‘See footnote #52 above.
'^*^The New Science, paragraph #314.
“^•^Ibid., paragraph #315.
'‘•’See, e.g., M. Fisch, Symposixm, P314; "But science itself is true or in­
telligible only as made along with the making of the world of nations, and 
the history of science is therefore the science of it."
'■•«Ibid.
CHAPTER III 
KANT'S CRITERION IN GEOMETRY AND PHYSICS
In this chapter I shall examine Kant's use of the "maker’s-knowledge 
criterion" in relation to geometry and physics. I shall then examine his no­
tion of reflective (teleological) judgment. Once we have an idea of Kant's 
thinking in these areas we shall then (in Chapter IV) be in a position to 
understand his use of these concepts in his philosophy of history.
In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant tells us that the histories of mathematics and natural sciences have 
something in common, in method, to which they owe their success. That some­
thing he informs us is the revolutionary principle that " . . .  reason has 
insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own."^ In 
mathematics the first man to demonstrate the properties of an isosceles tri­
angle was aware of this "new method." He found that he must " . . .  bring
out what was necessarily implied in the concepts that he had himself formed 
a priori, and had put into the figure in the construction by which he pre­
sented it to himself."*
A similar revolution occurred later in natural science. Beginning 
with the experiments of Bacon and moving on to those of Galileo, Torricelli, 
and Stahl, Kant says: "A light broke upon all students of nature."* These
experiments had shown that reason in natural science would no longer be kept
". . . as it were, in nature's leading-strings, but must itself show the way
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with principles of judgement based upon fixed laws, constraining nature 
to give answer to questions of reason's own determining."'*
Kant proceeds to tell us that the success of these sciences should 
by analogy incline philosophers to imitate their method. He says: "We
must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks 
of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge."® 
Now, what we must first do here in this chapter is get as clear
an understanding as we can of Kant's episteraological ground for this so-
called "new method." As we have pointed out earlier, Jaakko Hintikka in an 
article on transcendental arguments refers to this ground as a kind of 
"maker's knowledge." After quoting the famous passage that ". . . we are 
adopting as our new method of thought . . . that we can know a priori of 
things only what we ourselves put into them,"® Hintikka tells us that this 
and other passages show that: ".. .  Kant was a link in a long but in our
modern days almost forgotten tradition which may be called the tradition 
of genuine knowledge as maker's knowledge."^
Two things here seem clear: first, the ground of the new method
is the same one that we have examined in the previous two chapters on Vico. 
Second, Kant sees this "maker's-knowledge criterion" as his most fundamental 
epistemological claim, for it is upon this idea that his so-called "Copemican 
revolution" rests.
Like Copernicus who could explain the sun's apparent revolutions 
around the earth by showing that it is the earth's daily rotation on its 
axis that explains those appearances, so too the critical philosophy would 
endeavor to explain the appearances of a realist's world (i.e., a substance-
populated causally efficacious world) by showing that it is the activity of
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mind which "makes," constitutes, and therefore can fully explain those 
appearances.® P. F. Strawson in his book The Bounds of Sense, states the 
importance of Kant's "maker's-knowledge criterion" in the following 
manner:
The very possibility of knowledge of necessary features of ex­
perience is seen by him [Kant] as dependent upon his transcen­
dental subjectivism, the theory of the mind making nature [my 
emphasis]. This indeed is the essence of the "Copemican 
revolution" which he proudly announced as the key to a reformed 
and scientific metaphysics. It is only because objects of ex­
perience must conform to the constitution of our minds that we 
can have the sort of a priori knowledge of the nature of experi­
ence which is demonstrated, in outline, in the Critique itself.®
Strawson correctly observes that Kant wishes us to understand that 
the onig wag in which we may have a priori knowledge of the nature of ex­
perience is if the objects of experience conform to the constitution of 
our mind. We might shorten this by saying that, for Kant, we can have a 
priori knowledge of objects of experience onlg because we constitute those 
objects. In other words we can know a priori because we "make," and we can 
know a priori onlg if we "make."
It is important here to note that Kant is saying that we can have
a priori knowledge only if we make it. The a priori is crucial, for it is
this notion that picks out the element of necessity that is so essential to
"scientific" knowledge.
Any knowledge that professes to hold a priori lays claim to be 
regarded as absolutely necessary. This applies still more to any 
determination of all pure a priori knowledge, since such determi­
nation has to serve as the measure, and therefore as the (supreme) 
example of all apodeictic (philosophical) certainty.'®
Kant understands the a priori part of reason, i.e., the "pure" part, to be
that which determines its phenomenal object completely." It is due to this
determination of the "object" of experience by reason that reason can know
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the necessary elements of experience. Once again then reason can know a 
priori what it has made. Further, reason can know a priori only if reason 
has made the object.
Kant's problem, therefore, was to understand exactly how an idea 
"in us" refers to and constitutes a priori knowledge of an object. He ar­
rived at an answer by assuming a "maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth.
He came to this criterion, he tells us, by examining the alternatives of 
realism and idealism and finding them insufficient answers to his own 
sceptical doubts.*’
Let us here review Kant's procedure. First, he tell us that:
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform 
to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects 
by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of 
concepts, have, on this assumption [my emphasis], ended in 
failure. *'*
The "failure" occurs on both the level of intuition and on the level of 
(conceptual) thought. ". . . if an intuition must conform to the constitu­
tion of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the latter 
a priori . . And if ". . . the concepts, by means of which I obtain
this determination, conform to the object . . .  I am again in the same per­
plexity as to how I can know anything a priori in regard to the objects."*® 
While realism seems to offer no adequate solution to the problem 
of knowledge, Kant tells us that idealism (in the form of Descartes' Cogito) 
fares no better. "Problematic" idealism fails to secure knowledge of ob­
jects precisely because it fails to establish the knowledge of the self 
upon which the knowledge of objects was to be finally secured.
. . .  I am conscious of the existence of ray soul in time, but this 
soul is only cognized as an object of the internal sense by phenom­
ena that constitute an internal state, and of which the essence in 
itself, which forms the basis of these phenomena, is unknown.*^
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. . . The consciousness of self is thus very far from being a 
knowledge of self . . .
Cartesian idealism therefore does nothing but distinguish ex­
ternal experience from dreaming.'*
Thus, having rejected the alternatives of realism and idealism
because of their inability to answer satisfactorily the doubts of the
sceptic (and Kant himself), Kant must now show how his assumption, i.e.,
a "maker's-knowledge criterion," can explain the possibility of knowing a
priori.^® He offers us as an alternative explanation to the problem of
the possibility of a priori knowledge the following: ". . . if the object
(as object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty
of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility.'
The same he thinks applies to concepts. If "... I assume that the objects
. . . conform to the concepts . . . the outlook is more hopeful."*^
Now the precise detailed argument by which Kant attempts to show
how the "maker's-knowledge criterion" actually solves the problem of a
priori knowledge in geometry and physics (and metaphysics) is to be found
throughout the Transcendental Analytic. However, there are several important
passages which make clear Kant's general idea. That is, they show how Kant
thought of his "maker's-knowledge criterion" as supplying the solution to
the problem of knowledge. Because of their importance, I shall quote the
passage at length.
There can be in us no modes [my emphasis] of knowledge, no connec­
tion or unity of one mode of knowledge with another, without that 
unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and 
by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible.**
Were the unity given in itself independently of the first sources 
of our thought, this [a priori knowledge] would never be possible.
We should not then know of any source from which we could obtain 
the synthetic propositions asserting such a universal unity of 
nature. For they would then have to be derrived from the objects 
of nature themselves.**
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However,
We can extract clear concepts of them [i.e., rules or laws of 
nature] from experience, only because we have put them into ex­
perience, and because experience is thus itself brought about 
only by their means.
The "maker's-knowledge criterion" is the correct assumption, therefore,
because:
We are merely anticipating our own apprehension, the formal con­
dition of which, since it dwells in us prior to all appearance 
that is given, must certainly be capable of being known a priori.^®
We should conclude, therefore, that:
. . . the highest legislation of nature must lie in ourselves, 
i.e., in our understanding, . . . For how were it otherwise pos­
sible to know a priori these laws, . . ..*^
Thus the order and regularity in the appearances which we en­
title nature, we ourselves introduce.^
Thus the mode [my emphasis] in which the manifold of sensible 
representation (intuition) belongs to one consciousness precedes 
all knowledge of the object as the intellectual form [my emphasis] 
of such knowledge, and itself constitutes a formal a priori 
knowledge of all objects, so far as they are thought (categories).^®
However exaggerated and absurd it may sound, to say that the 
understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and 
so of its formal unity, such an assertion is nonetheless cor­
rect, and is in keeping with the object to which it refers, 
namely experience.®
Finally,
This peculiarity of our understanding, that it can produce a priori 
unity of apperception solely by means of the categories, and only 
by such and so many, is as little capable of further explanation 
as why we have just these and no other functions of judgment, or 
why space and time are the only forms of our possible intuition.®®
Hence the only alternative that can satisfactorily explain the possibility
of a priori knowledge is the "maker's-knowledge criterion." This criterion
shows that "The understanding does not derive its laws (a priori) from, but
prescribes them to, nature."®^
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Having argued that it is by "maker*s-knowledge" that man can 
explain the possibility of a priori knowing, Kant proceeds to show how 
this criterion functions in science, specifically in mathematics (geometry] 
and physics. There are two questions that must be answered in each of 
these sciences: first, are the judgments of these sciences a priori and
yet synthetic? Second, if the first question is answered affirmatively, 
how are such judgments possible?
In mathematics Kant answers the first question affirmatively by
saying:
. . .  it has to be noted that mathematical propositions, strictly 
so called, are always judgments a priori, not empirical; because 
they carry with them necessity, which cannot be derrived from 
experience.
Further, "All mathematical judgments, without exception, are synthetic.
To say that a mathematical judgment is a priori synthetic is to say that 
it is on the one hand a necessary and universal judgment and, on the other, 
that something more is contained in the predicate concept of the judgment 
than is contained in its subject concept. An example of this would be the 
judgment "a straight line between two points is the shortest distance."
This judgment, while necessary and universal, is for Kant also synthetic.
This is because
. . . the concept of straight contains nothing of quantity, but 
only of quality. The concept of shortest is wholly an addition, 
and cannot be derived through any process of analysis from the 
concept of the straight line.^®
In the natural sciences (i.e., physics] Kant again answers the 
first question in the affirmative. He cites as an illustration the follow­
ing example: ". . . in all changes of the material world the quantity of mat­
ter remains unchanged."®® Kant believes that the necessity here, and thus the
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a priori origin of the judgment, is evident enough. He claims, however,
that this judgment must also be synthetic for the same reason that was
given in the case (above) of mathematics. He tells us:
. . .  in the concept of matter I do not think its permanence, 
out only its presence in the space which it occupies. I go 
outside and beyond the concept of matter, joining to it a 
priori in thought something which I have not thought in it.
The proposition is not, therefore, analytic but synthetic, and 
yet is thought a priori; and so likewise are the other proposi­
tions of the pure part of natural science.
Given these affirmative answers to question one, we next come to 
the second question, which Kant considered to be the "single problem" of 
the Critique of Pure Reason, namely how are such a priori synthetic judg­
ments possible?^® The answer to this question will at the same time show 
us how we are to answer the questions "how is pure mathematics possible?", 
how is pure science of nature possible?", and the question of particular 
interest for us "how is a pure science of history possible?"®® (Kant goes 
on to ask how metaphysics as a science is possible, but this question does 
not directly concern us and our present topic.) Here too, i.e., in the 
area of history as in the areas of geometry and physics, we shall see that 
the validity of Kant's answer to these questions rests upon his use of the 
"maker*s-knowledge criterion."
Geometry
Let us now turn to geometry. I should like to point out here that 
in the few lines that I shall devote to an exposition of Kant's argument 
for the possibility of geometry, I do not intend the exposition to be taken 
as a thorough comprehensive study of the issue. I shall not, e.g., even 
enter into the debate concerning the consistency of Kant's views on space 
and mathematics, e.g., those views expressed in the Dissertation of 1770
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and those of the Aesthetic or the Analytic. I might say that I agree with 
S. Komer that sketches of this kind are inadequate, especially when com­
pared to the commentary of, say, Vaihinger who devotes over one hundred 
pages to Kant's argument'*’ (or to Christopher Gamette who devotes an en­
tire book to the subject). Nevertheless, such a sketch, I feel, is neces­
sary so long as our goal is to merely achieve an idea of Kant's intent and 
method. Therefore, I shall sketch Kant's argument for the possibility of 
geometry and physics in relation to the "maker's-knowledge criterion."
In this manner we may get a better idea of how his criterion "works" in 
history. With this in mind let us proceed to the argument.
Kant wishes to show that synthetic a priori judgments make up 
Euclidian geometry.'*' By showing this, coupled with an analysis of what 
synthetic a priori judgments are, he believes he can show how we "make" the 
concepts of that science and thus acquire knowledge. The "making" or con­
struction of these concepts takes place in pure intuition, and it is for 
this reason that they are themselves "pure" (i.e., because they are con­
structed from and in accordance with a priori intuition).'*^ Thus, these 
concepts, Kant tells us, are wholly determinate. His reasoning is that 
the wholly determined concepts of geometry must rest on an a priori intui­
tion of space since it is space that geometry is the "mathematics of."**^
The problem, therefore, is to show (1) that space is a priori, and 
(2) that judgments concerning it (i.e., spatial judgments, e.g., geometri­
cal judgments) are at the same time synthetic. If this can be shown, then 
Kant believes the "a priori synthetic" character of geometry will be shown 
and thus too will the possibility of judgments about it.**** Hence, the ques­
tion to be answered (concerning the possibility of a priori synthetic
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judgments in geometry) is "can an exposition of the concept of space 
explain how it is possible that a judgment of geometry is, on the one hand, 
synthetic and on the other hand, universal and necessary?" Kant, as we've 
seen, answers this question affirmatively, and he offers the following 
reasoning to support his answer.
We must begin by giving a "metaphysical" exposition of the con­
cept of space (and of time). We first perform a thought-experiment in 
which we isolate space. We can do this (i.e., isolate space) by first iso­
lating sensibility from the understanding. The result is that we achieve 
possession (in our thought-experiment) of a "bare" empirical intuition. 
(This is an intuition which has not yet gone on to be "thought" by the 
categories and "made" into an -"object.") We then perform a second thought- 
experiment on this empirical intuition, separating the sensations of the 
empirical intuition from the intuition itself. What remains is a pure in­
tuition, i.e., an intuition "in which there is nothing that belongs to 
sensation." It is this pure intuition, Kant holds, that must be the form 
of any outer appearance. This is to say that this pure intuition is the 
aspect of the appearance that remains when substance, force, divisibility, 
etc., have all been taken away. This pure intuition, Kant tells us, is 
space; it is the form of all outer appearances.
Having arrived at the isolated pure intuition, space, Kant pro­
ceeds to explicate its co n ce p t. He  tells us that space is not an empiri­
cal concept but is, rather, a necessary a priori representation. This is 
to say, among other things, that the concept of space is in no way dis­
cursive but is instead intuitive. Why is this?
Kant gives us several arguments, of which 1 shall only sketch a 
few. If space were an empirical concept, Kant thinks we should then be
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able to represent to ourselves two perceptions which are "external to and 
beside each other" and, at the same time, we should not have to presuppose 
that space contains them. This is to say that we should be able to first 
have the perceptions and then, secondly (empirically), obtain from them 
our concept of space. Kant's claim is that this is impossible. He argues 
that the experience of those perceptions (i.e., our outer experience) is 
itself possible only through the prior representation of space."*® He con­
cludes that space cannot, therefore, be of an empirical origin but must be 
a priori.
Kant tries to emphasize this same point in other ways. He says, 
e.g., we are driven to the view that space is a priori because we cannot 
think or imagine the absence of space, where we might very well imagine "it 
empty of objects." This is again simply to reiterate that while the repre­
sentation of an object is not a necessary representation, that of space 
must be."*^  Further, since necessity itself is a mark of a priority, space 
must, therefore, be an a priori representation.
Finally, he argues that space is not a discursive concept but an 
intuition. (This argument is actually the other side of the "a priority- 
of-space" coin.) He tells us, e.g., that if space were a discursive concept, 
we should be able to represent to ourselves many "diverse spaces." However, 
we cannot do this because we find, upon reflection, that we always mean by 
"many diverse spaces" simply parts of one whole space. Since "space is es­
sentially one," it must, therefore, be an intuition because it is only by 
intuition that one can "pick out" individuals such as the individual singu­
lar whole space. (Concepts, on the other hand, ultimately refer to or "pick 
out" a plurality, i.e., many individuals.^*) Therefore, if space were not
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an intuition but were a discursive concept instead, the plurality of 
individuals to which the concept refers (in this case the "many diverse 
spaces") would precede the individual whole space in which the many spaces 
"coexist ad infinitum."'*® This, of course, Kant finds unacceptable be­
cause (as he has told us) many spaces presuppose one whole space, and it 
is only in intuition that the whole precedes the parts.®® Therefore, 
space cannot be a discursive concept but must instead be an intuition.
We can see then the manner in which Kant argues that space must 
be pure necessary intuition. It is, however, still left for us to under­
stand how he establishes that geometrical judgments, i.e., judgments about 
space, result in synthetic a priori knowledge. Kant's explanation is, in 
the main, given in his "transcendental" exposition of the concept space.
In this exposition we learn that the science of geometry is possible be­
cause space is really "in us." It is to this issue that we now turn.
Kant has told us that "geometry is a science which determines the 
properties of space synthetically, and yet a priori."®* This means at least 
three things: first, that the propositions of geometry "go beyond the con­
cept," i.e., their truth is not arrived at by simply discursively analyzing 
the subject-concept contained in those propositions.®^ Therefore, space 
must be an intuition. Second, it again emphasizes that space must be an 
a priori intuition because all of the propositions of geometry are apodeic­
tic in that they are "bound up with the consciousness of their necessity."®® 
Third, because the a priori intuition of space is "pure" and not empirical, 
it must, therefore, be "found in us prior to any perception of an object."®® 
The intuition of space must be found in us (i.e., it must have "its seat in 
the subject only") Kant believes because (as we saw earlier) this is the
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only alternative left to explain the possibility of geometry. (The 
alternatives of realism and Cartesian idealism were canvassed and found 
wanting.)
Kant's strategy now begins to make itself evident. Knowledge of 
the truths of geometry must depend upon our pure spatial intuition because 
geometry is the science of that intuition. The necessity involved in geo­
metrical construction will, therefore, have its origin in the necessary 
characteristics of space. Since space is "in us," the necessary truths 
of geometry are possible because we construct them, i.e., we make them. 
Reasoning in this manner, Kant can then show that space is (1) an intuition 
and (2) universal and necessary. He can show this by showing that space is 
not a discursive concept and necessitated prior to any empirical investiga­
tion. Both of these claims are, in turn, justified by assuming that space 
is contributed by the subject.
Nevertheless, there still remains a problem. For geometry to be 
a science, i.e., for it to give us "knowledge of the world," its product, 
i.e., geometrical truths, must be shown to apply somehow to the world (thus 
reinforcing their synthetic character).®®* Kant must, therefore, explain
* I realize that Kant has told us that the "synthetic character" 
of a judgment is simply that the predicate term is not contained in the 
subject term. My point is simply that if we were to unpack his meaning 
here, we should find that synthetic judgments in geometry (i.e., a priori 
synthetic judgments) are judgments which apply to the "world of fact."
And, further, that they must so apply if they are to count as "knowledge" 
as Kant claims they do.
In Kant's "straight-line" example, he tells us that "the concept 
of shortest is wholly an addition, and cannot be derived through any pro­
cess of analysis from the concept of the straight line." My claim is 
simply that the concept shortest is derived from experience, and hence 
the unique feature of a synthetic a priori judgment is that it is a neces­
sary statement concerning experience.
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how this relationship is possible, i.e., how it is that geometric truths 
apply to the empirical world. His general argument is the following.
Things-in-themselves affect us. As a result of their affecting 
us and in conjunction with our various "makings," i.e., our contribution 
of the forms of pure intuition and the categories, we construct, represent, 
and thus are able to experience "objects." One of the necessary features 
of this experience of objects is spatial intuition. This is to say that 
the nature of the human mind is such that it is "constrained" to repre­
sent space whenever it has an outer intuition.^® (That is, it is constrained 
to see the final results or effects of things-in-themselves in a spatial 
perspective.)
However, the mind may also have a spatial intuition without being 
affected by things-in-themselves. For example, we may simply construct a 
triangle or some other geometrical figure at will.®® Nevertheless, even 
in this case we still have spatial intuitions. This is because geometry 
is the science which concerns itself with the construction of spatial 
figures. The question that naturally arises is precisely what is the re­
lationship of the spatial intuition of the science of spatial figures, i.e., 
geometrical space, to the spatial intuition of the space that natural "ob­
jects" occupy? Kant's answer is that since there is only one space,®* the 
spatial intuition that occurs during the experience of an "object" will be 
identical with the spatial intuition that occurs in the construction of 
the geometrical figure. This is to say that for Kant the nature of space 
is such that it will guarantee that the intuition of an object will occur 
onlg if the object has the same measurable properties as those measured by 
Euclidian geometry.®^
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Since space is an a priori intuition with which we construct or 
in some sense "make" objects, we cannot help representing the same space 
as a pure intuition when we represent (experience) objects, be they physi­
cal or geometrical. Once again, this is so because all pure intuition in 
geometry is actually a special case (i.e., the geometrical case) of the 
pure intuition of space per se. Further, because of this identity, the 
form of intuition in geometry will then be identical with the form of in­
tuition in the empirical intuition of objects.®^ Therefore, the conclu­
sions of geometry and the conclusions of experience will always involve 
exactly the same space, and therefore, geometrical knowledge will neces­
sarily apply to the empirical world.
It is clear that the key to Kant's argument here lies in his doc­
trine of intuition, for although it is true that "knowledge" is composed 
of two essential elements, the concept and a given intuition, Kant never­
theless tells us (concerning geometry) that
Mathematical concepts are not . . .  by themselves knowledge . . . 
the pure concepts of understanding, even when they are applied to 
a priori intuitions, . . . yield knowledge only insofar as these 
intuitions . . . can be applied to empirical i n t u i t i o n s . [my 
emphasis]
Human beings acquire intuition only through sensibility. "Sensible" intui­
tion is either pure or empirical. It is precisely due to pure intuition,
i.e., the a priori intuition of space (and time), that geometry is a neces­
sary science. Further, for geometry to be a science of the "world," i.e., 
for it to result in knowledge as opposed to mere thought, it must somehow 
deal with the "things" in the world. (This is again to say that it must 
also be synthetic.) "Now things [my emphasis] in space and time are given 
only insofar as they are perceptions . . . therefore only through empirical
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representation."®® Geometry, therefore, can become a mathematical science 
of "empirical representations" (i.e., spatial objects in the natural world) 
only if it enlists the aid of intuition. This is because it is only within 
intuition that "things" are given to the human mind. Hence, Kant's philoso­
phy of geometry succeeds because it shows how geometrical concepts apply 
to the natural world of "things" by way of the a priori intuition of space.
In this way we can understand (philosophically) how geometry as a science 
(i.e., as a body of a priori synthetic judgments) is possible. It is pos­
sible (epistemologically) because of Kant's "maker's-knowledge criterion."
We can have a priori synthetic knowledge in mathematics (geometry) because 
we "make" the objects of mathematics.
We can summarize Kant's view of geometry vis à vis his "maker's- 
knowledge criterion" as follows: "Mathematical knowledge is the knowledge
gained by reason from the construction of concepts. To construct a concept 
means to exhibit a priori the intuition which corresponds to the concept."®® 
[my emphasis] The intuition in the case of geometry is space: "The apodeic­
tic certainty of all geometrical propositions, and the possibility of their 
a priori construction, is grounded in this a priori necessity of space."®^ 
This spatial intuition ". . . has its seat in the subject only, as the formal 
character of the subject . . ."®® Therefore, we can have a science of 
geometry because ". . .we can know a priori of things only what we our­
selves put into them."®®
Physics
What of physics? Kant has told us that by solving the general 
problem of the possibility of a priori judgments (which he solves by
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introducing his "maker's-knowledge criterion") he will have at the same 
time succeeded in showing (1) how pure mathematics is possible and (2) how 
a pure science of nature is possible.'^ ® It is to the argument for the 
pure science of nature, or physics, that we shall now turn in order to 
see how Kant uses his "maker's-knowledge criterion" to justify that sci­
ence. The same remarks apply here that were made concerning the inadequacy 
of my sketching Kant's argument for geometry (i.e., that a sketch should 
not be taken to be a thorough and comprehensive treatment). Since the 
question of the possibility of a science of nature is seen by Kant to be 
equivalent to the question "how is nature possible?" it is in terras of this 
latter question that I shall sketch Kant's answer.
It should be noted that Kant's strategy for demonstrating the pos­
sibility of a science nature is quite similar to that for demonstrating the 
possibility of geometry. Just as the possibility of our synthetic a priori 
knowledge of geometry depends upon our "making," "constructing," or "put­
ting into" those objects forms of intuition, so too will our synthetic a 
priori knowledge of the natural world depend upon our "making," "construct­
ing," and "determining" those natural objects with forms of thought. These 
"forms of thought" Kant refers to as "categories." Concerning their valid­
ity he tells us; "If we can prove that by their means alone an object can 
be thought, this will be a sufficient deduction of them, and will justify 
their objective validity."^*
Kant's desire is to show that his categories (and the forms of in­
tuition, space, and time) are the necessary conditions for the possibility 
of the experience of objects (i.e., appearances). This, he thinks, is in 
effect to say that they are the conditions for the possibility of any
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experience.He sets out to show this by presenting us with a metaphysical 
and a transcendental deduction or proof of the categories. The design of 
the metaphysical deduction is to show that the categories (i.e., the pure 
concepts of the understanding) which determine the "objects" of nature 
correspond to and have their sense derived from our logical forms of judg­
ment. We are to think of these "categories" as concepts which determine 
the given when it is brought under the forms of logical judgment. The cate­
gories are devoid of significance except and insofar as they are related to 
the logical forms of judgment.^'*
This metaphysical deduction makes it quite clear that Kant's cate­
gories do not merely "categorize" the given as such (as e.g., Aristotle's 
categories do) but also recessarilg refer to the subject in that they ne­
cessarily refer to the subject's forms of judging. Because of this "built 
in" self-reference, i.e., because the Kantian category is a concept which 
necessarily refers to the logical forms of judgment, it is not abstracted 
from experience. It must, therefore, be a priori. (It may be noted that 
this was the same strategy employed in the metaphysical exposition of the 
concept of space, i.e., that our concept of space is not abstracted from, 
but presupposed by, experience.) The Kantian category, therefore, is to 
be seen as, first, a necessary manner in which we understand nature, and 
second, a necessary character of nature. Kant's argument is that without 
both of these features (i.e., without his categories) we should never be 
able to experience necessity in nature which amounts to saying (for Kant) 
that experience would be impossible.
Hie transcendental deduction is designed to show that the categories 
are objectively valid. Kant's problem here is to demonstrate that we are
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in fact justified in believing that just these (i.e., Kant's twelve) 
categories are the categories that are employed in experience. His strat­
egy to demonstrate this (as was mentioned above) is to show that it is by 
means of these categories alone that an object can be "thought" (i.e., 
judged, "made") and, therefore, experienced. The difference then between 
the metaphysical and transcendental deductions is that while the former 
is concerned with the a priori origins of the categories (locating them 
in the subject's forms of judgment), the latter is concerned with the ob­
jective validity of the categories. The transcendental deduction wished 
to establish our right to employ these twelve categories in experience 
while the metaphysical deduction is concerned with their necessary origin.
Now, I think we should be in a better position to understand Kant's 
claim, i.e., that for an "object" of knowledge (in this case, nature) to 
be an "object" of knowledge, it must be a "made" object if we see him as 
putting forth the following two interrelated theses: first is tlie thesis
that "the object of an experience is possible only if the subject that has 
the experience can distinguish himself as a judging subject from that which 
is judged." That is to say, the subject must be able to distinguish him­
self as something that is judging from what is judged. This is the thesis 
of the "transcendental unity of apperception."
The second thesis [and this tlie transcendental deduction only poin 
to] is assuming that a form of consciousness is capable of being aware of 
itself as "judging consciousness" and thus aware of itself as a transcen­
dental unitary consciousness, that "consciousness must in turn be able to 
perceive a necessary (temporal) order among some of its perceptions as
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against others." This is the causality thesis.* I think that if we focus 
on these two theses (which Kant offers in support of his basic epistemologi- 
cal claim that only a "maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth can account 
for the possibility of genuine theoretical knowledge of nature), we shall 
get a general idea of how Kant's "maker's-knowledge criterion" "works" in 
physics.
Let us here, therefore, examine these two theses in their relation 
to one another. The first thesis, we have said, is that in Kant's attempt 
to prove the "objective" validity of the categories, he first argues that 
there must be a transcendental unity of apperception. This essentially 
means that if experience is to be possible, we must be able to distinguish 
between the judging subject and the object judged. If we could not make 
this distinction, it would not then be possible for the "I think" to ac­
company all my representations. That is to say, it would not be possible 
for me to have
. . . that self-consciousness which, while generating the repre­
sentation "I think" (a representation which must be capable of 
accompanying all other representations, and which in all conscious­
ness is one and the same), cannot itself be accompanied by any 
further representations.^  ®
The thought that the representations given in intuition one and 
all belong to me, is therefore equivalent to the thought that I 
unite them in one self-consciousness: . .
* It should be noted here that I am including more in the sphere 
of the transcendental deduction (specifically deduction B) than is technically 
included by Kant in his divisions in The Critique of Pure Reason. For ex­
ample, I am also including the argument of the Analogies, whereas technically 
this argument comes under the heading "Analytic of Principles." Nevertheless, 
I place the causality argument in this relation to the transcendental deduc­
tion because I think we can more easily understand Kant's view of "making 
an object" if we focus on the relationship of the transcendental unity of 
apperception to the categories. The very notion of "making an object" re­
quires that the subject in distinguishing himself from the object "think" 
the object according to the categories. (In our example, the category of
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Therefore, if it is to be possible that a subject may have an 
experience of an object, it must be possible to distinguish the subject 
as a "judging" subject, i.e., as a transcendental unitary self-conscious­
ness, from the object judged. But it is precisely here that Kant relies 
on his "maker's-knowledge criterion." For this distinction between sub­
ject and object, so essential to Kant, is really a distinction drawn be­
tween a judging, unifying, i.e., a "making" subject on the one hand, and 
a judged, unified, "made" object on the other. That is to say that the 
one side of this distinction, namely the judging, "making" side, necessi­
tates that there be a "maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth operative in 
connection with a transcendental unitary consciousness. This, again, must 
be the case if in having an experience we are to be entitled to call it 
our own experience.
Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given 
representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to 
represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in these 
representations.’^
Whàt of the other side of the distinction, i.e., what of the judged 
or "made" object? Here Kant's design is to argue that in order for the
causality.) Therefore, if I could not here place the argument for causality 
(causality in particular and the categories in general) in relation to the 
transcendental deduction, I should only be able to sketch part of what I 
take to be Kant's epistemic strategy in the transcendental deduction, i.e., 
to establish the transcendental unity of apperception vis à vis the dis­
tinction between judging subject and object judged. I have used the cate­
gory of causality as my example because it demonstrates in an obvious manner 
Kant's belief that to distinguish the judging subject from the object judged 
the categories are required. (For example, it is required that some per­
ceptions be seen to follow a necessary order while others do not.) See 
B239-240. Also see Arthur Melnick's book Kant's Analogies of Experience 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973) to which I am much indebted
for this line of argument taken here.
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object to be "made" and thereby experienced by the subject, the categories 
must be brought into play. This is not to say that an object could not 
appear without the categories, for Kant explicitly says that it may (A89/ 
B122). It is to say, however, that one cannot have knowledge of objects 
without the categories, which is in essence to say that without the cate­
gories, one cannot have an experience.* In this way the question of the 
"made" object really presupposes the categories. This becomes quite ob­
vious in the case of causality, and it is for this reason that I chose it 
as one of the two "essential" theses.
Kant argues in the Second Analogy that in order for experience to 
be possible some perceptions, as against others, must be seen to, i.e., 
"judged to," follow each other according to a necessary rule. In relation 
to the first thesis discussed above, this means that in order for the sub­
ject to distinguish himself from the object (by his "making" the given into 
an object), it is necessary that he be able to distinguish some perceptions 
as following a necessary order from others which do not. If he were not 
able to make this distinction Kant tells us "All succession of perception 
would then be only in the apprehension, that is, would be merely subjective 
. . .  We should then have only a play of representations, relating to no 
object."’® Kant concludes the Second Analogy by arguing that if we are to 
distinguish a "made" object from a "making" subject, we must be able first 
to make the prior distinction between a subjective experience and that which 
it is an experience of. In other words we must be able to distinguish be­
tween some perceptions that the subject judges as having a necessary order 
and others judged to lack this order.
* "In other words they [the categories] serve only for the possi­
bility of empirical knowledge; and such knowledge is what we entitle 
experience." (B147)
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The obvious question is how? Kant asks precisely how it is 
. . that we posit an object for these representations, and so, in addi­
tion to their subjective reality, as modifications, ascribe to them some 
mysterious kind of objective reality."^* His answer is emphatic: some
perceptions, as against others, are seen to be "bound down" (B237) accord­
ing to a rule, thus making objective experience possible. It is Kant's 
view then that if there were no such necessary order or "rule" we could 
not:
. . . then assert that two states follow upon one another in the 
(field of) appearance, but only that one apprehension follows 
upon the other. [But] That is something merely subjective, de­
termining no object; and may not, therefore, be regarded as 
knowledge of any object, not even of an object in the field of 
appearance.
This is essentially to push the question of the "made" object back a step 
farther. That is to say, we now have to show what conditions must neces­
sarily hold if we are to be able to distinguish our subjective and objec­
tive experiences and thus be in a position to understand how "objects" are 
"made."®*
Once again (precisely at this point), Kant relies upon his "maker's- 
knowledge criterion" to solve the problem. The experiencing subject must 
be in a position to "make" the given into an "object" (i.e., to judge the 
given according to the categories). This must be possible if the subject 
is to distinguish himself from the object. This "making" takes place in 
and through judgment where the given, in being "judged," is brought under 
the categories (in our example, the category causality). In this way what 
is judged can then be represented as an "object" of nature.
Kant's strategy then is the following: in order to have an experi­
ence, the subject must be able to distinguish himself rom the "judged"
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object. In order to make this distinction, the subject must "make" the 
given into an object. This "making" simply means that the subject must 
"judge" the given through the categories, in this case (i.e., in our ex­
ample) the category causality. Therefore, it is Kant's view that an ex­
perience of an object is possible only if a judgment of (i.e., a "making" 
of) the object through the categories is possible.*^ It is in this way 
that one of the "essential" theses relied upon by Kant for "making" the 
given into object of experience turn out to be an argument for causality. 
(This is not to say that the other categories are not also "essential" to 
Kant's argument.) In this manner (i.e., by arguing for a necessary dis­
tinction between subjective and objective experience by way of a necessary 
temporal order of perceptions due to "rule-governedness") Kant is able to 
show how the features of substance, causality, and reciprocity are funda­
mental to our objective experience of nature.
Further, and more important for our purposes, Kant attempts to 
show that these necessary aspects of experience have as their epistemologi- 
cal ground the "maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth. Knowledge of nature 
is due to the unity of self-consciousness and to the categories (as well as 
the forms of intuition) which give order to our representations.** "Nature" 
is possible (and a fortiori so too is knowledge of it) only because we "make" 
it, i.e., determine it through judgment. This "making" of nature may be 
summarized as follows:
1. The judging subject must be distinguished from the object 
of experience. Such a distinction requires that there be 
a transcendental unified consciousness.
2. A second requirement that allows us to distinguish the judg­
ing subject from the judged object is that there be material 
capable of being "made" into an object in the first place, 
i.e., a "given" is required.
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3. The categories demonstrate that in order for the subject 
to experience "objects," he must "make" the "given" into 
"objects" according to rules.
4. In "making," i.e., judging the object, we apply rules 
which allow us then to distinguish "objects" (i.e., ob­
jective experience) from merely subjective perceptions.
We can become aware of this if we heed the distinction 
between temporal orders of perceptions, i.e., subjective 
as against an objective time series (as demonstrated by 
Kant in the Second Analogy).
5. Once we have "made" an object, we can then draw the 
necessary distinction between a judging, making sub­
ject (i.e., the transcendental unity of apperception) 
and the judged, made object of experience (i.e., nature). 
This distinction is a necessary condition for any pos­
sible experience of nature.
6. Finally, this analysis (above) is not in any sense 
chronological in character, i.e., none of these steps 
in any temporal sense occurs first. Rather, these 
are logical (or transcendental perhaps) distinctions.
Reflective Judgment
Having seen how Kant relates his doctrine of maker's-knowledge to
geometry and physics via the epistemic notion of judgment, we can now under­
stand why Kant should devote so much discussion (in two separate Critiques) 
to the notion of judgment. The reason is that it is precisely this notion,
i.e., judgment, which is made responsible for the "making" character in his
philosophy.85
In the third Critique (i.e.. The Critique of Judgement) Kant dis­
tinguishes a second kind of judgement from the "determinate" kind of the 
first Critique, which also plays an important role in judging nature. This 
judgment is referred to by Kant as a "reflective" judgment. This notion 
of reflective judgment is important to the argument of Kant's philosophy 
of history because it is this notion that acts as the epistemological ground
of history. We shall in this section, therefore, briefly comment upon
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Kant's notion of "reflective" judgment, contrasting it with his notion of 
"determinate" judgment.
We have seen that Kant's solution to the problem of knowledge is
Cepistemologically} based upon his "maker's-knowledge criterion," whose
central element, i.e., the "making" element, is judgment. (It is this
idea of "judgment creating objects" that makes Kant a revolutionary in the
area of episteraology.) Hence, Kant's problem in the first Critique was to
show how experience could be "made," i.e., judged, into unified "objects"
of knowledge. To show this would be, so Kant reasoned, to demonstrate the
possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge. In a second Critique, i.e..
The Critique of Practical Reason (which we have not examined and will not
examine here) Kant addressed himself to a different but related problem,
namely how to show in the area of morality: "In the same way [how] reason,
which contains constitutive a priori principles solely in respect of the
faculty of desire, gets its holding." (CJ 168) Finally, in yet a third
Critique, i.e.. The Critique of Judgment, Kant.tells us:"
But now comes judgment, which in the order of our cognitive 
faculties forms a middle term between understanding and reason.
Has it got independent a priori principles? If so, are they 
constitutive, or are they merely regulative, thus indicating no 
special realm? And do they give a rule a priori . . .? This is 
the topic to which the present Critique is devoted.®®
Kant divides The Critique of Judgment into two parts : "The Cri­
tique of Aesthetic Judgment" and "The Critique of Teleological Judgment." 
Although both parts are concerned with the notion of "reflective" judgment 
and its relationship to experience, we shall here concern ourselves with 
only the second part, "The Critique of Teleological Judgment." We do this 
because we roust first understand Kant's concept of teleology (not beauty) 
if we are.to understand the epistemic ground of his philosophy of history.
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Kant has made it clear in the first and third Critiques that to 
"judge" is to "think" a particular representation as being contained under 
a universal concept. It is in this way that the knower, the understanding 
(i.e., the judging subject) "makes" nature into one unified experience and 
thus distinguishes it from merely subjective representations.®’ Judgment 
is that which distinguishes the objective from the subjective by taking 
some representations to stand under rules.®® It is these rules then that 
allow for the various acts of synthesis which in turn allow for the judging 
(making) of our various subjective awarenesses (of the manifold) into "ob­
jects" by bringing them (the awarenesses) under universal concepts.
One such rule which occurs in our determination of objects in 
this way is the rule of necessary succession, i.e., causality. We have 
seen that this notion is possible only if the temporal series in question 
is determined.®® And further, we have seen that it is through the faculty 
of judgment that such determination takes place. Therefore, it is a de­
terminative judgment that is responsible for the necessary order that is 
known as causality as well as for the possibility of experience in general.
Kant tells us:
Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular 
under the universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, or 
law) is given, then the judgment which subsumes the particular 
under it is determinant .... The determinant judgment deter­
mines under universal transcendental laws furnished by under­
standing and is subsumptive only; the law is marked out for it 
a priori, and it has no need to devise a law for its own guidance 
to enable it to subordinate the particular in nature to the 
universal.®®
It is determinate judgments which, by applying categories to our various 
representations, allow for the possibility of our experience of nature. 
Without determinate judgments (i.e., without judging representations cate­
gorically and constitutively), objective experience would be impossible.
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The transcendental deduction showed that for nature to be possible 
it must exist as an a priori system in accordance with categorial principles 
such that its objects form a necessary unity. This unity could be effected 
only by judgment, specifically determinate judgment. This is because de­
terminate judgment has at its disposal the universal (which is "in us") 
and could, therefore, simply subsume the particular under it.®^
So much for the necessity involved in accounting for the possi­
bility of nature. It is at this point that there arises a different but 
related problem concerning our systematic knowledge of nature. Kant states 
the problem as follows:
But there are such manifold forms of nature, so many modifica­
tions, as it were, of the universal transcendental concepts of 
nature left undetermined by the laws furnished by pure understand­
ing a priori as above mentioned, and for the reason that these 
laws only touch the general possibility of a nature (as an ob­
ject of sense) that there must needs also be laws in this behalf.
These laws being empirical may be contingent as far as the light 
of our understanding goes, but still if they are to be called 
laws (as the concept of nature requires), they must be regarded 
as necessary on a principle, unknown though it be to us, of the 
unity of the manifold.
The problem is that the necessary laws which allow for the possi­
bility of nature in general (whose necessity has its origin in determinate 
judgment) are not themselves sufficient for adequately explaining other 
necessary concepts (i.e., rules or laws) that must also be employed in 
order to come to an adequate understanding of nature. When we ask why the 
former (mechanistic) laws are inadequate, Kant replies that they can account 
for the possibility of nature only and not its apparent systematic unity.
This notion of systematic unity, Kant holds, can only be accounted 
for if we introduce the concept of teleology into natural explanation. How­
ever, the problem is that this concept, i.e., teleology, is not numbered
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among those categories that allow for the possibility of nature. Hence, 
a teleological judgment, though necessary (according to Kant) for system­
atic unity, will be different in character from a determinate judgment be­
cause it will have a different origin.
Let us quickly review Kant's argument. In order for knowledge 
of nature to achieve the rank of science, it must be able to obtain sys­
tematic unity.®'* However, this unity is to be thought of on two distinct 
levels. First, there is the systematic unity that is to be demonstrated 
by showing how pure natural science, i.e., "mechanistic" science, is pos­
sible. This is the unity treated in the Transcendental Analytic which has 
shown that experience of objects is possible only because certain necessary 
categories have formed (i.e., "made") via determinative judgment our sub­
jective experience into certain objective unities. It is the principles 
of these categories that constitute, on one level, our systematic knowledge 
of nature. "This system of categories makes all treatment of every object 
of pure reason itself systematic . . ."®® This level of systematic unity 
of nature precedes any empirical knowledge of nature because it is due to 
this unity that empirical nature is itself possible.
By nature, in the empirical sense, we understand the connection 
of appearances as regards their existence according to necessary 
rules, that is, according to laws. There are certain laws which 
first make a nature possible, and these laws are a priori. Em­
pirical laws can exist and be discerned only through experience, 
and indeed in consequence of those original laws through which ex­
perience itself first becomes possible.®*
There is, however, also a second level of the unity of nature to 
be accounted for, namely the systematic unity of nature's diverse empirical 
laws. Kant is well aware of the fact that . . in respect of nature's 
merely empirical laws, we must think in nature a possibility of an endless
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multiplicity . . Nevertheless, in order to achieve science of nature,
these laws must be seen as forming a systematic unity . . necessarily 
presupposed and assumed, as otherwise we should not have a thoroughgoing 
connexion of empirical cognition in a whole of experience."**
Once again then the problem is to show how such a systematic unity 
of empirical laws of nature can be epistemologically justified (given the 
"maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth and the argument of the first Cri­
tique') . As we have seen above, the categories and the corresponding de­
terminate judgment with which objective experience is made possible can be 
of no direct help. The categories account only for the possibility of 
nature by presenting us with the apparatus by which we "make" nature. After 
"making" nature possible, the categories have nothing to say concerning its 
specific details. For these, we must investigate nature, 'me details that 
we discover in our investigations provide the basis for our empirical gen­
eralizations, i.e., our empirical laws. However, we must still unify these 
empirical laws themselves. That is, we must systematically relate these 
laws to each other. This unification cannot be done by "determinate" judg­
ment but requires instead "reflective" judgment. As McFarland correctly 
observes :
. . . the systematic unity of the empirical detail of nature is 
not constitutive of our experience, since we could quite well have 
experience which, though subject to the categorical principles, 
was otherwise so diverse as to be incapable of further 
systematization.**
How then and by what principle are we to justify our viewing nature
such that we see her empirical laws as necessarily forming a systematic
unity? Kant's answer may be broken down into three basic stages.
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First, we must judge nature reflectively, i.e., we must make use 
of a judgment which, as opposed to determinate judgment, can " . . .  ascend 
from the particular in nature to the u n i v e r s a l . T h i s  judgment is prior 
to empirical experience in that its function is to establish the unity of 
empirical laws. At the same time it does not unify experience in the man­
ner that the categories do, for then it would be a determinate judgment and 
thus constitutive in the same manner as determinate judgments. Therefore, 
the "transcendental" character of this judgment is that it functions as a 
necessary guide, i.e., it ". . . prescribes a law, not to nature (as 
autonomy), but to itself (as heautonomy), to guide its reflection upon 
nature."***'
Second, we must secure for this "reflective" judgment a necessary 
principle, i.e., we must show by principle that reflective judgment can 
necessarily guarantee an account of the systematic unity of nature while 
it itself is not derived from an empirical investigation of nature. Kant 
says:
. . . the principle sought can only be this: as universal laws of
nature have their ground in our understanding, which prescribes 
them to nature (though only according to the universal concept 
of it as nature) particular empirical laws must be regarded in 
respect of that which is left undetermined in them by these uni­
versal laws, according to such as they would if an understanding 
(though it be not ours) had supplied them for the benefit of our 
cognitive faculties, so as to render possible a system of experi­
ence according to particular natural laws. ***^
Finally, the above two points lead us to see that reflective judg­
ment (i.e., the judgment which must find a universal for the particular by 
assuming that nature was created by some "other" intelligence for our "cog­
nitive faculties") will be one which necessarily thinks purposiveness into 
nature. This is to say that because of reflective judgment, we will judge
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nature "as if" it were created according to a plan. This kind of judgment 
is necessary once again in order for us to succeed in unifying nature's 
empirical laws and thus achieve science. A s  Kant states it, . . the 
principle of [reflective] judgement is that nature specifies its universal 
laws to empirical ones, according to the form of a logical system, for the 
purpose of the judgement."^”'* ■
We must, therefore, be able to assume that nature is of such a 
character that it can be "scientifically" known. For nature to be "sci­
entifically" known in the full sense, it must first be made possible ac­
cording to determinate judgment, and second, rendered certain and systematic 
according to teleological (reflective) judgment. A teleological judgment 
of nature is possible only if we assume that empirical laws conform to our 
power of judgment. This in turn is possible only by assuming that an 
understanding analogous to our own created the world for us such that we 
are capable of seeing the world's unity. This judgment then cannot be of 
a determinate character, for determinate judgments do not guarantee the 
unification of the empirical laws of nature. They instead guarantee only 
nature's possibility. Therefore, a reflective judgment (i.e., a teleologi­
cal judgment) is required, for only a reflective (teleological) judgment 
can guarantee the systematic unity of nature's empirical laws inasmuch as 
only teleological judgments think of nature as a purposeful unity.***® This 
then in brief is a summary of Kant's argument for the necessity of thinking 
of nature as a teleological system.
I should like to end my comments here by noting that it is re­
flective judgment that Kant sees as securing certainty (i.e., necessity) 
for the science of nature. One of the central notions involved in Kant's
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concept of science is the notion of necessary unity. Without a necessary 
unity, we can have no science, and further, all necessary unity is imposed 
by mind. "An idea has to underlie the possibility of the natural product."'”® 
[my emphasis] (I develop this notion more in Chapter IV where it is di­
rectly related to history via Kant's discussion of "ultimate" and "final 
ends.") It is because Kant contrasts the notion of necessary unity with 
that of chance [identifying "blind chance" with a "mere mechanistic explana­
tion"'” )^ that mechanistic explanation ("because it leaves things to chance") 
cannot provide the unity required for a science of nature.
Kant reiterates this thesis in several different ways. For ex­
ample, he says that for a science of nature to be possible empirical laws, 
though in one respect contingent, must be thought of if they are truly 
"laws,'”” this being especially obvious in the case of organisms. Organ­
isms, Kant says, must be judged reflectively (i.e., teleologically), for they 
can be properly conceived only if they are conceived as having been de­
signedly formed."” Finally, ". . . once such a guide for the study of na­
ture has been adopted, and its application verified, it is obvious that we 
must at least try this maxim of judgement also on nature as a whole [my 
emphasis]. .
The upshot of this line of reasoning is that only reflective judg­
ment (by which nature is judged as a purposeful unity) can secure the neces­
sity, and thus the certainty, required in order to have a complete systematic 
explanation, and therefore a "science," of nature.
Kant discusses at great length in the "Critique of Teleological 
Judgement" the related problems of mechanism and teleology. He also deduces 
there an antinomy and offers a solution, the discussion of which is quite
146
beyond our scope here.*** The important point for us to see here is that
Kant considers it absolutely necessary that nature be viewed as purposeful.
He tells us, e.g.:
For were it not for this presupposition, we should have no order 
of nature in accordance with empirical laws, and consequently, no 
guiding thread for an experience that is to be brought to bear 
upon these in all their variety, or for an investigation of 
them.* * *
We may here pause and ask, in light of Kant's notion of reflective 
judgment, where have we come? The question we set out to answer was "how 
is science possible?" This question, as we have seen, is a specific ex­
pression of the general problem of Pure Reason, namely how are a priori 
synthetic judgments possible? To answer this question, we have had to look 
at two sciences and their epistemological presuppositions.
We found that for Kant knowledge of geometry (i.e., of the a priori 
synthetic judgments which comprise the mathematical science of space) is 
possible only if we in some sense "make" the elements of that science. So 
too we found that physics (i.e., the science of natural objects in space) 
is possible only if we in some sense "make" the given manifold into an "ob­
ject." Further, in the case of physics, it became apparent that in order 
to have a complete understanding (and thus a proper science) of nature, we 
must judge nature such that we see in it a unity of a teleological 
character.
The unity of nature's empirical laws, her various organized natural 
products, her vast systems of plant and animal life, these Kant held could 
not be due to mere chance or fate but must, instead, be seen as teleologi~ 
callg necessary. They could be seen as necessary (in other words) only if 
they could be seen as evidencing a purposeful plan. Nature must be judged, 
therefore, "as if" it were designed according to a plan.
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To judge nature in this manner required a "new kind" of judgment.
A determinate judgment could not be the ground of such a concept as "pur­
pose," for a determinate judgment does not allow that its object contain 
its own purposeful end. Determinate judgments, while constitutive, are 
merely mechanistic. Further, the arrangement of the object of a determi­
nate judgment is always contingent, i.e., any particular arrangement of the 
objects could have been otherwise and yet still have been adequately (on 
mechanistic principles) explained.
We found, therefore, that determinate judgment could not give us 
the second kind of necessary unity that "science" requires. Hence, we 
needed a "new kind" of judgment to achieve this unity, and this judgment 
Kant called "reflective." It was reflective judgment that allowed us the 
kind of concept (i.e., teleological concepts) and unity that we were look­
ing for. That is the concept of ". . . an object, so far as it contains 
at the same time the ground of the actuality of this object, [this] is 
called its end."'*'*
Therefore, we must make use of reflective judgment if we are to 
achieve a "science" of nature because only reflective judgment allows us 
to view nature as a purposeful whole."® Reflective judgment allows us to 
conceive nature as a teleological whole by working hand and hand with Kant's 
"maker's-knowledge criterion." It is because we in "making" nature can 
judge (i.e., "make") it into a purposeful whole that we can achieve a com­
plete science of it. "For we can have complete insight only into what we 
can make and accomplish according to our conceptions.""®
What does this mean for history? In his essay Jdea for a Universal 
History Kant says, "The history of mankind can be seen, in the large, as
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the realization of nature's secret plan . . He then asks (at the
beginning of a later essay. An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human 
Race Constantly Progressing) "But how is a history a priori possible?"
He answers, ". . . if the diviner himself creates and contrives the events 
which he announces in advance."*'®
We are, now, finally in a position to try to understand what the 
epistemic notions of "making and knowing" and "teleology" mean in Kant's 
philosophy of history, and it is to this task that we shall now turn.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
^Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (Bxlll). Also 
see, e.g., Bxi-Bxii: "The true method, so he [Thales or some other] found,
was not to inspect what he discerned either in the figure [geometrical] or 
in the bare concept of it, and from this, as it were, to read off its 
properties; but to bring out what was necessarily impli-d in the concepts 
that he had himself formed a priori and had put into the figure in the 
construction by which he presented it to himself."
:Bxll
SBxlll
"Bxll
^Bxvl
Sgxvlll
^Jaakko Hintikka, "Transcendental Arguments: Genuine and Spurious,"Wous 
VI (September 1972), p. 274.
Also see Practical Reason, ed. Stephan Komer, specifically the article by 
Hintikka, "Practical vs. Theoretical Reason— An Ambiguous Legacy." In this 
article Hintikka mentions both Vico and Kant as users of "maker's knowledge." 
Concerning Vico: "For Vico, the scope of epistemologically relevant maker's
knowledge is not restricted to human thoughts, plans, decisions, intentions, 
hopes and wishes but comprises also their concrete manifestations and re­
sults in the realm of culture and society." (pp. 88-9)
And concerning Kant: "One of the most interesting variants of the tradi­
tion of 'maker's knowledge' in effect suggests that we can have a priori 
knowledge of things only through imposing this kind of anticipatory frame­
work on them. 'Reason has insight only into that which it produces after 
a plan of its own, ' says Kant (Critique of Pure Reason, tran. by Kemp Smith, 
Bxlll, p. 93)."
®C. Pure R. Bxvl and Bxxll footnote. For explanation of Kant's Copernicus 
analogy see Paton, Kant's Metaphysics of Experience, Vol. I, pp. 75-76.
149
ISO
We might note here that Kant's "maker's-!cnowledge criterion" as used.by 
humans, not God, answers the question of how physics is possible on two 
different levels. Vico's criterion, on the other hand, does so only on 
one. In physics it is by constructing hypotheses that both Vico and Kant 
hold that man can gain knowledge of nature. That is to say, man can know 
only because he constructs experiments based on hypotheses which he has 
constructed in reflection and has thereby determined in advance what na­
ture's answers to his questions will be or at least what would count as 
an answer. This is the meaning of Kant's statement ". . . adopting as 
a guide that which it [reason] has itself put into nature." (bxiv).
Again " . . .  a judge who compels the witnesses to answer questions which 
he has himself formulated." (Bxlll) On this level Vico and Kant's cri­
terion operates in the same way.
However, there is a second level of explanation for natural objects and, 
therefore, for physics, namely a metaphysical level on which Kant's "maker's- 
knowledge criterion" operates and Vico's does not. On this level 
the thesis of maker's knowledge is used by Kant to show that the actual 
objects of nature, and hence knowledge of them, are possible because of 
man's making. It is this second level that I shall concern myself with 
here in this chapter for it is at this level, as we shall see later, that 
Kant's maker's-knowledge thesis is of importance to his philosophy of 
history.
Finally, Vico also has his "maker's-knowledge criterion" operate on a meta­
physical level, i.e., constructing natural objects, but it is the Divine 
maker's knowledge that does so, not man's. There is, of course, a sense 
in which this is true for Kant also. The point is probably best expressed 
by saying that the notion of "appearance vs. thing-in-itself" is foreign 
to the Vichian philosophy.
®P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (Nethuen and Co Ltd, 1973), p. 22.
^’‘critique of Pure Reason, AXV
“ Ibid, BX
*^"It is a logic of truth. For no knowledge can contradict it without at 
once losing all content, that is, all relation to any object, and there­
fore, all truth." (A62-3/B87) Also see A237/B296.
^®"I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing, which 
many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber . . . "  Prolegomena, 
p. 7.
Kant considered it a scandal to philosophy and human reason that an ade­
quate answer had not yet been provided to the question "how it is we have 
knowledge of objects." His doctrine of "maker's knowledge" was, once and 
for all, to provide and answer to this question. Further, it would bypass 
all of the mistakes of previous "idealisms" because of his "special" doc­
trine of sensible intuition which could account for the possibility of 
objects. See footnote in Prolegomena, p. 153.
151
i“C. of Pure R. BXVI
iSBXVII
iGlbid.
^^Prolegomena, pp. 102-3. Kant refers to the idealism of Descartes as 
"problematic" and to the idealism of Berkeley as "dogmatic." See "Refu­
tation of Idealism," in The Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 244-7.
*®B158, C. Pure R. (Also compare this with Vico's criticism of Descartes.)
^^Prolegomena, pp. 102-3.
2'Bxvll (Also see B 160)
21 Ibid.
22lbid. (Also see B22-3, where Kant tells us that his ". . . critique of 
pure reason, in the end, necessarily leads to scientific knowledge, while 
its dogmatic employment on the other hand, lands us in dogmatic assertions 
to which other assertions, equally specious, can always be opposed— that 
is, in scepticism."
2®A 107
2"A 114. See also B 166-7.
2®A 196/B241
2®A 210/B2S6. See also Axx: "IVhat reason produces entirely out of itself
cannot be concealed, but is brought to light by reason itself . . . "
(.4nd see BXXIII, A477/BS05.)
^^Prolegomena, pp. 80-1.
2®A 125
2®A 129-30. Compare this with Vico's claim that ". . . Science is the knowl­
edge of the form or of the mode in which a thing is produced, and by which 
the mind, because in knowing a thing it combines its elements, makes the 
thing." (Flint, p. 87)
®"A 127
” B 145-6
^^Prolegomena, pp. 81-2.
®®B14-15
®“A10/B14..
152
^®B16-17, p. 53, Kemp Smith. The same idea applies to judgments of
arithmetic. . .we find that the concept of the sum 7 and 5 contains 
nothing save the union of the two numbers into one, and in this no thought 
is being taken as to what that single number may be which combines both.
The concept of 12 is by no means already thought in merely thinking this 
union of 7 and 5; and I may analyze my concept of such a possible sum as 
long as I please, still I shall never find the 12 in it." (B15)
3GB17, p. 54.
s?B17-18
3*819
**See On History, eds. L. W. Beck, Robert Anchor, and Emil Fackenheira
(Bobbs-Merrill Co.), specifically the essay "An Old Question Raised Again:
Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?", p. 137.
Of course, Kant held that the answers to these questions, i.e., the pos­
sibility of geometry, physics, and history, required an answer to the 
question "how metaphysics is possible?" See, e.g., paragraph 40 of the 
Prolegomena..
‘**5. Komer, Kant (A Pelican Original), p. 34. Also see the excellent book 
of Christopher Garnette, The Kantian Philosophy of Space (Port Washington,
New York: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1965).
'‘3816-17, A 25, B40/41, B64-5/A47, B120/A88, B204, B207.
‘*A724/B752, A715-16/B743/44.
‘*8204. Also B40: "The science which determines the properties of space
synthetically, and yet a priori."
■“•B41.
‘^Critique of Pare Reason, trans. Kemp Smith, pp. 66-7.
‘*B38: "The representation of space cannot, therefore, be empirically ob­
tained from the relations of outer appearance. On the contrary, this 
outer experience is itself possible at all only through that representation." 
(Ibid.)
'*’A24/B39.
’**". . . every concept must be thought as a representation which is contained 
in an infinite number of different possible representations (as their 
common character)." B40
‘**"lt is in this latter way, however, that space is thought; for all the 
parts of space coexist ad infinitam." B40
153
Pure Reason A2S/B40, 4th argument.
S1B40
“ b16
S3B41
54 Ibid.
55A713/B741. "Thus I construct a triangle by representing the object . . . 
completely a priori, without having borrowed the pattern from any 
experience.”
55See B147 for Kant's discussion of this. He is here faced with the same 
problem that Vico had when he (Vico) tried to show how geometry was pos­
sible on maker's-knowledge principles; namely the problem of the relation 
of geometry to the world of nature. Vico solved this by way of a "meta­
physical hypothesis" (sec Chapter I). Kant solves the problem by way of 
his doctrine of "geometer's" space, i.e., the thesis that physical space 
is really identical with (Euclidian) geometrical space.
5'I wish once again to emphasize the generality of ray sketch. I do not, 
e.g., even enter the squabble over the Analytic vs. the Aesthetic inter­
pretation of space, i.e., whether the Axioms arc really concerned with 
the construction of figures in space and therefore with the construction 
of space, as against the doctrine of the Aesthetic, which teaches that 
space is represented as an infinite given magnitude and, therefore, not 
constructed.
5 8A34
55See If55 above.
5“A2S. For Kant, this "one" space is the identical "one" space of geometry.
°^As Strawson points out, "This is the reason why the pure mathematics of 
space is also the mathematics of physical space, why the propositions of 
pure geometry necessarily hold of the physical objects of empirical in­
tuition." {Bounds of Sense, p. 67) Also see pp. 281-4 of that same work.
521 owe this particular form of this argument to Professor Christopher 
Garnette as stated in his book The Kantian Philosophy of Space, p. 183.
55B147
54". . . things [my emphasis) which allow of being presented to us only in 
accordance with the form of that pure sensible intuition." B147
5 5B147
5 5A713/B741
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G7A24/B39 (#3A edition)
68B41
«’Bxvlll
7°B20. Kant holds that our knowledge of objects is knowledge of appearances 
and not things-in-themselves. He means by this that "something" which we 
can never know affects us in such a way that it brings about in us a sensa­
tion. As a result of this effect, we, in relating our intuitions of space 
and time to sensations, acquire empirical intuitions. In being presented 
with an empirical intuition (which is not yet an object; it is an "undeter­
mined" object), we are being presented with an appearance. (See A89/B122)
The appearance has two parts, matter and form. The form of the appearance 
is that which the mind completely contributes a priori, thus "determining" 
(i.e., making) the appearance through judgment (and the categories) into an 
object. Hence, we can know objects because we have made (i.e., determined) 
them. (A19-21)
71A97
72"Categories are concepts which prescribe laws a priori to appearances, and 
therefore to nature . . . "  (B163)
^^"The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a 
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations 
in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle 
the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the 
same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it pro­
duced the logical form of a judgment also introduces a transcendental content 
into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in 
intuition in general. On this account we are entitled to call these repre­
sentations pure concepts of the understanding, and to regard them as apply­
ing a priori to objects— a conclusion which general logic is not in a 
position to establish.
In This manner there arise precisely the same number of pure concepts of the 
understanding which apply a priori to objects of intuition in general, as, in 
the preceding table, there have been found to be logical functions in all 
possible judgments." (B104-105/A79-80)
. . these functions [i.e., the logical functions of judgment] specify the 
understanding [i.e., the categories] completely, and yield an exhaustive in­
ventory of its powers. ' (BIOS)
As Strawson puts it: "We must take it that the categories are here derived
simply by adding to the forms of logic the idea of applying those forms in 
making true judgements about objects of awareness (intuition) in general . . . 
(Bounds of Sense, p. 77)
7SB132 (Also see B1133
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?*B134
77B133
78B239
79B242
®“B240. Further, Kant tells us: "I could not then assert that two states
follow upon one another in the [field of] appearance, but only that one 
apprehension follows upon the other. That is something merely subjective, 
determining no object; and may not, therefore, be regarded as knowledge 
of any object, not even of an object in the [field of] appearance." 
(B240/A19S)
®^Kant's answer, of course, is that there must be categories which allow us 
to "make" an object of experience. These categories will be the rules by 
which we may avoid the arbitrary and thus derive " . . .  the subjective 
succession of apprehension from the objective succession of appearances.
[We must be able to do this since] the subjective succession by itself is 
altogether arbitrary, it does not prove anything as to the manner in which 
the manifold is connected in the object." (B238/A193)
"We have, then, to show, in the case under consideration, that we never,
even in experience, ascribe succession [that is, the happening of some
event which previously did not exist) to the object, and so distinguish 
it from subjective sequence in our apprehension, except when there is an 
underlying rule which compels us to observe this order of perceptions 
rather than any other." (B241-42/A196-97) [emphasis added]
®2"I find that a judgment is nothing but the manner in which given modes of 
knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception. This is 
what is intended by the copula 'is.' It is employed to distinguish the 
objective unity of given representations from the subjective." (B141-2)
®®B236/A191. Kant's claim is that appearance can be represented as an ob­
ject only if it stands under a rule.
®‘*See #72 above.
®®For a thorough discussion of the central epistemic notion of judgment in 
its relation to "making," see Arthur Melnick's excellent book on Kant,
Kant's Analogies of Experience (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).
Melnick correctly argues that the notion of an "object" in Kant should be 
interpreted as being primarily the notion of an object of judgment. For 
example, he says, "Kant's major point is that judgment can relate to what 
is given in experience (or what is given in experience can be an object 
of judgment) only if what is given conforms to certain epistemic categories 
that set up or define the relation between judgment and what is given 
sensibly in the first place . . .  In Kant's terminology, epistemic con­
cepts and only epistemic concepts can bring appearances (what is given) 
into necessary relation to the understanding (the faculty of judgment)."
(p. 45)
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®®Critigue of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1973), p. 4.
®^See A68/B93 and also (179), Critique of Judgement, from now on referred 
to as CJ.
®®". . . judgement . . . the faculty of subsuming under rules; that is, of 
distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given 
rule (casus datae legis)." (A132)
®^"The order in which the perceptions succeed one another in apprehension 
is in this instance determined, and to this order apprehension is bound 
down." (A192/B238)
®“CJ (179)
®*"That nature should direct itself according to our subjective ground of 
apperception, and should indeed depend upon it in respect of its conformity 
to law, sounds very strange and absurd. But when we consider that this 
nature is . . . merely an aggregate of appearances, so many representa­
tions of the mind, we shall not be surprised that we can discover it only 
in the radical faculty of all our knowledge, namely, in transcendental ap­
perception, in that unity on account of which alone it can be entitled 
object of all possible experience, that is, nature." (A114) Concerning 
this see also First Introduction to the Critique of Judgement, trans.
James Haden (Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) (208-9), p. 14.
*^CJ (179-80) in the First introduction (Bobbs-Merrill) he says: ". . . ex­
perience . . . must ideally form a system of potential empirical knowledge 
according to universal as well as particular laws, insofar as this is ob­
jectively possible, at least in principle. The unity of nature under a 
principle of the thoroughgoing connection of everything contained in this 
sum of all appearances requires this." (208-9)
"Therefore it is a subjectively necessary, transcendental presupposition 
that this dismaying unlimited diversity of empirical laws and this hetero­
geneity of natural forms does not belong in nature, that instead, nature is 
fitted for experience as an empirical system through the affinity of par­
ticular laws under more general ones." (209)
For a discussion of this point and also a good analysis of Kant's concept 
of teleology, see J. D. McFarland's book Kant's Concept of Teleology 
(Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1970).
^^"It is, I mean, quite certain that we can never get a sufficient knowledge 
of organized beings and their inner possibility, much less an explanation 
of them, by looking merely to mechanical principles of nature. Indeed 
so certain is it, that we may confidently assert that it is absurd for 
men even to entertain any thought of so doing or to hope that maybe another 
Newton may some day arise, to make intelligible to us even the genesis of 
but a blade of grass from natural laws that no design has ordered." CJ (400)
96
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®‘*A832/B860 C Pure R.
^^Prolegomena, p. 88.
8263
9?CJ (179-80)
(183-4). Also see C.J 184 and C Pure R A6S0/B678. "The law of reason 
which requires us to seek for this unity, is a necessary law, since with­
out it we should have no reason at all, and without reason no coherent 
emplojaiient of the understanding, and in the absence of this no sufficient 
criterion of empirical truth. In order, therefore, to secure an empiri­
cal criterion we have no option save to presuppose the systematic unity 
of nature as objectively valid and necessary [my emphasis] . . . That 
the manifold respects in which individual things differ do not exclude 
identity of species, that the various species must be regarded merely as 
different determinations of a few genera, and these, in turn, of still 
higher genera, and so on; in short, that we must seek for a certain sys­
tematic unity of all possible empirical concepts, insofar as they can be 
deduced from higher and more general concepts— this is a logical principle, 
a rule of the Schools, without which there could be no employment of 
reason." (A651-52/B679-80)
^^ Mcl'arland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, p. 16.
'°°CJ (180). Also see First Introduction (203-4).
‘°*CJ (185-6).
'°^CJ (180). Also see First Introduction (203-4) and compare with footnote 
Il5 above.
Introduction to Critique of Judgement (215-16).
■‘““ibid.
’““McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, p. 85.
’““CJ 377
. . the explanation adopted by Epicurus. It completely denies and 
abolishes the distinction between a technic, of nature and its more mechan­
ism. Blind chance is accepted as the explanation . . . "  (CJ 393)
It is worth noting that both Vico and Kant saw their respective maker's 
knowledge criteria, in conjunction with their teleological explanations, 
as refuting the doctrines of "Blind chance" and "Deterministic Fate." For 
example, Vico says "Hence Epicurus, who believes in cliance, is refuted by 
the facts, . . . and so arc Zeno and Spinoza, who believe in fate." (1109) 
New Science.
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And Kant tells us when speaking of the explanatory power of Epicurus' 
"Blind Chance doctrine": "Hence nothing is explained, not even the il­
lusion in our teleological judgements, . . . [and of "Blind Necessity"] 
"But Spinozism does not effect what it intends . . . suppose we grant it 
this mode of existence for its beings of the world, such ontological unity 
is not then and there a unity of end and does not make it in any way 
intelligible." (393) CJ
i°*CJ (180)
*“®CJ (370)
ii'CJ (398) " . . .  reflective judgement is essentially necessary, if for
no other purpose, to obtain an empirical knowledge of their [certain 
natural objects] intrinsic character. For the very notion that they are 
organized things is itself impossible unless we associate with it the 
notion of a production by design." (398)
It is clear that Kant thinks of organisms as embodying designed physical 
ends. He says, "A thing exists as a physical end if it is both cause and 
effect of itself. For this involves a kind of causality that we cannot 
associate with the mere conception of a nature unless we make that na­
ture rest on one underlying end, . . . "  (371) CJ
“ hbid.
” ^CJ (404-8)
“ C^J (185)
I'^CJ (180)
**®"We are entitled, nay incited, by the example that nature affords us in 
its organic products, to expect nothing from it and its laws but what is 
final [purposeful] when things are viewed as a whole." CJ (379).
"®CJ (384)
^^^Idea for a Universal History, p. 27.
Old Quei 
pp. 79-80.
stion Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?
CHAPTER IV 
KANT AND HISTORY
In this chapter we shall examine how the notions of teleology and 
maker's knowledge operate in Kant's philosophy of history. We shall first 
isolate Kant's problem with history and then consider his use of these two 
concepts in his solution. This will involve our seeing how Kant's notion 
of teleology is transferred from nature and a "physical" teleology to his­
tory and a "moral" teleology.
Secondly, I wish to construct what 1 think would constitute a 
plausible Kantian answer to the question "how is history as a science pos­
sible?" Although Kant never explicitly raised this question, it is my con­
tention that his "maker's-knowledge criterion," in conjunction with his 
various writings on history, points to a [rather] definite answer to it. 
Further, 1 think it will greatly benefit us, in attempting to understand 
the full import of Kant's philosophy of history, if we raise the above ques­
tion and construct an answer to it on Kantian principles.
The Problem of History
In the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Critique of Practical 
Reason, as well as in the Groundwork and other writings, Kant had developed 
a picture of man that was composed of two seemingly incongruous elements.
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On the one hand there was man viewed as phenomenon, i.e., a mere product 
of nature, a process or sum of processes governed by laws which he must 
blindly obey. This perspective rendered man just as much a determined part 
of nature as any other part, obeying, like the rest of nature, strictly 
mechanical laws. On the other hand, the Critique of Practical Reason, as 
well as the Critique of Judgement, viewed man as noumenon, i.e., a thing 
• unto himself and a member of an "intelligible" world. This perspective 
renders man as a lawgiver unto himself, a moral legislator, that is, one 
who is precisely not determined by mechanical laws but, rather, is a self­
determining, free agent in his consciousness of a higher, moral law.
The problem of history for Kant arises exactly here. First, which 
kind of perspective is the correct one viewed from a historical perspective? 
Second, what implications arise, and what shall we think of history itself 
after it is decided whether it is a physical or moral process? Kant's 
answers to these questions are complex. He does not come down squarely for 
one or the other of the alternatives of the first question, and as a result 
his answer to the second is a combination on the one hand of thinking of 
history as a physical (i.e., a natural) process and on the other as a moral 
process. In either case (i.e., be it a physical or moral process or some 
combination of the two) Kant holds that history is teleological in character. 
It is, therefore, to this question that we should first turn so as to under­
stand better his answer to the others.
We saw earlier in Chapter III that it was Kant's view that in order
to have a completely unified science of nature it is necessary that we be
able to judge and thus think of nature in at least two different ways. First,
we must judge nature determinately, i.e., we must judge nature such that in
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the act of judging it we determine it under universal transcendental laws. 
In so doing, we thereby "make" nature and, a fortiori, make knowledge of 
it possible.
However, we also learned secondly that we must judge nature re­
flectively, i.e., in those cases where we have "given" to us particulars 
of nature made possible by determinate judgement , but yet requiring a 
universal (rule, principle, or law) by which wo can systematize those par­
ticulars into one organic unity.' This second way of judging nature, i.e.,
via reflective judgment, is what Kant means by teleology. In his teleo­
logical moods Kant claims that we must judge nature's parts "as if" they 
serve purposeful ends if we wish to achieve systematic science.
Now it is because of the necessity of this second manner of judg­
ing nature (i.e., telcologically) that Kant is prompted in his essay Idea
for a Universal History to ask, "Is it reasonable to assume a purposiveness 
in all the parts of nature and to deny it to the whole?"^ Me answers nega­
tively:
If we adopt the principle of an objective finality in the manifold 
variety of the specific forms of terrestial life and in their ex­
trinsic relations to one another as beings with a structure adapted 
to ends, it is only rational to go on and imagine that in this ex­
trinsic relation there is also a certain organization and a system 
of the whole kingdom of nature [my emphasis] following final 
causes."3
Finally, when we press on and ask, "Precisely what is the purpose or end 
of nature as a whole?" Kant tells us that it is the production of man 
". . . the being upon this earth who is the ultimate end of nature and the 
one in relation to whom all other natural things constitute a system of 
ends."'*
Nature then is to he seen as a teleological system, a purposeful 
whole whose ultimate end is man. This rather traditional but profound idea
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is the "guiding thread" in the Kantian philosophy of history. Kant's "idea" 
is that behind the manifestations of human actions there is a providential 
purpose at work. History is the story of human actions which " . . .  being 
physical phenomena themselves, . . . like every other natural event are de­
termined by universal laws." (Jdea, p. 17) However, these particular actic 
i.e., historical actions, are special, Kant thinks, because they are free. 
This is to say that they are determined only by man's own good will. Hence, 
history is the story of providence producing a being (man) who can become 
capable of achieving freedom.
The purpose of the historian is to narrate the manifestations of
man's will in such a manner that his past actions can be made intelligible
by being seen in the light of some underlying plan. To accomplish this
requires a "philosophical" study of history which may enable man to:
. . . discern a regular movement in it, and that what seems com­
plex and chaotic in the single individual may be seen from the 
standpoint of the human race as a whole to be a steady and pro­
gressive though slow evolution of its original endowment.^
The problem of history, therefore, is the "discernment of a regular move­
ment" on the one hand and the explanation of this historical movement as 
now a natural and now a normal process on the other.
It is important to note that Kant sees both of these elements (i.i. 
the natural and the moral-teleological elements) as forming the epistemo- 
logical basis of history. History is the story of man as a "teleological” 
product of nature, "making" himself into a cultured and moral being.® Tin; 
is essentially to say for Kant that history is the story of "natural" man 
making himself human. To see what Kant has in mind here, let us begin by 
examining the "physical," i.e., the natural-tcleological element in Kant's 
essay Idea for a Universal History.
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Nine Theses
The typically Kantian move which becomes evident here is to 
inquire into the conditions for the possibility of history. These condi­
tions will be those which allow for the "discernment of a regular movement" 
in the appearances that we know as human actions. These conditions Kant 
refers to (in this essay) as theses, of which there are nine. Therefore, 
we shall examine the meaning of these nine theses in order to see how the 
"maker's-knowledge criterion" and the concept of teleology are applied.
We might note here that the last four of these nine theses apply to the 
future. This is because Kant does not think of history as simply whatever 
has happened in the past. He thinks, instead, of history as a special kind 
of "on-going" process which has a special purpose to fulfill.
In the "First Thesis" we learn that in Kant's view man necessarily 
has a history. This necessity is made clearer by keeping in mind the fol­
lowing points: The Critique of Judgement had established that nature is a
(physical) teleological unity. A consequence of this is that any "natural” 
capacity of any creature is destined to evolve to its "natural" end.^ Man 
is a natural creature, and he has a unique capacity, namely rationality. 
Further, man's rationality is of such a developmental nature (i.e., it is 
not instinctive) that it would be impossible for it to evolve to its natural 
end in the lifetime of, say, Euclid. Kant's claim, therefore, is that only 
through a ". . . series of generations, each of which passes its own en­
lightenment to its successor"® can the species man fully develop the faculty 
of reason. Therefore, only through history (i.e., only through man's time 
as a species) can the ultimate* purpose of nature— the development of man 
and his rational faculties— be realized.
‘"Ultimate" is used technically by Kant, and we shall examine 
his usage later.
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It is by a physical teleology (i.e., nature's plan or tendency for 
man as a species, progressively to develop his faculties) that Kant accounts 
for the necessity of man having a history. This is to say that part of 
what history means for Kant is that there are purposeful "natural" processes 
that take time to occur, thereby allowing man the ability to develop his 
rationality. Hence, there is a sense for Kant in which men are already 
"historical" creatures before they are aware of history. That is, they are, 
in a sense, "naturally" historical because it is nature that brings about 
the means by which man will in the future civilize himself, thus making 
himself fully human. Finally, this "bringing about" is itself part of the 
meaning of history. (As we have said, Kant later adds a second sense— a 
"moral" meaning— to his "natural"-historical process, and as a result, his­
tory is thought of not as the history of nature, but rather as the history 
of freedom.*)
It would seem then that the philosopher-historian** is concerned
with accounting for history naturally. He must, therefore
. . . try to see if he can discover a natural purpose in this 
idiotic course of things human . . .[i.e.], to have a history 
with a definite natural plan for creatures who have no plan 
of their own.^^
Kant believes that it is only in this way (i.e., by appealing to a "plan"
of nature) that one can account for why there must be such a thing as human
history. Once again, human history is the story of man's cultural and
moral development, i.e., the story of freedom. In order for man to achieve
this developmental end there must be a prior "natural Plan" which will
"bring about" (at least the beginning of) man's development.
The means employed by nature to bring about the development of 
all the capacities of men in their antagonism [my emphasis] in 
society, so far as this is, in the end, the cause of a lawful 
order among men.**
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The question may arise "What would happen if this so-called
antagonism of men (i.e., their "natural" unsocial-sociability) were absent?"
Kant's answer is that if there were no such "plan of nature," and thus no
antagonism, there would be no history. Further, if there were no history,
there would be no development of man's potentialities and, therefore, man's
. . . talents would remain hidden, unborn in an Arcadian shepherd's 
life, with all its concord, contentment, and mutual affection. Men, 
good-natured as the sheep they herd, would hardly reach a higher 
worth than their beasts; they would not fill the empty place in 
creation by achieving their end, which is rational nature.
Hence, with his argument for a plan of nature, Kant has, as R. G. Collingwood
pointed out some years ago:
. . . achieved the remarkable feat of showing why there should be 
such a thing as history; it is, he shows, because man is a ra­
tional being, and the full development of his potentialities 
therefore requires an historical process.*'*
We may conclude our discussion of this First Thesis, which gives 
a reason why there must be history, by recapitulating Kant's view. Man 
must have a history for he is a natural being whose faculties (in this case 
the unique faculty, rationality) must be allowed to develop to their natural 
end. This natural process of development is itself regarded by Kant as 
part of the meaning of history.
The next five theses trace out nature's plan for man. The picture 
again demonstrates nature's plan. Nature has forced man to develop himself 
by placing in him on the one hand ". . .an inclination to associate with 
others because in society he feels himself to be more than man, i.e., as 
more than the developed form of his natural [my emphasis] capacities"*® and 
on the other hand ". . . a strong propensity to isolate himself from others, 
because he finds in himself . . . the unsocial characteristic of wishing to
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have everything go according to his own wish."'® Hence, nature has thrown 
man into a state of conflict. But this conflict, it turns out, is a posi­
tive thing, for it is only conflict that produces a state of culture. Con­
flict eventually turns to culture because in conflict man's powers are 
awakened, and this brings him to ". . . conquer his inclination to laziness, 
and, propelled by vainglory, lust for power, and avarice, to achieve a rank 
among his fellows whom he cannot tolerate but from whom he cannot withdraw."'^ 
Nature produces antagonism among men in order that man may further 
his interests in a social context, the only context in which his interest 
can be furthered, for it is the only context in which he can have interests 
in the first place. In the Fifth Thesis Kant argues that because of the 
impetus of nature (i.e., the "natural" antagonism) man must create a society 
which allows him the greatest amount of freedom possible to pursue his own 
interests while yet preserving the society in question. The only kind of 
society capable of such freedom Kant tells us is one which has a just civic 
constitution. To create such a constitution is "the greatest problem of the 
human race, to the solution of which nature drives man . . ."'®
In the Sixth Thesis Kant tells us how difficult this problem is by 
pointing out that the problem is not solved by merely having a master.
Hobbes had argued that because man agrees that law should apply equally to 
all and at the same time (due to his self-interest) thinks of himself as an 
exception, he must have a master to ensure conformity of his will to the 
law. Kant shares this view but cogently asks:
. . . whence does he get this master? Only from the human race.
But then the master is himself an animal, and needs a master . . .
The highest master should be just in himself, and yet a man. This 
task is therefore the hardest of all . .
167
Kant tells us that this problem of establishing a civil society 
will be the last to be solved and that its solution will require at least 
four ingredients: a correct conception of a possible constitution, a great
amount of experience, and most important of all, a good will ready to ac­
cept such a constitution.The fourth ingredient is the subject of the 
Seventh Thesis. In this thesis Kant asks "lïhat is the use of working toward 
a lawful civic constitution among individuals when the same natural antago­
nism that drives man to create commonwealths also causes any single common­
wealth to 'stand in unrestricted freedom in relation to others'?" The only 
solution, he believes, is a league of nations where "even the smallest state 
could expect security and justice, .. . "
Further, he says that when we look at "men in the large" we find 
that nature has been attempting to get man to establish just such a league 
all along. "All wars are accordingly so many attempts (not in the intention 
of man, but in the intention of nature) to establish . . .  a state . . . 
which, like a civic commonwealth, can maintain itself automatically."^* He 
thinks it is reasonable, therefore, to assume that nature proceeds as a pur­
posive unity to try to stop man from "wasting the powers of the commonwealths 
in armaments to be used against each other, through devastation brought on 
by war"^^ and attempts to force him to . . institute a cosmopolitan con­
dition." The success of such a cosmopolitan condition depends, of course, 
upon man, and Kant makes it quite clear in the Seventh Thesis that without 
a rational (which here necessarily includes peaceful) system of relations 
between nation states, the problem of establishing a perfect civic consti­
tution is insoluble.^*
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The final two theses (i.e., light and mind) for the possibility of
history are the most interesting in relation to our particular problem (i.e.,
the status of the "physical" teleological element in Kant's philosophy of
history). The Eighth Thesis states:
The history of mankind can be seen, in the large, as the realiza­
tion of nature's secret plan to bring forth a perfectly constituted 
state as the only condition in which the capacities of mankind can 
be fully developed, and also bring forth that external relation 
among states which is perfectly adequate to this end.^ "*
Three comments are here in order. First , history is to be seen as display­
ing a natural purpose (which is not to say that human history is simply 
"natural" history like that of "bees and beavers") only when it can be seen 
"in the large." That is, only when humanity is viewed as a whole can a 
purpose be discerned in history. This is simply because individual events 
do not by themselves evidence any overall purpose. Kant tells us that when 
we look at individual actions, the course of things strikes us as "idiotic," 
but when viewed as a whole (i.e., teleologically, which involves the use of 
reflective judgment and the "God-man maker's-knowledge" analogy), the re­
sult is that we discern that humanity is ordained by Providence. We see, 
in other words, that history has a definite plan.
Second, by viewing humanity as a whole from a "cosmopolitan" point 
of view, we come to see that, e.g., the annual tables of marriages, births, 
and deaths, which seem at first glance to follow no rule (being subject to 
man's free will), do in fact occur according to rather stable laws. Kant's 
point is that since mankind is a part of nature it too should (like nature) 
be viewed teleologically. This is simply to repeat that history's begin­
ning is a "natural" one, and we must, therefore, always interpret historical
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actions as being part of a natural plan. Once again, this is not to say 
that history for Kant is simply a natural process. It is to say, rather, 
that natural (or physical) teleology makes up an essential element of 
history.
Third, because Kant has argued that an essential element of his­
tory is physical teleology, i.e., a "plan of nature," and because we must 
interpret historical actions with constant reference to "nature's plan," it 
follows that history is not concerned merely with man's past but with his 
present and future as well. That is to say that if part of the meaning 
of the historical process is "natural," then, like nature, the historical 
process must be thought of as a whole unity and, therefore, as having been 
going on in the past, even before man was aware that he had a past. Further, 
it (history) must also be thought of as "going on" now in the present just 
as natural processes are, far beyond any direct control of our oim. Finally, 
the historical process will include a view of the future such that the fu­
ture is seen as giving meaning to the present. This means that to think of 
history as being (in part) the result of a "physical" teleology (i.e., as 
a plan of nature) entails thinking of the historical purpose as unfolding 
now and in the future, achieving its providential end which at the same 
time "clarifies" the "real" meaning of the present.
It should be noted that Kant does not claim that one can predict 
the course of human events. Indeed, he asks rather sceptically "Does nature 
reveal anything of a path to this end?" (p. 22 Idea). And he answers, "She 
reveals something, but very little." (Ibid.) Kant's main contention is 
that history can only be possible if we assume nature to have a plan and 
that this assumption entails that human actions, when viewed "historically," 
be interpreted in the light of this plan.
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This brings us to the Ninth and final thesis of the essay where 
Kant tells us:
A philosophical attempt to work out a universal history accord­
ing to a natural plan directed to achieving the civic union of 
the human race must be regarded as possible, and, indeed, as 
contributing to this end of nature.
Kant's idea here is that if we regard the history of mankind as the realiza­
tion of nature's secret plan, etc., then we should also be willing to grant 
that a philosophical attempt to "work out" such a universal history on the 
one hand and a natural plan on the other is logical. If history is to be 
thought of as universal (i.e., as an overall unity whose purpose can be 
discerned) and if it is to nature that we must turn in order to discern the 
beginnings and interpretation of such a purpose, then to say that one has 
worked out a "philosophical" universal history is to say that one has 
simply discerned the workings of nature's plan.^^ Kant's intention, there­
fore, in explaining how such a history can be possible is to show that he 
has an "idea" which allows us to look at human actions in such a way (i.e., 
purposefully, and therefore, historically) that we may better understand 
them. Therefore, he offers us an "idea" of history— a "guiding thread"—  
by which we may attempt to unify this "planless conglomeration of human 
action." His belief is that it is only by means of such an "idea" that one 
can see unity in human activity, have such a thing as history, and thereby 
clarify "the confused play of things human."
One last comment about this Ninth Thesis. In the Introduction to 
the essay, while speaking of the composition of the so-called laws of his­
tory (which if discovered would thereby render history a science), Kant 
tells us:
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. . .  we leave it to nature to produce the man capable of composing 
it. Thus nature produced Kepler, who subjected, in an unexpected 
way, the eccentric paths of the planets to definite laws; and she 
produced Newton, who explained these laws by a universal natural 
cause.
Kant makes it quite clear in this Ninth Thesis that nature has produced at 
least one person who has attempted to contribute to this end, i.e., of 
achieving a civic union of the human race, namely Kant himself. This is 
to say that Kant's "idea" for a universal history is a "philosophical at­
tempt" which itself contributes to the plan of nature (i.e., achieving a 
civic union of the human race, etc.).
He reiterates that this attempt (i.e., his "idea") is extremely im­
portant if we are to gain a "guiding thread" by which we may see the justi­
fication of Providence in the world. In fact, Kant seems to suggest that 
this "idea" (i.e., the idea that history displays a purpose, namely that 
the ultimate end of nature is man's civic union) is somehow the very best 
idea possible.
For what is the good of esteeming the majesty and wisdom of crea­
tion in the realm of brute nature and of recommending that we 
contemplate it, if that part of the great stage of supreme wisdom 
which contains the purpose of all the others— the history of man­
kind—  [my emphasis] must remain an unceasing reproach to it?^*
Moral Teleology
Let us turn now from the "natural" to the other element that com­
poses Kant's philosophy of history, namely the "moral" teleological element.*® 
First, Kant distinguishes between two kinds of ends, natural and moral, re­
ferring to them as "ultimate" and "final" ends of nature respectively.**
Then in a lengthy but important passage, he tells us:
A thing is possible only as an end where the causality to which it 
owes its origin must not be sought in the mechanism of nature, but
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in a cause whose capacity of acting is determined by conceptions 
(my emphasis]. What is required in order that we may perceive 
that a thing is only possible in this way is that its form is not 
possible on purely natural laws— that is to say, such laws as we 
may cognize by means of unaided understanding applied to objects 
of sense--but that, on the contrary, even to know it empirically 
in respect of its cause and effect presupposes conceptions of rea­
son [my emphasis] . . . Now reason in every case insists on cog­
nizing the necessity of the form [my emphasis] of a natural 
product, even where it only desires to perceive the conditions 
involved in its production [my emphasis].
There are three important points to be kept in mind from this pas­
sage. First, the very notion of a thing being an "end" entails that the 
cause of the form of the thing in question is always an idea.^^ Second, 
the source of this particular kind of idea is never the understanding but, 
instead, reason. Third, reason must be satisfied in knowing the necessity 
for such a teleological form of the thing in question. Reason can do this 
if it can become aware of the origin of the form, i.e., whence the form is 
produced.This is finally to say that reason will come to recognize that 
it is itself, via reflective judgment, the origin of the teleological forms 
of natural products and, therefore, that the very notion of an "end" (for 
Kant) entails the use of certain "ideas" of reason.
Now we have seen that one of the reasons that Kant introduced his 
talk of "ends" was that he held the belief that organisms were radically 
different things from non-organic things. He believed, therefore, that 
organisms must be "thought" of differently from lifeless matter. Now a 
straightforward reading of the passage quoted above makes it sound as if 
Kant is saying that an idea (which comes from us) is the actual cause of the 
(teleological) organism. Yet it is quite clear that this is not Kant's in­
tention. Kant is claiming, with his talk of "ends" that an organism is
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simply the type of thing whose parts are intrinsically and reciprocally 
determined, which is to say that it must be "both cause and effect of it­
self."’® If this is the case, i.e., if the parts of an organism must be 
intrinsically and reciprocally determined, it follows that an "idea" could 
not possibly be the cause of an organism, for if it were, then the cause of 
the organism would not be in (i.e., intrinsically) the make-up of the 
organism, but rather in minds where ideas have their origin (i.e., extrinsic 
to the organism).’®
Yet, if this is true, what then are we to make of the claim that 
"an 'end' is possible only if its causal origin is something whose capacity 
for acting is determined by conceptions?" I think that the following is 
Kant's complicated but intelligible answer.
As we have seen earlier,’^  Kant has "built into" his conception of 
maker's-knowledge (i.e., that the mind can have knowledge only of that 
which the mind makes) a "God-man maker's-knowledge analogy." He uses the 
analogy to drive home the limitedness of human discursive maker's-knowledge 
by contrasting it to God's unlimited intuitive maker's knowledge.’® All of 
God's "maker's-knowledge objects" are "made" actual in a way different from 
those objects of man's "maker's-knowledge." That is, simply by virtue of 
God's intellectual intuition the object of knowledge becomes actual. Man's 
maker's-knowledge, however, does not, correspondingly, make the object 
actual by merely thinking it, "For if understanding thinks it— . . . then 
the thing is represented merely as possible."”  For man, the object can be 
actual only by being "given" in sensible intuition.
Nevertheless, Kant tells us that thinking certain kinds of objects 
(e.g., God) is an "indispensable idea of reason, a valid use of the
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employement of our cognitive faculties." (CJ 402-3) Now, the "idea" of a 
being who has, by intellectual intuition, "made" actual the objects of na­
ture according to a plan or idea, is itself one of those necessary objects 
that must be thought by beings who have cognitive faculties with our pe­
culiar structure. Therefore, the "idea" of a being who makes objects actual 
according to a plan or idea is a necessary idea by which we should judge 
organisms. This is the meaning of the (troublesome) passage in which Kant 
explains the possibility of organisms. An organism is a unique "object."
Its parts must in their collective unity reciprocally produce one 
another alike as to form and combination, and thus by their oim 
causality produce a whole, the conception of which, conversely,—  
in a being possessing the causality according to conceptions that 
is adequate for such a product— could in turn be the cause of the 
whole according to a principle, . .
Yet one difficulty remains, namely whose "idea" is it that is the 
(teleological) cause of the organism? Let us here pause and restate the 
problem. Kant says, on the one hand, that we are to think of an organism 
as a system. This means that an organism is a whole whose parts are related 
to each other in a "special" way (i.e., they are reciprocally cause and ef­
fect of each other) such that they depend upon a "plan." This is to say 
that they (i.e., organisms) depend upon an "intelligent idea" which is 
their cause. It is this idea then that forms organisms into unified wholes. 
On the other hand, since the organism is a product of nature (and not a 
human work of art), the "idea" cannot be a human "idea," for that would 
mean that the cause was external to the organism, thus contradicting the 
very notion of an organism (namely that an organism is a unified whole whose 
cause is internal to and reciprocally related with its effect)."*^  But 
surely the "idea" must be a human "idea" if it is humans which are to ex­
perience (i.e., judge) nature teleologically.
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The solution to this apparent difficulty is to see that Kant is 
actually speaking of two distinct kinds of teleological ideas which have 
two distinct origins. He is saying in the first place that we must make 
use of the "idea" (call it Idea #1) that "organisms are to be judged as if 
they depend in a 'special' way upon an idea" (call it Idea #2) of a non­
human mind. Now the special way in which organisms depend upon that mind 
cannot be that the idea (Idea #2) exists external to the organism. For if 
this were the case, the idea would thereby be disqualified as a "cause" of 
the organism. (This is so, once again, because organisms are defined as 
being caused by an idea which is internal to their make-up.)
Further, the mind in question cannot be a human mind, for if it
were, then a human idea could be the actual cause of the organism. This is
to say that in merely thinking the idea of an organism we (humans) could 
thereby bring organisms into existence. This claim, i.e., that human be­
ings have intellectual intuition of organisms, Kant, of course, denies.
The conclusion, therefore, must be that there is a non-human in­
telligence or mind which, simply by virtue of having an "idea," thereby 
makes actual the objects of nature, in this case organisms."*^ Hence, there 
are two distinct kinds of teleological ideas that come from two distinct 
origins— man's mind and God's mind. On the one hand, there is our idea 
(Idea #1) whose origin is our human reason. This is the teleological idea 
of an organism "as having been produced by an intelligent cause, i.e., a 
plan." The organism is, as a consequence of this idea (Idea #1), thought 
of as being completely determined by an idea (Idea #2) which is the intel­
ligent cause of the organism, i.e., which actually does the determining.
On the other hand, the origin of the second idea (Idea #2) is a non-human
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intelligence (God) which, given the occasion of his having the idea (Idea 
#2), he thereby causes the actuality of the object. (This is to say that 
God, in knowing nature, makes it.) Therefore, there are two kinds of ideas 
involved here; Idea #1 which is of something (namely a non-human mind en­
dowed with intellectual intuition) and is itself non-creating. Further, 
there is Idea #2 which is not merely of something but also creates and, 
therefore, is that something.
If we keep in mind these two kinds of teleological ideas and their
origins, we shall better understand the explanatory function of Kant's "God-
man maker's-knowledge analogy" in its relation to teleological explanation.
Kant uses it, for example, to account for the teleological character of
nature. He speaks of the necessity of using such an idea (Idea #1) in the
following passage:
We are bound to have present to our minds the thought of another 
possible form of intuition if ours was to be deemed one of a 
special kind, one namely, for which objects were only to rank as 
phenomena. Were this not so it could not be said that certain
natural products must, from the particular constitution of our
understanding, be considered by us— if we are to conceive the 
possibility of their production— as having been produced designedly 
and as ends, . . . (CJ 405-6)'*^
We saw earlier that reason must be satisfied in knowing the neces­
sity of all forms of nature even if that simply meant that reason must be
able to become aware of the origin of such forms. We now see that reason
does become aware of the origin of the teleological forms of nature by 
analyzing the concept of an "end." In discovering this origin, reason is 
satisfied. The origin of the teleological form of an organism is in our 
reason (specifically, reflective judgment) which necessarily makes use of 
a (teleological) idea (Idea #1) of a being which possesses "a different type 
of causality from that of physical laws,"'*'* i.e., a ". . . causality
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according to conceptions that is adequate for such a product [as an 
organism] . . . "  [Idea #2].'*®
How then is this relevant to history? Kant makes it clear that 
reflective judgment is necessary for beings with our particular constitu­
tion in judging the world. He has told us, concerning organisms, that we 
must judge parts of nature such that we view them as ends. Further, he 
says:
. . .  we must at least try this maxim of judgement also on 
nature as a whole, because many of its laws might be discover­
able in the light of this maxim which otherwise . . . would
remain hidden from us."*®
In judging the whole of nature reflectively, i.e., as a designed end, the 
question naturally arises, "For what end does nature itself exist?" It is 
here that Kant claims that it is man alone who is the "ultimate end [my 
emphasis] of nature, and the one in relation to whom all other natural 
things constitute a system of ends.""*^
We have seen earlier that the history of mankind is to be viewed 
as the realization of nature's ultimate end or secret plan. We now see what 
this end is, namely to produce a being that will "make himself human," i.e., 
make himself, through his moral actions into a final end. History, then, 
is the story of man making himself into a final end with the aid of nature 
(in that she promotes him as her own ultimate end). It is because man is 
the only being on earth that possesses understanding and, therefore, the 
only being that can set ends before himself by choice, that he is the
". . . titular lord of nature, and, supposing we regard nature as a teleo­
logical system, he is bom to be its ultimate [my emphasis] end." (CJ 434) 
Kand did not, however, believe that man comes into the world with 
reason and moral qualities in him full-blown. Instead, he believed that
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man must "make" himself into a rational and moral creature.Man does 
this with the aid of nature, but it is nature's job to prepare man to be­
come self-sufficing and independent of nature. Nature does this by pro­
ducing in man a certain aptitude. It is precisely this aptitude " . . .  for 
any ends whatever of his own choosing, consequently of the aptitude of a 
being in his freedom, [which] is [man's] culture." [CJ 431) It is through 
culture, then, that nature helps man bring about his own freedom and thus 
allows him to become a final end.
We can begin to see how the "moral" teleological element makes up 
the "other aspect" of Kant's philosophy of history. This moral element has 
its locus within the notion of a "final" end [as opposed to an "ultimate" 
end). A final end is one which does not require any other end as a "condi­
tion of its possibility," it is unconditioned, i.e., it is dependent upon 
no conditions other than its own "idea." An ultimate end, on the other hand, 
is dependent on other conditions, i.e., other "natural" things. For example, 
although man is the ultimate end of nature as an end, he nevertheless de­
pends upon nature. This is not the case with final ends.
Now there is only one being in the world, Kant tells us, which can
determine ends for itself unconditionally, and that being is man.
He is the only natural creature whose peculiar objective char­
acterization is nevertheless such as to enable us to recognize 
in him a supersensible faculty— his freedom--and to perceive both 
the law of causality and the object of freedom which that faculty 
is able to set before itself as the highest end— the supreme 
good in the world.
Therefore, man as noumenon, i.e., as a member of the intelligible world, is 
an absolute end in himself [which is again to say that he is a final end).
He is this because, as the only rational creature on earth, he possesses 
will [i.e., practical reason) which Kant defines as a kind of free
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causality. As Paton puts it, "To describe such a will as free would be to 
say that it can act causally without being caused to do so by something 
other than itself."®^
It is having this property of "free will," then, which allows us 
to view man and only man as the "final" end "to which nature is teleologi­
cally subordinated." (CJ 436). Because of free will, man acts purposively
and yet without the force of any condition other than his own idea. It is 
in history, as opposed to nature, that man himself determines the conditions 
for his actions, and this, for Kant, means that man, by acting in accordance 
with only his own idea, makes himself human in the process. Kant tells us, 
e.g., ". . . Man is destined by his reason to live in a society with men 
and in it to cultivate [my emphasis] himself, to civilize [my emphasis] 
himself, and to make [my emphasis] himself moral [my emphasis] by the arts 
and sciences.
The historical process, then, is a moral process precisely because
it is founded upon the nation of a different kind of causality, i.e., a free,
unconditioned causality which Kant thinks of as action in accordance with
an "idea." If man had no such will, he could not act from his own idea and
would then, like nature, forever depend upon prior conditions. Therefore,
he would not be thought of as a "final" end. This is why Kant tells us in
his essay "Conjectual Beginning of Human History" that history was possible,
i.e., precisely because man had a (free) will and with it made himself free
of nature as soon as:
. . . reason began to stir. He stood, as it were, at the brink of 
an abyss. Until that moment instinct had directed him toward spe­
cific objects of desire. But from these there now opened up an 
infinity of such objects and he did not yet know how to choose be­
tween them. On the other hand, it was impossible for him to return 
to the state of servitude (i.e., subjection to instinct) from the 
state of freedom, once he had tasted the latter.
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(I shall not here enter into the intricate relationships among the good 
will, duty, freedom, and the categorical imperative. Suffice it to say 
that, for Kant, morality (The Good) depends absolutely on this notion of 
"will," for as he says, "It is impossible to conceive of anything at all in 
the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualifica­
tion, except a good will."®'*)
We may here say in summation that it is because man can become a
rational being and has "practical" reason, i.e., a will, that he is not
totally subject to conditions imposed by nature. Therefore, man operates 
by a different kind of causality, namely freedom. For history to be pos­
sible, there must be a creature who is both the ultimate end of nature and 
a final end in himself. There is such a creature, Kant tells us— man. We 
are able to come to see that man is an ultimate end of nature because we 
are able to judge nature as a teleological process. We are able to come to 
see that man is an end in himself because we can judge him as a teleologi­
cal and a moral (final) end. History, then, is the story of man's becoming 
a final end. The notion of end, however, as we have seen, depends upon 
there being a "special" kind of judgment, i.e., a "reflective" judgment which 
allows for teleological judgments in the first place.
Before turning now to the final section of this chapter, i.e., the
construction of a Kantian answer to the question "How is history as a pure
science possible?", I wish to comment upon one last notion and its relation 
to history, namely Kant's notion of "self-making."
Making and Self-Making
Michel Despland in his book Kant on History and Religion has 
pointed out that there is a difference for Kant in our knowledge of nature
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and our knowledge of history. He says:
Our knowledge of nature, helped by regulative ideas, is seen as
an ongoing process; but the substratum for that knowledge is not 
seen as an ongoing process (or the question as to whether the sub­
stratum, or better, the things in themselves are in the process 
of becoming is not raised because it cannot bo raised in the con­
text of the Kantian system). Such is not entirely the case with 
history. We make what we subsequently come to know [my emphasis]
(or at least participate in the making of it), and that we make it
is morally very important [my emphasis].®®
I believe Despland is correct in his observation, and I should like 
to develop his remark with the following comments. For Kant, nature is 
known, or at least,knowable, because we "make" it. However, our knowledge 
of the kind of making that goes on in the world of nature is not seen to 
have any direct moral implications. This is because tlie philosophy which 
explains how "natural" objects are "made" (i.e., the critical philosophy of 
the first Critique) in no direct way entails the notions of "self-making" 
and "self-knowing."
On the other hand, when this same critical philosophy turns its 
attention to the historical world and attempts there to give an account of 
the "object" of history (i.e., man), the notions of "self-making" and "self­
knowing" are brought straight to the surface. It is these notions, then, 
i.e., self-making and self-knowing, that mark out the difference between 
natural and historical knowledge.
Kant made it quite clear in the Critique of Pure Reason that the 
objective of the "critical philosophy" was, ". . . to secure for human rea­
son complete satisfaction in regard to that with which it has all along 
so eagerly occupied itself, though hitherto in vain."®® The first Critique 
was a "tribunal" by whose institution the task, namely ". . . that of self- 
knowledge" (Axi), was to be finally achieved. By understanding how it is
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that knowledge of nature is possible, e.g., geometry and physics, man comes 
to understand himself. That is when man "makes" nature and can, therefore, 
come to have knowledge of nature, he also, in seeing how he "makes" nature 
(via the critical philosophy], at the same time gains knowledge of his own 
capacities and limits. This, for Kant, is one sense of "self-knowledge."
However, man also "makes" history, and here too self-knowledge is 
involved, although in an altogether different sense. We have seen that the 
"making" of history is a twofold process. First, it is because man has made 
nature and made it purposeful that it becomes possible for him to discover 
a "regular movement in the appearances of the play of freedom of the human 
will at large." That is, because of these conceptual "makings" (i.e., de­
terminative and reflective judgment], it becomes possible for there to be 
such a thing as history. In this sense history is possible because reflec­
tive judgment allows nature to be seen as purposeful and man to be viewed 
as a final end. Now it is because history is possible in the above sense 
that man can come to see himself, when viewing history "at large," as a his­
torical agent whose actions make a difference to his own nature. As a his­
torical agent, man "makes" history, and this sense of "making" is different 
from that discussed above. Further, the "self-knowledge" gained from this 
second sense of "making" history will also be different. This "sense" may 
be thought of as a kind of "practical making" and so too the "self-knowledge 
gained from it. In giving a "philosophical" account of how history is pos­
sible, Kant has thereby shown how its object (i.e., man] comes to be viewed 
as a being who has, through his actions, "made" himself into what he is. As 
P.mil Fackenheim puts it, for Kant, "historiography investigates what he [man 
has made of himself, llio past achievements of freedom, as much as its pros 
cnt possibilities and actualities, escape the roach of natural laws."^’
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In his "Conjectural Beginnings of Human History" Kant pointed to 
this difference between history and nature. Only in history does man make 
himself into a cultured being quite independent of, and at times "in opposi­
tion to" nature. This is not to say that history somehow represents the 
good while nature represents the bad, for Kant in fact held just the op­
posite view.®® It is simply to say that the meaning of historical activity 
is qualitatively distinct from the meaning of natural activity. It is in 
history and not nature that man attains culture and morality. It is also 
in history and not nature that human strife, fear, anxiety, war, and respon­
sibility reside. Because of his power of reason, man leaves the "womb of 
nature" to succumb to the fate of his own self-making. This is
. . .  an alteration of condition which is honorable, to be sure, 
but also fraught with danger. For nature had now driven him from 
the safe and harmless state of childhood— a garden as it were, 
which looked after his needs without any trouble on his part (3:23)—  
into the wide world, where so many cares, troubles, and unforseen 
ills awaited him. (p. 59 Conj Beg)
Hence, history is the story of man in his distinctness from nature 
making himself human. The knowledge that is gained from history will there­
fore also be a distinct kind from that of natural knowledge in that it will 
be a different kind of self-knowledge. Instead of the self-knowledge gained 
simply by an awareness of one's limits and capacities, in history man in­
stead acquires knowledge of the origins and development of his own "self- 
made" humanity.
History is then distinguished from nature by Kant by being the 
locus for the origin of humanity, i.e., the origin of man's own self­
making. It is in this manner that Kant solves the "problem" of history 
(i.e., whether history is a moral or physical process and what the answer 
to this question implies for man). History is to be seen as both a natural
184
and a moral process. In viewing history from this perspective, Kant develops 
a concept of man as a self-making, self-actualizing, autonomous being who, 
with the aid of nature, develops his own humanity. Kant holds that accom­
plishing this development will necessitate the guarantee of certain funda­
mental rights in local and world governments. For example, it is necessary 
that institutions which guarantee man's liberty and survival be established 
if man is to accomplish his task of self-development.
History demonstrates that man "makes" himself civilized, moral, 
and thereby human. Finally, in showing this, history gives man a "practical" 
self-knowledge which again points to a quantitative difference between knowl­
edge of nature and knowledge of history. This is the reason for Despland's 
remark that it is morally important to Kant that we "make" history. Only 
in the historical process, which is a "self-making" process, can man gain 
knowledge of the origins of his humanity. Since the critical philosophy has 
been established that only by knowing the origins of objects is knowledge 
finally possible, it follows that only in the area of historical knowledge 
is knowledge of man possible. Therefore, genuine "self-knowledge" is pos­
sible only in historical knowledge.
History as an A Priori Science
1 should now like to conclude by constructing a general Kantian an­
swer to the question, "How is history as a science possible?" Such a con­
struction is important in that it will help to establish the epistemological 
roles played by the concepts of maker's-knowledge and teleology in Kant's 
philosophy of history. It is my view that these concepts are epistenologi- 
cally basic to Kant's philosophy of history, which is to say that without 
seeing how they function, we shall fail to understand it philosophically.®®
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Kant's answer can be divided into three steps. First, having come 
to the conclusion that there is such a thing as history and that it displays 
the process of man making himself human, we ask in the manner of the other 
Critiques, How is it possible as a science?®” We find that this question, 
translated into Kantian language, is really asking, "What are the epistemo­
logical grounds for truth and certainty in the area of history?" The an­
swer to this question can only be discovered by tracing out the origin of 
the necessity that is contained in historical judgments. This is because 
" . . .  we have complete insight only into what we can make and accomplish 
according to our conceptions."®*
Second, we next discover that the possibility of science of nature 
actually rests upon our own understanding in that, through judgment, we con­
stitute the objects of nature in a "law-like" fashion. Further, in our need 
to systematize the particular laws of nature and account for our peculiar 
experience of organisms, we "judge" nature teleologically as well as mech­
anistically and find that the "teleological necessity" involved in nature 
as a whole also has its origin "in us." From this we conclude that the 
truth and certainty are epistemologically grounded in a "maker's-knowledge 
criterion," i.e., that the "maker*s-knowledge criterion" is really the logic 
of nature since it is the "logic of truth."®^
Third and finally, we show that history as a science is possible 
by using the same strategy that allowed us to see how a science of nature 
was possible. That is to say, we attempt to show that there are synthetic 
a priori truths of history, the necessity of which can only be accounted for 
in terms of the epistemological concepts "maker's knowledge" and "teleology." 
We would then see that Kant's "maker's-knowledge criterion" performs two
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important functions. First, it provides the epistemological basis for a 
mechanistic science of nature. Second, it provides the basis for a useful 
analogy (i.e., "God-man maker's-knowledge analogy") which in turn provides 
the basis for a teleological view of nature. It is this teleological view 
of nature that makes it possible for history to be a science.
Concerning the second teleological view, we have seen that it is 
reflective judgment that grounds that view of nature and thus also grounds 
our teleological view of man. Such a view of man is absolutely essential 
to a science of history because only a teleological explanation of man's ac­
tion ("in the large") will account for the element of certainty that every 
science (including history) requires. Finally, the question arises, "Upon 
what principle is reflective judgment to be based?" Kant answers:
. . .  as universal laws of nature have their ground in our under­
standing, which prescribes them to nature (though only according 
to the universal concept of it as nature), particular empirical 
laws must be regarded, in respect of that which is left undetermined 
in them by these universal laws, according to a unity such as they 
would have if an understanding (though it be not ours) had supplied 
them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, so as to render 
possible a system of experience according to particular natural 
laws.
It is by means, then, of an analogical argument that Kant accomplishes his 
task. By arguing that we must assume that there is an understanding like 
ours in the respect that it knows only because it makes and unlike ours, in 
that in knowing it thereby brings about the existence of the actual being 
via intellectual intuition, we account for teleology in nature. With this 
line of argument Kant claims that teleological explanation is the indis­
pensable kind of explanation for a science of history. Teleological explana­
tion, it will be remembered, was seen as indispensable for natural science 
in its study of organisms and in its general unification of particular
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empirical laws. This kind of "explaining" was accomplished by making use 
of "theoretical reflective judgment" which itself was in principle based 
upon the assumption of an intelligent world cause. All of this was involved 
in Kant's notion of a "physical" teleology. On the other hand, he argued 
that there must also be a "final" end of nature as well as an ultimate end. 
Here only "practical reflective judgment" could judge man to be the sole 
candidate for this office. The reasoning was that only man (on earth) is 
a rational creature and that, therefore, only he has that unconditioned 
property that allows him to set ends for himself, namely an autonomous will. 
In this way Kant introduces his notion of "moral" teleology. This notion 
also requires the assumption of an intelligent world cause and adds that it 
must be a moral cause. It (God) must be moral if man is to be judged as a 
final end of nature; for if it were not, then man would abandon his pur­
suit of the moral law and thereby cease to exercise his good (autonomous) 
will, ceasing thereupon to be a final end.®"*
How, then, is history possible? We have said that history is the 
story of man "making" himself human. Further, to see history as such a 
story we require the use of a "maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth and a 
concept of teleology. Maker's knowledge allows the possibility of nature 
and, by way of analogy, a non-human intelligence which has created a teleo­
logical world. Teleological judgment allows us to have certainty in our 
explanations of history. Moreover, it is moral teleological judgment that 
allows for the possibility of a priori truths of history. This is to claim 
that teleological, reflective judgment, once it has passed out of the area 
of mere nature and into the area of history, becomes a constitutive 
judgment.®®
1S8
It becomes clear that, on Kantian principles, only if constitutive 
judgments can be "made" in history can history be possible as a science.
This is because only constitutive judgments, in the Kantian system, account
for the actual necessity of appearance. Hence, the construction of a Kantiar
answer to the question, "How is history as an a priori science possible?" 
must in the end show that constitutive judgments are possible in the area 
of history, as they were in geometry and physics. Kant never argued this.
Yet this is precisely what is suggested to us when we examine his cpistemic 
notions of maker's knowledge and teleology in relation to history. Further, 
this is precisely what was suggested to philosophers of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries in their attempts to demonstrate that history is a sci­
ence and, in some cases, the science. (1 have in mind such philosophers as 
Hegel, Oil they, Croce, Gentile, and Collingwood.)
For Kant (in oar construction) history as a science is possible
only if two conditions are met: first, wo can have historical knowledge
only if we "make" the object of that knowledge. This "historical" knowl­
edge will be different from that of natural knowledge in that the "object" 
of our knowledge is (moral) man and so the "making" of the object ends up 
being a self-making resulting in a (special) self-knowledge.'’*' Second, we 
can have historical knowledge only if we can judge nature in a theoretically 
teleological reflective way and man in a practical, teleological, reflective 
way. In so doing, we can then establish the a priori conditions (i.e., 
Kant's nine theses) by which it can bo shown that man's history as the 
"final" end of creation is the story of his making himself human.
Of course, there is a sense in which this whole question of the 
possibility of the "science" of history is, for Kant,-moot. Kant never
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raised the issue. However, if we raise it and construct an answer on 
Kantian grounds, I am confident that the paradigm for the "science" of his­
tory would not be that put forth in the first Critique. It would, instead, 
involve the construction of a new paradigm, involving the constitutive use 
of concepts such as maker's knowledge and teleology in the area of history 
thus, in effect, offering a "new science."
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thinks of "idea" in the above essay in a technical sense, which he makes 
clear in the Critique of Pure Reason, A313/B570. As Beck explains it:
"Kant takes the word 'idea' from Plato, though he does not ascribe meta­
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dwellers on other planets and their nature . . . that each individual 
can perfectly attain his destiny in his own life. Among us, it is dif­
ferent; only the race can hope to attain it." (p. 18, Idea, footnote #2)
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""CJ 373.
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"God-man maker's-knowledge analogy." See, e.g., CJ 180.
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seeks to make his actual state of being adequate under purely empirical 
conditions— an impossible task . . . his [man's] own nature is not so con­
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ends whose possibility rests upon conditions that man can only await at 
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^^Anthropology, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Martinu/Nijhoff Press), p. 186 (325). 
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^^Conjectural Beginning of Human History, p. 60.
®®Kant says, e.g., when speaking of the principle of reflective judgment, 
that we must assume that a non-human (maker's-knowledge) intelligence ac­
counts for teleology in nature. This assumption is ". . . the epistemologi­
cal basis upon which the systematic unity of the form and combination of 
all the manifold contained in the given matter becomes cognizable for the 
person estimating it." (CJ 373)
®°lt should be re-emphasized that we are here assuming that history is a sci­
ence for the purpose of constructing a Kantian answer as to its possibility. 
This is in the same manner as Kant stated the question for the other sci­
ences. He says, "How is pure mathematics possible? How is pure science 
of nature possible? Since these sciences actually exist, it is quite 
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proved by the fact that they exist." (Critique of Pure Reason B20-21)
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empirical acts of the understanding systematic." (A664/B692)
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indeed the source of all truth (that is, of the agreement of our knowledge 
with objects), inasmuch as they contain in themselves the ground of the 
possibility of experience . . ." (B296/A2347, also see A63)
"The law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity, is a necessary 
law, since without it we should have no reason at all, and without reason 
no coherent employment of the understanding, and in the absence of this 
no sufficient criterion of empirical truth." (A652/B679)
^^Critique of Pure Reason A62/B87.
“ cj 180.
®**lt is important to note that Kant is not saying that men should be moral, 
or are moral, merely because they will receive immortality from the hands 
of a just and moral God. He is saying, instead, that if there were no 
moral God then man could ". . . never expect to find in nature a uniform 
agreement— a consistent agreement according to fixed rules, answering to 
what his maxims are . . . Thus the end which this right-minded man would 
have, and ought to have, ir view in his pursuit of the moral law, would 
certainly have to be abandoned by him as impossible." CJ 452.
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G Sit may be that it is constitutive even in the area of nature, i.e., in our 
experience of organisms. This is left unclear by Kant. In any case it is 
clear that " . . .  once the question touches practical matters, a regula­
tive principle of this kind— one for providence or wisdom to follow— which 
directs us to act in conformity with something, as an end, the possibility 
of which, by the frame of our cognitive faculties, can only be conceived 
by is in a certain manner, then becomes also constitutive." (CJ 457)
GGpor a superb paper on the notions of history, self-making, and self-knowing, 
see Emil L. Fackenheim's Metaphysics and Historicity, The Aquinas Lecture, 
1961.
CHAPTER V 
COMPARISON AND CONTRAST
In this chapter I should like to compare and contrast some of 
the major points of Vico's and Kant's philosophies of history. 1 wish to 
do this in order to investigate more carefully their parallel development. 
This comparison has two objectives: (1) to show the fundamental differ­
ences of these two philosophies of history, and (2) to show the similari­
ties of these philosophers' views on history due to their similar 
epistemological commitments.
There are in English only two papers which explicitly give a gen­
eral comparison of Vico's and Kant's theories of knowledge. One is a 
paper by Eugene T. Gadol, "The Idealistic Foundations of Cultural Anthro­
pology: Vico, Kant, and Cassirer," Journal of the History of Philosophy,
12 (April 1974):20-25. The other is a paper by Nathan Rotenstreich, "Vico 
and Kant," in Giambattista Vico’s Science of Humanity, ed. Giorgio Taglia- 
cozzo and Donald Phillip Verene (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1976).
As can be seen from the title, Gadol's paper includes a section 
on Cassirer and, therefore, is not exclusively devoted to a comparison of 
Vico and Kant. Nevertheless, Gadol has several important things to say 
concerning Vico, Kant, and our topic. Rotenstreich's paper, on the other
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hand, goes directly to the heart of the matter by focusing on issues 
particularly relevant to our study.
My strategy in this chapter is twofold. First, I shall compare and 
contrast Vico's and Kant's views on the various points which Gadol and Roten­
streich take up in their papers. In this way, while I shall be able to offer 
my reasons as to why Vico and Kant hold either similar or dissimilar views 
in their respective philosophies of history, I shall at the same time be able 
to comment upon the merits of Gadol's and Rotenstreich's comparisons. Sec­
ond, continuing the comparison, I shall offer some comments on Vico's and 
Kant's use of teleological explanation in their respective philosophies of 
history (which Rotenstreich and Gadol have not addressed themselves to).
Gadol
Let us begin with Gadol's paper. Gadol speaks to at least three 
important related points of special interest to our topic (maker's knowledge 
and teleology in Vico's and Kant's philosophies of history). First, he 
recognizes that both Vico and Kant use a "maker's-knowledge criterion" of 
truth which he refers to as the "dictum." Second, he points out that both 
philosophers rely upon the dictum to ground mathematics and physics. In 
fact, Gadol's strategy in his paper is to point out the differences between 
Kant and Vico by showing how the dictum is used differently by each phil­
osopher in his application of it to geometry, physics, and history. Third, 
Gadol argues that Vico makes use of the dictum to attempt to ground history 
"metaphysically" and that Kant (while like Vico in reading history teleo­
logically, was nevertheless unlike Vico in that he) took knowledge of his­
tory to be unadulterated with metaphysics or theology. Following Gadol's 
explanations, I shall comment on each of these three points.
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Gadol begins by telling us that the central doctrine which Vico 
and Kant share is "Verum et factum convertuntur— to really know a thing, 
it is necessary to create or generate it. (This idea we shall henceforth 
call the dictum.)"^ It is this central doctrine or "dictum," then, that 
Gadol feels provides the necessary link between Kant and Vico concerning 
"the nature of human creativity.However, although both Kant and Vico 
see the dictum as central to their respective theories of knowledge, they 
nevertheless make quite different things of it.® These differences, Gadol 
argues, concern each philosopher's views of geometry, physics, and per­
haps history.
We have seen in Chapters I and III that both Vico and Kant believe 
that it was only by making use of a "maker's-knowledge criterion" (Gadol's 
dictum) that one could justifiably answer the sceptic.'* It is Gadol's view 
that:
Vico simply used the dictum (1) to justify his sceptical conclu­
sions regarding the possibility of genuine mathematical or physi­
cal knowledge, and (2) to ground or legitimize the claims of 
history as a genuine science. Kant [on the other hand] asked 
for its meaning. He offered a critical analysis of it for the 
first time in the history of ideas, and this for exactly the 
opposite reason: to demonstrate that the only knowledge we have
(in the strictly scientific sense of "knowledge") is mathematics 
and physics.®
Gadol believes that Vico is really a sceptic when it comes to 
knowledge in the areas of mathematics and physics and that it is only in 
history that Vico leaves his scepticism and sees, because of the dictum's 
acceptability there, that genuine knowledge is really historical knowledge. 
Gadol says that although mathematics teaches appreciation of "delicate 
ideas of lines of geometry and numbers, . . . mathematics is not [for Vico] 
a genuine science." Further, Vico's
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. . . theory of metaphysical points sustaining matter had to 
make the world of physics a mirage. Vico's substantial con­
cept of bodies, coupled with his notion of a transcendent cona­
tion which supports and moves them, led inevitably to scepticism 
as regards the possibility of obtaining real physical knowledge.®
In the area of history it turns out that Vico is not sceptical
because he correctly observes that the dictum perfectly applies to:
. . . one vital and complex insight: that the nature of man, as
revealed in the common nature of nations, is to be understood 
only via an understanding of the growth and development of man's 
indigenous institutions.
Man can have knowledge of history precisely because man had "made" the in­
stitutions which history is the story of. However, and this 1 take to be 
Gadol's major point, Vico does not really understand the meaning of the 
dictum with which he attempts to justify even historical knowledge. Vico:
. . . needed the dictum and employed it without giving further 
thought to the problem of its metaphysical justification. He 
simply makes use of it without more explicit and detailed de­
fense, save for declaring the poetry and myths of the ancients 
to have structures that we can really know.®
It is only with Kant and the "critical" philosophy that the real 
meaning of the dictum becomes clear because it is only with the critical 
philosophy that a distinction is drawn between phenomenon and noumenon, 
thus solving the seemingly insoluble realist problems of knowledge. Vico, 
Gadol argues, was then not only sceptical but also dogmatic. Vico asserted 
the creativity of man and the superiority of historical cognition over 
natural scientific or mathematical in a purely dogmatic fashion as indeed 
he had to, for the Copemican revolution which Kant was to introduce into 
philosophy and which was to critically justify a doctrine of creativity was 
still some years away. All pre-critical (pre-Kantian) formulations of the 
problem of knowledge were dogmatic in the sense that they entailed a
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fundamental and unquestioned commitment to realism: a belief in the
substantival existence of a subject (the knower) and its object (the known).®
Finally, when it comes to history, the application of the dictum 
by Vico results in a "metaphysical" grounding of history. For Kant, on the 
other hand, in his use of the ductum, "Knowledge of history as well as na­
tural science is "possible" without metaphysics or theology."*® Neverthe­
less, Gadol tells us that Vico and Kant share the notion of man's progress 
in history from mythos (poetry) to logos (reason). Yet for Vico, this 
progress is conceived as providential while for Kant it is thought of as 
natural.* * This is not to deny that Kant holds that history should be 
read as teleological in character and that its meaning "constitutes the 
self-development of man's spirit . .
What we are to say of Gadol's comparisons? First, he is right in 
supposing that because the distinction between phenomen and noumenon is 
absent in Vico's philosophy, the application of the dictum to nature by 
Vico may, in one sense, be thought of as resulting in a "kind" of scepti­
cism concerning knowledge of nature. Concerning this point, I think that 
Gadol is right. However, concerning most of his other points, I think he 
is simply mistaken, and I shall comment on three in particular. But first, 
let us return to the first point about which Gadol is right.
The "kind" of scepticism mentioned above that Vico is guilty of 
is the kind that results from the belief that knowledge of nature can never 
be absolutely certain (as opposed to geometry and history which can be).
Gadol is correct in pointing out that Vico did not see how the dictum could 
apply to "objects" in such a way as to render them totally "made." Knowl­
edge of nature, i.e., physics, was possible for Vico, to be sure (because
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of the dictum, i.e., "our making"). However, the "making" that is done 
in physics is not the creation of objects in the Kantian sense, but rather 
in the Baconian sense of "constructing" hypotheses and experiments with 
which we could then investigate nature. (See Chapter I for a discussion 
of this "making" in physics.) Put simply, for Vico we are able to gain 
knowledge of nature only because we "make" experiments.
The crucial difference then (which Gadol rightly points to) between 
Vico's use of the dictum and Kant's in relation to nature is that for 
Vico we do not "make" the objects of nature because the objects of nature 
are in some sense or other already given. It is God who makes the objects 
of nature. For Kant, on the other hand, we do make the objects of nature 
in that all of the essential "formal" aspects which transform the "given" 
into an object are contributed by the subject. In other words, we can have 
absolutely certain knowledge of nature for Kant because (or perhaps only 
because) the dictum is applied to a world of phenomena. On the other hand, 
we cannot have absolutely certain knowledge of nature for Vico because (and 
perhaps only because) the dictum is applied to a world of noumena.*^
However, in acknowledging this difference between Vico's and 
Kant's use of the dictum vis-à-vis nature, we should not exaggerate Vico's 
scepticism. This, then, is the first point about which I believe Gadol is 
in error. It is worth remembering that it was precisely Vico's contention 
throughout De Antiquissima (and he nowhere withdrew it in The New Science) 
that there is only one way in which one can answer the sceptic, namely by 
use of the dictum.*"* In De Antiquissima the science which resulted in 
knowledge of the world of nature and which, therefore, must be secured from 
sceptical attacks were precisely the sciences of geometry and physics.
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Vico was not sceptical about mathematical (geometrical) knowledge. 
Mathematical knowledge is made by us and, analogously, tells us something 
about the way nature is shaped. Vico "justified" this view by what he 
called a "metaphysical" hypothesis. It is true that he believed that the 
truths of geometry were abstract and not "real"; however, we should not 
infer from this that (as we have seen in Chapter I) geometrical entities 
or figures do not correspond to the "real" corporeal world. The purpose 
of Vico's "metaphysical hypothesis" (i.e., his doctrine of metaphysical 
points) was to show how geometrical entities that we completely create do 
correspond to the "real" world which God has completely created. The ob­
jects of the real world have been generated out of God's metaphysical points 
just as the objects of the geometrical "world" have been generated out of 
our geometrical points. Our geometry, therefore, applies to the natural 
world precisely because the natural world is "made" in an analogous manner 
to that of the geometrical world.
Next, when it comes to physics, here too we see that Vico's so- 
called scepticism was not a scepticism concerning whether knowledge of na­
ture was genuine. This is because the test of genuine knowledge for Vico 
was whether knowledge could be grounded by the dictum. In other words,
Vico believed that knowledge of the "natural" world could be justified 
epistemologically and metaphysically by making use of the dictum and the 
doctrine of metaphysical points. However, because he had to make use of 
the dictum in an analogical manner, i.e., by thinking of it in an analogous 
way to that of God's knowledge, he was necessarily sceptical concerning 
the possibility of man's absolute knowledge of corporeal nature.
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This is to say that man could not have a certain "kind" of 
knowledge (i.e., absolute knowledge) of corporeal nature as God does. This 
is because man has not "made" corporeal nature as God did. The best man 
could hope for in the area of corporeal nature was probable knowledge, and 
this he could achieve by relying on the experimental method.*® This is 
not to say, however, that probable knowledge was not genuine knowledge.
It is, rather, to say that it was necessarily qualified and, therefore, 
limited knowledge.
Therefore, while it is true that Vico came to hold the view that 
only in history could we have "absolutely certain (God-like) knowledge," 
it is an exaggeration to infer from it that Vico was " . . .  led inevitably 
to scepticism as regards the possibility of obtaining real physical knowl­
edge."*^ It is simply not true that Vico is a sceptic concerning knowl­
edge of nature. IVhat is true is that for Vico we do not make natural 
objects, whereas for Kant, in some sense, we do. Vico is not a sceptic in 
any sense but one, namely the one which acknowledges certain limits con­
cerning knowledge of nature because of our inability to create the objects 
of nature. (These limits do not exist in the area of history.) What 
Gadol fails to see is that nature cannot be knoTO for Vico in the way that 
history can, i.e., known in the same manner as God does.*® It is because 
of this limitation of the dictum's applicability to nature that our knowl­
edge of nature for Vico is possible but not certain. History, on the 
other hand, can be known in the same manner as God knows things, and it is, 
therefore, absolutely certain.
The second point that I think Gadol is mistaken about is related 
to the first and concerns history more directly. Gadol says that:
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Vico avoids the trap of scepticism inherent in his realistic 
position by simple fiat. [This is an interesting choice of words 
on Gadol's part.] He resolves, on the basis of a shaky critique 
of mathematics and natural science and a strong humanistic in­
clination, to eschew both domains. Without fully understanding 
the revolutionary repercussions of his position, he simply de­
clares that the works of culture are the sole works upon which 
cognition can rely, for they have not merely a conceptually cre­
ated, ideal or abstract being, but also a determinate concrete 
and historical being.'*
My comment here is that it should be clear by now that it is false that
Vico was ever in danger of the "trap of scepticism,” and it is equally
false that he eschewed the domains of geometry and physics.
Once again, what Vico did was to argue elaborately (not merely 
"declare") that only history could be an absolutely true and certain sci­
ence, i.e., a science in which both "real" truth and complete certainty 
could be obtained by man. Whether his arguments for this claim are sound 
is a distinct issue, but that there are arguments is (as we have seen in 
Chapter II) unquestionable.
Finally, if our study has shotm anything, it has shown that it is 
not the case that Vico merely uses the dictum arbitrarily with no idea of 
its meaning. Nor is it the case that Vico had to make some sort of choice 
between knowledge of nature and knowledge of history and, upon choosing, 
became a sceptic concerning the former and a dogmatist concerning the 
latter.Vico was perfectly aware of the meaning of the dictum and its 
use (especially since he developed it and wrote on its epistemological, 
etymological, and metaphysical meaning. See, e.g.. De Antiquissima, San- 
soni, pp. 62-3), and he used it for both nature and history. What he found 
in the case of history was that man could attain absolute, real, and 
certain knowledge where he could not in physics and geometry.
206
The second point then is that Gadol is simply mistaken about Vico's 
"dogmatism" in history and also about his (Vico's) awareness of how the 
dictum operates in the areas of mathematics and nature. In fact, in his 
Autobiography Vico explicitly acknowledges his awareness of what he was 
doing:
By this insight [i.e., the insight that enabled him to synthesize 
philosophy and philology] Vico's mind arrived at a clear concep­
tion of what it had been vaguely seeking in the first inaugural 
orations and had sketched somewhat clumsily in the dissertation 
On the Method of Our Time, and a little more distinctly in the 
Metaphysics.^  ^ *
The third point I wish to comment on concerns Kant. In an almost 
unintelligible paragraph** Gadol claims (among other things, I suppose] 
that, for Kant, knowledge of history is possible without metaphysics or 
theology. (I am assuming that Gadol means by "knowledge of history" a 
philosophy of history, i.e., a rational explanation of the possibility of 
history both as phenomenon and as a science; just as, for Kant, "knowledge 
of nature" means both of these things. This is clearly what Kant had in 
mind in, e.g., his Ninth Thesis in Idea for a Universal History. "A phil­
osophical attempt to work out a universal history according to a natural 
plan . . ." (p. 23) If Gadol does not mean a philosophy of history, then 
I fail to see the relevance of comparing Kant with Vico.) I take it, 
therefore, that Gadol's point is one of contrast, i.e., that Vico gave 
history a metaphysical ground and Kant did not, within their respective
* The Metaphysics is Book 1 of De Antiquissima.
** But if metaphysics is "impossible," i.e., illusory, what about history? 
In Vico's mind, history, even though it was man's creation, was in need 
of metaphysical grounding. By thoroughly anthropomorphizing and by 
critically analyzing the concept of creativity in his doctrine of the 
synthetic a priori, Kant not merely dispensed with metaphysics, qua 
ontology, but with a metaphysically oriented concept of history as well. 
Knowledge of history as well as natural science is "possible" without 
metaphysics or theology. Both turn their back on the feasibility of 
grounding . . .
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philosophies of history. My claim, of course, is that this is false; Kant
did in fact give history a metaphysical and a theological ground. First
of all, and less importantly, terminologically speaking Kant tells us in
the first Critique that:
Metaphysics, alike of nature and of morals, and especially that 
criticism of our adventurous and self-reliant reason which serves 
as an introduction or propaedeutic to metaphysics, alone properly 
constitutes what may be entitled philosophy .
Second and more to the substance of the issue, we have seen in Chapter IV 
that, for Kant, history is possible only if the following conditions hold: 
One, we must be able to judge nature as having been produced by a non-human 
understanding whose very idea of, say, an organism results in the existence 
of the organism. Only in this way could nature be thought of as a purpose­
ful unity. In other words for history to be possible, we must first be 
able to judge nature in such a way, i.e., reflectively, that "the history 
of mankind can be seen, in the large, as the realization of nature's secret 
plan . . This calls for a metaphysical assumption of an understand­
ing analogous to ours (although non-human) which can be responsible for 
the idea of the physical teleological make-up of things.
Two, for history to be possible we must view it as part of nature's 
purposeful plan. This means that we must view nature's creatures, specific­
ally man, as being able to fulfill their purposes. History is the story 
of man fulfilling his purpose, i.e., developing his freedom. In order to 
"see" man in this way, i.e., as a final end, a moral teleology is required. 
"We must assume a moral world cause . . . i f  we are to set before ourselves 
a final end in conformity with the requirements of the moral law."*"* 
Therefore, to substantiate this claim Kant offers us a moral proof for the
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existence of God (CJ 477). This proof is designed to exhibit how 
" . . .  from the above moral teleology and its relation to physical teleol­
ogy, reason advances to t h e o l o g y . I t  is only by demonstrating that it 
is necessary to assume a moral teleology that Kant can show how history is 
possible. Hence, Gadol is wrong on this third point, i.e., it is false 
that Kant does not make use of metaphysics and religion to ground history.
he may summarize our comments on Gadol's paper as follows: (1) We
agree with Gadol that Vico does not "make" the objects of nature in the same 
way that Kant "makes" the objects of nature. (2) We disagree with Gadol 
that Kant believed a philosophy of history is possible or could be grounded 
epistemologically without metaphysics. Kant's ground for the principle of 
reflective judgment, which is the only epistemological principle that can 
allow knowledge of history, is grounded squarely in metaphysics, i.e., a 
non-human understanding capable of intellectual intuition. (3) Finally, 
in the light of these comments we can see that although it is true that 
Vico and Kant apply the dictum differently to nature, there is nevertheless 
a fundamental similarity in the development of the dictum in each of their 
works. For example, both use the dictum to ward off scepticism. Both use 
it in geometry, physics, and history. Both see it as being applied in an 
analogous manner to a non-human understanding which is capable of intel­
lectual intuition. Finally, both require that we think of this non-human 
understanding (and its use of the dictum) as somehow appearing in history, 
thus making history possible. Let us now turn to Rotenstreich's paper.
Rotenstreich
Rotenstreich tells us that he sets out to interpret "Vico in the 
light of Kant and to interpret Kant in the light of Vico"^® because of a 
"possible affinity" of ideas. Like Gadol, Rotenstriech believes that the
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two systems obviously have in common the notion of "human creativity" but 
that they vary in their elaboration of this theme.
As it turns out, Rotenstreich thinks that Vico and Kant differ 
much more than they agree, and he attempts to show this by examining their 
views on four separate but related issues: (1) the Cogito of Descartes;
(2) creation and transubstantiation (i.e., the notion of ontological con­
stitution in its relation to the maker's-knowledge thesis); (3) nature and 
history; and (4) Bonum-ipsum-Factum (i.e., maker's knowledge and the Good).
I shall concern myself here with only two of Rotenstreich's points 
of comparison. This is not to suggest that there are only two points of 
interest in Rotenstreich's paper, for that is not the case. I limit my­
self to only two points simply because I consider them especially relevant 
to my topic: the points that concern (1) creation and transubstantiation
and (2) history and nature. I shall first summarize Rotenstreich's views 
and then comment on each of his points in turn.
Rotenstreich begins by saying that the presentation of the Coperni- 
can Hypothesis by Kant and the emphasis he lays on the relationship 
". . . between knowing anything with a priori certainty and imposing the 
a priori concepts on the objects, is a variation on Vico’s theorem of 
V e r u m - f a c t u m .However, although both Vico and Kant use a variation of 
the verum-factum thesis, Kant, says Rotenstreich, applied it to physics 
". . . while Vico tried to show precisely that that applicability is pre­
cluded, and the formula [my emphasis] can hold good for history and not
for physics."28
Rotenstreich goes farther in his comparison of Vico with Kant than 
does Gadol in that he (Rotenstreich) gives a short analysis of how the
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'Mictum" works for Kant and Vico vis à vis the constitution of objects.
He says that although neither Kant's nor Vico's position concerning nature 
amounts to the creation of objects ontologically, nevertheless Vico's claim 
is that " ... the horizon of knowledge is the horizon of created objects, 
the orbit of history, as against the orbit of nature . . Rotenstreich
concludes that for Vico there can be no knowledge of nature.
For Kant, on the other hand, although the spontaneity at the base 
of man's creativity cannot totally create the object (something uncreated 
must always be "given") nevertheless ". . . it still can know the objects, 
though they refer to data which do not stem from the "tree" of knowledge."^** 
In other words for Kant knowledge of nature is possible precisely because 
his use of the dictum allows for a partial creation of "objects." (This 
partial creation of objects is possible for Kant because of the conception 
of a "unifying form" which ". . .  presupposes the to-be-united, or unified, 
m a n i f o l d . T h i s  is not the case with Vico says Rotenstreich because for 
Vico there is:
. . .  a kind of a realistic inuendo— knowledge has to follow the 
objects, and it can follow them only when there is an identity of 
the process bringing about the objects and the process, or pro­
cedure, formulated in the knowledge of the object.
For Vico, then, there is no partial creation of objects. Crea­
tion, while not ontological, is either all or nothing. In the case of na­
ture, since it is nothing, no knowledge is possible. For Kant, on the 
other hand, creation is not simply all or nothing; there is partial crea­
tion. Although it too is not ontological, it nevertheless does allow, in 
the case of nature, for the possibility of knowledge. Now, it is Roten­
streich's view that this same relationship holds for the two thinkers in
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the area o£ mathematics. That is to say, for Vico mathematical objects 
are completely created by us, while for Kant they are partially created.
Thus far, Rotenstreich's argument may be summed up as follows:
Kant applied the dictum (Rotenstreich refers to it as the "formula,", p.
227) to physics, i.e., nature, thereby showing how knowledge of nature is 
possible. Vico showed that the application of the dictum to physics is 
not possible, thereby showing that knowledge of nature is impossible. The 
reason that the dictum makes knowledge of nature possible in the one case 
and impossible in the other is that in the one case Kant's partial crea­
tion counts as justifying knowledge, whereas in the other (Vico's) partial 
creation does not count as justifying knowledge.
Ultimately, Rotenstreich believes that this difference amounts to 
the difference between a "contextual" concept of cause, which he assigns 
to Kant, and an emanatist concept of cause, which is Vico's. Vico’s emana- 
tist conception is realistic in that he takes "cause" to mean "to produce 
existence." For Kant, on the other hand, to cause means "to be dependent 
within a context of events against the background of time." Since knowl­
edge is knowledge of causes, Kant can have knowledge of objects by "making," 
i.e., providing the form of objects, while Vico, on the other hand, cannot 
because Vico cannot "make" the object, i.e., provide its form and thus 
bring it into existence.Rotenstreich emphasizes this point. " . . .  Kant 
presented the view, which Vico could not present, that knowledge of amor­
phous data is possible. Data are not known as such, but only insofar as 
they are integrated in formal frameworks of relations."^'*
My comment on this point made by Rotenstreich is in two parts: 
first, we have seen in Chapters I and II and in my comments on Gadol's
212
paper that Vico does not deny that knowledge of nature is possible. On
the contrary, in De Rntiquissima he gives us the only condition by which
knowledge of nature (i.e., physics) can be possible, namely by showing how
the "maker's-knowledge criterion" justifies an experimental method ("Con-
cludiamo infine osservando che non si deve introdurre nella fisica il
metodo geometrico, ma la diretta diraostrazione sperimentale .... In
questo modo la fisica puo progredire." Sansoni, p. 124; also see p. 68).
Knowledge of nature is possible because and only because of experiment.
What Vico denies (twenty years later in The New Science') is that
the "maker's-knowledge criterion" will apply to nature in the same God-like
way that it does to history. History is the only area, and hence the only
"science," in which man can be God-like in achieving absolute truth and
certainty. Upon making this discovery Vico then asks why the philosopher
should waste his time trying to achieve absolute truth and certainty in the
t
world of nature which, since God made it, only God could achieve (N.S., #331).
Hence, Rotenstreich has made the same error as Gadol. He has 
failed to see that for Vico there are actually two "kinds" of knowledge. 
First, there is knowledge of the natural world (i.e., geometry and physics) 
which is either not "real" or not certain but in any case a kind of knowl­
edge argued for in De Rntiquissima (Sansoni, p. 68). Secondly, there is 
"God-like knowledge," i.e., knowledge which is of absolute truth and, 
therefore, "real" and totally certain. This second type of knowledge can 
be achieved by man only in history.
The second part of ray comment on Rotenstreich's point is that, 
although Rotenstreich does center on a crucial difference between Kant and 
Vico in their respective theories of knowledge of nature (i.e., that for
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Kant there is partial creation of natural, objects while for Vico there is 
not), he does so by way of what I consider to be a misleading comparison.
For example, nowhere in Rotenstreich's paper does he point out that it was 
only because of Kant's doctrine of phenomenon and noumenon that the "maker's- 
knowledge criterion" could be applied to nature (in the way that Kant ap­
plies it), thus securing knowledge of objects. (It may be that Rotenstreich 
nowhere points this out because of its obviousness. Yet, when one is com­
paring two distinct applications of the dictum or formula such as Vico's 
and Kant's, it would seem that Kant's appearance/reality distinction would 
be an important difference to take notice of.) Kant, e.g., never tires of 
telling us that it is only because of his doctrine of "appearance and 
things-in-themselves" that knowledge of nature's laws is possible. It is 
precisely because of the doctrine of appearance that these laws must agree 
with the understanding.
. . . appearances do not exist in themselves but only relatively 
to the subject, . . .  so the laws do not exist in the appear­
ances but only relatively to this same being, so far as it has
understanding.3 5
It is quite clear that Kant never thought for a moment (as Hegel never 
tires of reminding us) that his "maker's-knowledge criterion" could result 
in knowledge of nature when nature was considered to be the "real," i.e., 
a thing-in-itself.
Given that this is so, the question arises as to what can then be 
legitimately compared, in the cases of Vico and Kant, concerning their 
respective uses of the "maker's-knowledge criterion" in relation to "ob­
jects" of nature. If, on the one hand, we compare Vico's nature (i.e., 
the natural world) with Kant's, where "nature" means for Vico thing-in-itself
214
and where it means appearance for Kant, then we shall have to conclude (as 
does Rotenstreich) that, for Kant, man can create "objects" (in some par­
tial sense) while for Vico, he cannot. That is to say, the other way 
round, that if we interpret Vico's "maker's-knowledge criterion" to mean 
that one can only have knowledge if one has created the "thing-in-itself," 
and Kant's criterion to say that one can only have knowledge if one has 
created the "appearance," then again, we must conclude that Kant can have 
knowledge of nature while Vico cannot. (This, of course, assumes that for 
Vico "knowledge of nature" comes about in the same way, i.e., that the 
"maker's-knowledge criterion" is applied to nature in the same way as it 
is to history. I have gone to some lengths to point out that this is an 
erroneous assumption.)
The question, then, is this: is it quite accurate to draw a com­
parison in the above manner? That is, doesn't Kant's unique doctrine of 
appearance/reality, in some very straightforward sense, count against, i.e., 
rule out, the comparison as a misleading one because of the equivocation 
on the term "nature?" (We might note here that while it is in some sense 
misleading to compare Vico's and Kant's use of the "maker's-knowledge cri­
terion" in the area of nature without dwelling upon the different meaning 
of "nature" for each philosopher, when it comes to history, we are on much 
firmer ground. History for Kant is the narration of the appearances of 
the human will at large. The human will involves a "different kind of 
causality" from that of nature, namely that of freedom. Actions that are 
performed in accordance with freedom are not merely appearances but are 
appearances known to be grounded in the noumenal or intelligible world. 
Hence, to compare Vico's and Kant's "maker's-knowledge criterion" in the
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area of history is to compare two similar things, i.e., both Vico and Kant 
are, in this area, dealing with the "real" or thing-in-itself.)
Concerning nature, I should think that a more accurate comparison 
would be this: let us compare Kant's and Vico's notions of nature where
"nature" means the same thing for both thinkers. Since Vico nowhere puts 
forth a doctrine of "appearance" and since Kant did put forth the notion 
of "thing-in-itself," let us compare the applicability of the "dictum" to 
nature where "nature" means thing-in-itself. This is not as outrageous as 
it might at first seem, for both of them think of the "real" in this manner.
I am fully aware that Kant's "critical" philosophy is based upon 
distinguishing between appearance and reality, and therefore, in this sense, 
he would not allow the dictum to be applied to nature where "nature" means 
the real. However, surely this comparison would be as accurate as comparing 
the uses and application of the dictum by Vico and Kant to nature when they 
mean different things by "nature." Of course, the fairest in the land 
would be to make all of the above distinctions when drawing the comparison, 
and it is this that I hope to accomplish here.
If then we compare the applicability of the dictum to nature by 
both philosophers where both mean by "nature" thing-in-itself, we shall be 
able to see precisely how radically different the application of the dictum 
is in each thinker's case. Of course, what we find is that they are not 
different at all. That is to say, Kant no less than Vico considers it 
absurd to think that man could create (partially or otherwise) any object 
of the natural world when "nature" means the "real," i.e., the thing-in- 
itself. Further, for Kant there is no "knowledge" of any kind probable or 
certain of nature when nature is thought of as a thing-in-itself.
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That there is a difference between the two thinkers in their 
application of the dictum to "nature" once again is beyond doubt. But it 
is crucial to see that this difference lies in the absence of a metaphysics 
of appearance and reality in one of the thinkers (Vico) and the presence 
of such a metaphysics in the other (Kant). Further, this absence (or 
presence) of an appearance and reality metaphysics entails a different 
meaning of "nature" for each philosopher, and it is because of this dif­
ferent meaning that the dictum is applied to "nature" differently in each 
case. To pick out precisely what the difference in applicability of the 
dictum is in each case depends upon the specific points one wishes to com­
pare, and this choice in turn is not as clear-cut as one would like.
For example, if on the one hand we should compare Kant's "nature' 
as appearance with Vico's as thing-in-itself, the difference between the 
two is at best this: Kant has certain knowledge of nature while Vico has
only probable knowledge of nature. Kant's certain knowledge is justified 
by the dictum in that it argues since man partially makes or creates na­
ture, he can have knowledge of it. Vico's probable knowledge of nature 
is justified by the dictum in that it argues that since man makes or creates 
the hypotheses and experiments of physics, he can acquire probable knowledge 
of the content of those experiments.
On the other hand, if we compare Kant's nature as a thing-in- 
itself with Vico's nature as a thing-in-itself, the difference between the 
two is that Vico argues that we can have probable knowledge of nature jus­
tified by the dictum, whereas Kant argues that there can be no such knowl­
edge, for the dictum can never justify knowledge of nature when nature is 
seen as noumenon. In neither case will Vico's or Kant's use of the dictum
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justify the ontological creation of the object, and on this point I am in 
agreement with Rotenstreich.
Hence, Rotenstreich is right in a general way, i.e., there is a 
difference between the two thinkers in their application of the dictum to 
nature (physics). However, he is wrong in the specific difference that he 
cites, namely that "Kant applied the formula . . .  to physics while Vico 
tried to show precisely that that application is precluded, and the formula
can hold good for history and not for physics."*®
In De Antiquissima Vico shows precisely how the formula does apply 
to physics*(Sansoni, pp. 68, 82, 114, 124, and 130), therefore, on this 
point Rotenstreich is mistaken. Secondly, and this may have been what led 
Rotenstreich to overlook Vico's application of the formula to physics, 
Rotenstreich has simply made a misleading comparison of the formula as Kant
and Vico used it in physics. IVhat Rotenstreich should have pointed out is
that there are two different meanings of "nature" in these philosophic 
systems, and hence, the formula will function in two different ways. This 
is finally to say that if one's goal is to see how the "formula" or "dictum" 
applies or does not apply to "nature" in these two systems, one should
* e.g., Sansoni, p. 68, Vico tells us:
[opere 137). . . in fisica nengono approvate quelle teorie cui 
corrisponda per similtudine qualache nostra operazione; e raggiungono 
la massima celebrita e consenso universale quelle idee sulla natura 
che siono confortate da esperimenti mediante i quali noi facciamo 
qualcosa di simile alia natura. . . .  In physics those theories are 
proven which allow us [successfully] to operate something similar to 
them and the clearest and most commonly accepted reasonings about 
natural things are those supported by experiments in which we create 
(make) imitations of nature.
(Sansoni, p. 124), he tells us [opere ]84]:
Concludiamo infine osservando che non si deve introdurre nella fisica 
il metodo geometrico, ma la diretta dimostrazione sperimentale. Let 
us conclude finally that it is not the geometric method that should be 
used in physics but the experimental demonstration itself.
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first be quite clear as to what it is that one is comparing when comparing 
each philosopher's respective notion. Hence, Rotenstreich's claim that 
the formula is for Kant applicable to physics, whereas for Vico it is not 
is in one sense false and in another misleading.
The second area of comparison of Vico and Kant made by Rotenstreich 
is that of history and nature. Rotenstreich indicates that there are at 
least two specific points which show how Kant and Vico differ in their 
views of history. First, Rotenstreich claims that while for Vico there is 
a fundamental distinction in terms of knowledge concerning " . . .  the orbit 
of history as against the orbit of nature, . . . for Kant there is no 
fundamental distinction [my emphasis]. . . since both are penetrable for 
knowledge and its apparatus."^’ Second, in terms of Vico's and Kant's re­
spective historical conceptions, Rotenstreich says that "Vico is more con­
cerned with historical knowledge, while Kant is more concerned with the 
character of the historical process or with the historical objective.
The first point is quite important to Rotenstreich, for it is in 
his view precisely because of this lack of a fundamental distinction be­
tween nature and history (in Kant) ". . . that Kant could not follow Vico 
vis-à-vis history . . Before commenting upon this point, let us see
exactly how Rotenstreich comes to hold it. We have seen that Rotenstreich 
believes that Vico cannot achieve knowledge of nature with his version of 
the "formula," whereas Kant can. This is because for Kant man can know 
objects even though the formula justifies knowledge vis-à-vis "partial cre­
ation." That is to say, man can know objects even though he hasn't com­
pletely created them— even when there is still something given.
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For Vico, on the other hand (according to Rotenstreich), to have 
knowledge entails absolute creation, i.e., it is only when the object of 
knowledge is totally "adequate" that knowledge is justified by the formula.'*'’ 
Now, when the area of concern shifts from nature to history, Rotenstreich 
says that for Kant "There is, even in terms of history, a substrate which 
is not created by man [my emphasis] but is presupposed by him and taken ad­
vantage of by him in his strifes and aspirations: the substrate of nature."'**
Rotenstreich's point, I take it, is this: nature and history both presup­
pose a non-created substrate. Therefore, Rotenstreich thinks, nature is 
really not separate or different (essentially) from history. In other 
words, there is always something left over (i.e., a substrate) in both 
nature and history, which is not created by man. Knowledge of history, 
therefore, must be justified by the formula in the same way that knowledge 
of nature is.
Further, for Rotenstreich, it is fair to infer that if there were 
nothing left over in history, i.e., if there were no substrate given, then 
there would be a clear distinction between nature and history, just as 
there is in the case of Vico.
It is clear that Rotenstreich is led to the view that for Kant 
there is no fundamental distinction between nature and history, whereas 
for Vico there is by his (Rotenstreich's) prior view of how the "formula" 
is applied by the two philosophers in their respective philosophies of 
nature; namely that for Kant partial creation gives access to knowledge 
while for Vico only total creation gives access to knowledge.
Concerning Rotenstreich's view on the application of the formula,
I have two comments. Consider first his claim that for Kant "in history
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there is something presupposed, namely nature, which is not created by man 
but given, whereas for Vico everything in history is created by man." That 
claim is misleading, if not outright false. First, this view assumes that 
Vico's use of the formula does not justify knowledge of nature which as we 
have seen is false. But second, and perhaps more important, it assumes 
that Kant's nature (in the context of history) is not created by man but 
is merely a presupposed reality. Now "nature" for Kant in this context can 
mean one of two things, "appearance" or "reality." It is clear, however, 
that it cannot mean reality, for if it does, not only can Kant not follow 
Vico in his justification of historical knowledge, but historical knowledge 
would be impossible for Kant on any grounds.
However, Kant believes that history is possible. Further, it is 
possible, he believes, only if nature is assumed to have a purpose."*^  We 
have seen that nature can be assumed to have a purpose only if there is a 
nature to begin with which is to say that the "possibility" of history ac­
tually depends upon the "possibility" of nature. This is in effect to say 
that if nature were not possible, neither would history be possible. Now 
the possibility of nature depends upon the doctrine of appearance and 
reality in conjunction with the formula."*^  It seems straightforward enough, 
therefore, that if "nature" in the above context means reality and not 
appearance, it would follow that nature would be impossible to know and 
therefore, so too would history. Hence, our only other alternative is that 
"nature" means appearance. This, of course, is clearly Kant’s meaning, and 
it is precisely at this point that our difficulty with Rotenstreich's 
view becomes apparent.
Since "nature" means appearance, what sense are we to make of the 
claim that history for Kant presupposes a non-created substrate, i.e..
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nature? Far from being a presupposed substrate (as the Critique of Pure 
Reason has taken great pains to show), nature as appearance is and can only 
be justified in that it is man's (non-presupposed) creation. Further, if 
Rotenstreich means to say that "nature" refers to the noumenal aspect 
rather than the appearance aspect of nature, then as we have seen above, 
history is going to be impossible. That is to say, if "nature" means 
noumena, then no knowledge of nature can be had, and therefore, the "secret 
plan" of nature would (in principle) forever remain a secret. It is not, 
therefore, the noumenal aspect of nature that Kant points to as manifest­
ing a "secret plan" but the phenomenal aspect of nature.
The upshot is this; Rotenstreich is wrong on his grounds in ar­
guing that "for Kant there is no fundamental distinction between nature 
and history." He is wrong because his argument presupposes that nature is 
to history as the given is to the object. It is precisely this relation­
ship that I maintain does not hold. In the former case, i.e., "nature is 
to history," man creates both nature and history, whereas in the latter 
case, i.e., "the given is to the object," man creates only the object.
Since Rotenstreich is mistaken on this point, it cannot be used to justify 
the claim that "Kant could not follow Vico vis-à-vis history." Perhaps it 
is true that Kant couldn't follow Vico (and it is clearer still that he 
didn't), but the reasons that he didn't are not those given by Rotenstreich.
One final comment concerning Rotenstreich's claim that for Kant
■?
there is no fundamental distinction between history and nature (p. 229). 
There is textual evidence to show beyond question that Kant draws a sharp 
distinction between nature and history. The distinction he makes is that 
between a subjugation to instinct vs. the experience of freedom, i.e., a
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transition from an . . uncultured, merely animal condition to the state 
of humanity."'*'* The text I have in mind where the distinction is drawn is 
the "Conjectural Beginnings of Human History." In this essay Kant offers 
a "philosophical explanation" to show how man generally developed from a 
natural, purely instinctive creature to a rational human being capable of 
morality. This process Kant sees as the development of freedom, and it is 
precisely the story of that development that constitutes history.
In the "Conjectural Beginnings" Kant points out four stages through 
which man develops himself into a rational being."*® At each of these stages 
man leaves nature (characterized as the determined and instinctual) to be­
come a rational and moral creature (characterized as an end in itself) in 
the realm of culture. Further, Kant tells us that once man had chosen for 
himself how to live (as opposed to being directed how to live by nature),
". . . it was impossible for him to return to the state of servitude (i.e.,
subjugation to instinct) from the state of freedom, once he had tasted the
latter." (p. 56, C.B.)
In the state of culture man is a free creature because of his 
unique ability to reason. Human history is the story of man making himself 
a free creature by his autonomous use of reason. There is no such autonomy 
in the state of nature. Hence, the distinguishing characteristic that di­
vides nature from history is man's rational "autonomy." In other words, 
we may distinguish nature from history by seeing that there is no "self­
making" going on in nature. Because of man's rational "autonomy," he may 
view himself as a "self-maker" and, therefore, as a true end in himself.
From this account of original human history we may conclude: man's
departure from that paradise which his reason represents as the
first abode of his species was nothing but the transition from . . .
instinct to rational control— in a word, from the tutelage of 
nature to the state of freedom.'*®
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The above departure once again is possible because of man's ability to 
reason.
. . . reason considered not insofar as it is a tool to the 
satisfaction of his inclinations, but insofar as it makes 
him an end in himself. Hence this last step of reason is 
at the same time man's release from the womb of nature ...'*’
Finally, if Rotenstreich were correct and there were no fundamental 
distinction between nature and history for Kant, it would follow that there 
would then be no fundamental distinction between judgments of value about 
nature and judgments of value about history. That is to say, to judge cer­
tain historical actions as good, bad, right, or wrong presupposes that 
these actions are not merely natural and thus determined according to the 
same causality as that of nature but that they are also free actions, fol­
lowing from choices for which man can justifiably be held accountable. 
Natural actions are, at the very least, neutral and for Kant, at best, all­
good due to their having been designed by a benevolent deity. This, how­
ever, is not the case with historical actions. Kant believes that history 
shows some actions to be ". . . woven together from folly, childish vanity, 
even from childish malice and destructiveness.""*® Other actions, on the 
other hand, e.g., the French Revolution, point to ". . . the disposition 
and capacity of the human race to be the cause of its own advance toward 
the better . . .""*®
If, therefore, there were no distinction between nature and his­
tory, we should not be able to find Kant pointing out a difference in 
judgments of value covering natural and historical actions. Kant re­
emphasizes his point rather cryptically: "The history of nature therefore
begins with the good, for it is the work of God, while the history of free­
dom begins with wickedness for it is the work of man."®® It is clear.
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then that for Kant there is a fundamental distinction between history and 
nature, and therefore, Rotenstreich is at best very misleading when he 
says that . . for Kant there is no fundamental distinction [my emphasis] 
between the orbit of nature and the orbit of history, since both are pene­
trable to knowledge." (p. 229) I wish now to conclude my comments on 
Rotenstreich's comparison by examining his second claim, that Vico is 
really more concerned with historical knowledge, while Kant is more con­
cerned with "the historical objective."®'
It would seem (at least in one sense) that Rotenstreich is correct 
in this claim. Obviously, one of Vico's chief aims in The New Science is 
to show not only that history can become a science, but also that history 
is indeed the ultimate science. In attempting to show this Vico must give 
an account of how historical knowledge is possible. Kant, on the other 
hand, nowhere in his writings claims that he is concerned with showing how 
history can be a legitimate science, much less that it is the ultimate 
science, therefore, Kant is not (unlike Vico) concerned with giving an 
explicit account of how historical knowledge is possible. However, it 
would be misleading to infer from this that Kant was not concerned with 
what constitutes "historical" knowledge, or that Vico, on the other hand, 
was not concerned with "the historical objective." I should like to com­
ment on each of these points in turn.
Concerning the first point, we have seen in Chapter IV that while 
Kant never explicitly asked the question, "how is history possible as a 
science?", he nevertheless provided in his writings on history and teleol­
ogy the material for the answer (or at least the beginning of an answer to 
such a question).
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We saw in Chapter IV that history is possible for Kant only if it 
is first seen to evolve out of nature and secondly if it is judged as a 
purposeful moral unity. This requires, on the one hand, that nature be 
possible (which was shown to be the case by the arguments of the Critique 
of Pare Reason, relying on the revolutionary "maker's-knowledge" criterion 
of truth) and, on the other hand, that man's actions be judged as purpos- 
ively contributing to his own being as an end in himself (this was shown 
to be the case by the arguments of the Critique of Judgement and various 
ethical and historical writings).
We saw that the epistemological apparatus that Kant offered to 
demonstrate the possibility of history consisted of, first, the "maker's- 
knowledge criterion" and, second, reflective (teleological) judgment, in 
both its "physical" and "moral" aspects. In light of Kant's use of these 
particular epistemological concepts in the area of history, we found that 
the knowledge derived from history was basically a "self-knowledge," which 
in turn pointed to the notion of "self-making." (This idea of "self-making," 
we saw, was derived from the "maker's-knowledge criterion" in a sense not 
too dissimilar from that of Vico's. See pp. 16-21, Chapter IV.) This is 
to say that for Kant man gained knowledge of himself in the area of his­
tory precisely because he had in that area "made" the object, which was 
himself. He did not gain this kind of "self-knowledge" in the area of na­
ture (which he also came to know only because he had "made" the object 
there), for that which was "made" in nature, i.e., natural objects, was 
not man but something else, i.e., merely nature.
What can we conclude from this? We cannot conclude that Kant and 
Vico thought of the relationship of the concepts "self-making" and
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"self-knowing" in exactly the same way; indeed I shall later argue that 
they did not. We can conclude, however, that there is a straightforward 
sense in which Kant was concerned with historical knowledge as a "special" 
kind of knowledge. The evidence for this concern is the use made of those 
epistemological concepts which we have examined in Chapters III and IV, 
i.e., the epistemological concepts that ground his view of history—  
maker's-knowledge and teleology. Upon examining these concepts quite 
closely we found that Kant has given an answer to the question, "how is 
historical knowledge possible?" (or at least indicated the epistemological 
basis for a science of history which Dilthey came to clearly recognize).
Therefore, in one sense (which I believe Rotenstreich would, upon 
reflection, agree with) Kant had to be concerned with historical knowledge 
in that, in treating history, he wished to justify his views by using the 
same kinds of epistemological concepts used in the critical philosophy.
This attempt to epistemologically ground history (with these concepts) dis­
plays Kant's concern.
The success of Kant's attempt to ground history in these epistemo­
logical concepts is too large an issue to deal with here. But that there 
was an attempt is evident from Kant's writings on history. Finally, we 
saw that in his attempt to apply the "maker's-knowledge criterion" in a 
roundabout way to history, Kant was faced with the problem of explaining 
how the "self-knowledge" gained from history is qualitatively different 
from that of the "self-knowledge" gained from nature. It would seem that 
these two "kinds" of "self-knowledge" can actually be different only if 
there is a difference in the "objects" of which they are knowledge.
This is indeed the case. But if so, it means that Kant distinguished
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knowledge of nature from knowledge of history, at least implicitly, which 
in turn means that he was concerned with the problem of historical 
knowledge.
What about Vico and the so-called "historical objective?" On this 
point Rotenstreich is simply mistaken. While it is plausible to make some 
sort of case for the view that Kant was only indirectly concerned with the 
problem of historical knowledge, one cannot make a similar case for the 
view that Vico was only indirectly concerned with the "historical objec­
tive." Rotenstreich builds his case on one basic premise; namely that for 
Kant the historical process and its objective is based upon a moral process 
while for Vico it is not. He (Rotenstreich] says that:
It is obvious that Kant takes the historical process as express­
ing an idea or an ideal of convergence between the ethical impera­
tive and the factual process as it is. Vico is more empirical: 
he does not deal with history from the birds'-eye view of the 
moral principle but explores events and facts, though he struc­
tures them in cycles.^
Now, while it is true that Vico does not deal with history from a "birds'- 
eye view," we must ask whether it is also true that for Vico the histori­
cal process is not essentially "a moral process."
We have seen in Chapter II that Vico held that one of the princi­
pal elements of his "new science" was ". . .  a rational civil theology of 
divine providence." (N.S. #341) This means, among other things, that 
The New Science would demonstrate "What providence has wrought in history 
. . . often against the designs of men, . . . "  (342) Concerning the proof 
of this providence he tells us:
In contemplation of this infinite and eternal providence our 
Science finds certain divine proofs by which it is confirmed 
and demonstrated. Since divine providence has omnipotence as
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minister, it must unfold its institutions by means as easy as 
the natural customs of men. Since it has infinite wisdom as 
counselor, whatever it disposes must, in its entirety, be in­
stitutive order. Since it has for its end its own immeasurable 
goodness, whatever it institutes must be directed to a good al­
ways superior to that which men have proposed to themselves 
[my emphasis].
In Book 1, "The Elements," Vico tells us that "To be useful to the human 
race, philosophy must raise and direct weak and fallen man, not rend his 
nature or abandon him in his corruption."®'* He then tells us that from 
this axiom we will see that the Platonists were right all along in that 
they
. . . agree with all the lawgivers on these three main points: 
that there is a divine providence, that human passions should 
be moderated and made into human virtues [my emphasis], and that 
human souls are immortal. Thus, from this axiom are derived the 
three principles of this Science.®®
Finally, when speaking of the reason why men continue to live in a "social
manner" rather than follow their individual self-interests, he says:
. . .  it is only by divine providence that he [man] can be held 
within these institutions to practice justice [my emphasis] as 
a member of the society, of the family, of the city, and finally 
of mankind. Unable to attain all the utilities he wishes, he is 
constrained by these institutions to seek those which are his 
due; and this is called just [my emphasis]. That which regulates 
all human justice is therefore divine justice, which is adminis­
tered by divine providence to preserve human society [my empha­
sis].®®
It is clear that for Vico fundamental to the very project of The 
New Science is his notion of a Divine Providence which is fundamentally a 
moral process and without which history (as Vico understands it) would be 
impossible. Where Vico and Kant differ, then, concerning history and the 
"historical objective" is not in its being or having a "moral" objective 
(for both see the Good to be in some sense the very "driving force" of 
history) but, rather, in their conceptions of the attainment of "the his­
torical objective."
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For Kant the historical process is such that it shows man to be 
progressing to a point where he will eventually, necessarily exist in a 
"perpetual peace." Further, there is no indication in Kant that man could 
from this point of perpetual peace turn back and have to begin the process 
(of striving toward and achieving his freedom) all over again. For Kant 
the notion of "cyclic" history is ruled out of court precisely because it 
does not seem to be compatible with his notion of attaining the historical 
objective. Ife could say that the attainment of the historical objective 
for Kant, therefore, would be a once-and-for-all affair.
For Vico, on the other hand, this is not the case. Vico was alive 
to the idea that man's nature was such that, while he could achieve his 
historical objectivity (which is to live in a community as a ". . . human 
nature, intelligent and hence modest, benign, and reasonable, recognizing 
for laws conscience, reason, and duty"®®), man could at the same time lose 
that objective. Once lost, man would return to a state of barbarism, thus 
having to repeat his struggle all over again.
Concerning this "return," two things are important to note here: 
first, if man does indeed return to the "barbaric" stage of development, 
this stage is not pari passu like the very "first" barbaric stage from 
which he originally developed. Rather, it is a second (or even third) bar­
barism, qualitatively different from the first. This is because it grew 
out of conditions that were qualitatively different from the f i r s t . I t  
would be misleading, therefore, to think of Vico's stages as cycles where 
"cycles" means the qualitatively same occurrences. Second, it would also 
be misleading to think of Vico's stages as cycles if one means by "cycles" 
those logically necessary recurrences that all nations must go through
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eternally (this I take to be Kant's meaning of "cycles"). Vico nowhere 
says or implies that his stages are logically necessary in their recurrence. 
What he says is that, having reached the third stage, i.e., the fully 
"human" stage, it mag happen, as was the case with Rome, that the popular 
state will become corrupt. If so, i.e., if the popular state becomes cor­
rupt, then its philosophy will become corrupt, and it (the philosophy) will 
descend into scepticism. From this corruption will arise a ". . . false 
eloquence, ready to uphold either of the opposed sides of a case indiffer­
ently."®” Because of this "intellectual" corruption, only power (as op­
posed to truth) will be desired, ". . . and as furious south winds whip 
up the sea, so these citizens [will have] provoked civil wars in their 
commonwealths and [would have thus driven] them to total disorder."®'
Vico then goes on to argue that there are two possible checks on 
this destruction of the third stage. First, one may be fortunate enough 
to find a good monarch, e.g., like Augustus, who could put things right 
by ruling with a stem but fair hand. This would be one way in which a
return to barbarism could be avoided. Second, a foreign power may conquer
the commonwealth and thus also prevent it from returning to barbarism. 
However, if these two remedies fail, then providence will decree that 
" . . .  through obstinate factions and desperate civil wars, they [the 
people in question] shall turn their cities into forests and the forests
into dens and lairs of men." (1106 N.S.)
In other words the fact that men do return to a stage of barbar­
ism and begin their struggle for humanity once again is a contingent 
state of affairs or at least not a logically necessary one. However, the 
history of the world thus far suggests to Vico that this is a well-worn 
cycle.
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Therefore, it is not the case that Vico and Kant differ in their 
■concern with the "historical objective," namely that history is the strug­
gle for the true and the Good, rather, they differ in their conceptions 
of attaining the objective and keeping it.
This then ends our comparison of Vico and Kant (in light of Gadol's 
and Rotenstreich's papers). I should now like to offer a brief analysis 
concerning Vico's and Kant's use of the concept of teleology in their re­
spective philosophies of history.
Teleology
The question I wish to examine here briefly is this: Why is the con­
cept of teleology used by Vico and Kant in their philosophies of history? 1 
believe the answer to this question is that they considered the concept of 
teleology to be the only concept that could be used for an adequate histori­
cal explanation in that it could give certainty to history. I shall give 
my reasons for this answer by first examining Vico's view and then Kant's.
As we have seen in Chapter II, Vico's notion of teleology is em­
bedded in his idea of Providence. Vico believes that the various facts of 
history are in some sense explained by being instances of the workings of 
providence. It is clear that Vico thinks of providence as, among other 
things, a theory of historical causation, namely a teleological causation 
which differs radically from other theories. He tells us, e.g.:
Hence Epicurus, who believes in chance, is refuted by the facts, 
along with his followers Hobbes and Machiavelli; and so are Zeno 
and Spinoza, who believe in fate. The evidence clearly confirms 
the contrary position of the political philosophers, whose prince 
is the divine Plato, who shows that providence directs human 
institutions.®^
Vico's idea is that the Epicureans, who believe in chance, and 
the others (whom he refers to as the Stoics, #335), who believe in fate.
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offer theories of historical causation which upon reflection are not 
adequate for the purpose of explaining historical facts.®'* The question 
naturally arises, why is it that the above theories are not adequate?
Vico's answer takes two forms, one explicit and the other implicit. The 
explicit answer addresses each view in turn. He says that if we take the 
Stoics' theory of causality (Vico includes Spinoza in this group), we must 
hold that since one's action necessarily follows from the nature of a neces­
sary being, men have no free will, and as a result, their actions cannot 
be explained (ultimately) by their ideas. I believe what Vico has in mind 
here, whether or not he adequately represents Spinoza's position, is the 
following;
Vico took Spinoza to be saying that everything follows necessarily 
from the nature of God, i.e., a necessary being. Since this is the case, 
the creation of society is actually not due to man's own free will but in­
stead to the necessary being. Therefore, men's actions cannot in any 
ultimate sense be explained by their ideas. Their actions will instead be 
explained (ultimately) only in reference to a necessary being.
Now it is Vico's view that "Human choice, by its nature most un­
certain, is made certain and determined by the common sense of men with 
respect to human needs or utilities which are the two sources of the na­
tural law of the gentes. (N.S., #141) His argument with Spinoza then is 
that Spinoza denies that there is any contingency in human affairs. Vico 
believes, on the contrary, that if man has free will, there must be some 
contingency in man's affairs. This is the price one pays (i.e., contingency) 
if one wishes to believe that human beings can be held responsible (ulti­
mately) for the creation of civil society.
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Therefore, the historian's knowledge of the ideas of a certain 
group of people at a certain time (on Vico's view) will be an aid to him 
in explaining their actions. That is, if we assume that the ideas of the 
people in question have some direct link with their actions and further, 
if we assume that the people in question have free will to act according 
to their ideas, then their ideas will serve as a useful guide in explain­
ing their actions. In order to verify the causes for certain human ac­
tions, we must assume that the "ideas" of the people in question had 
something to do with their actions. We must assume that the people have 
"free will." Only if these two assumptions are correct are we in a posi­
tion to reconstruct the histories of the institutions of peoples and in 
light of those histories interpret their actions. That is to say, we must 
reconstruct the histories of various peoples by examining the ideas con­
tained in their various artifacts, documents, poems, etc. Finally, for 
this reconstruction to be possible, man must have full authority for his 
actions, i.e., he must have free will. This "free will" even God cannot 
take from man.
Upon this divine authority followed human authority in the full 
philosophic sense of the term; that is, the property of human 
nature which not even God can take from man without destroying 
him . . . This authority is the free use of the will, . .
On the other hand, Vico’s interpretation of the Epicurean view of 
causality makes that theory unacceptable also. According to Vico, the 
Epicurean view implies that we must hold that every event that takes place 
happens merely according to chance. (Vico believes this, I take it, be­
cause Epicurus offers no ultimate explanation for the gathering together, 
or hitting, of the atoms.) Hence, all historical events are to be
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explained (ultimately) as happen-stance. The claim here is that "the facts 
themselves" show that the Epicurean view is an unacceptable explanation.
It is clear that while Vico wishes to avoid the determinism of the stoics 
he at the same time will not allow that "explanation" of historical facts 
be accomplished by appealing to the other extreme, i.e., pure chance. From 
his own historical investigations Vico believes he has found that the same 
kinds of historical consequences always seem to follow from the same kinds 
of historical conditions. This fact indicates to him that "something more" 
is involved in history than mere chance. " . . .  it was not fate for they 
did it by choice; not chance, for the results of their always so acting 
are perpetually the same."®®
Therefore, Vico cannot accept the Epicurean theory, so he attempts 
to steer a middle course between the pure "determinism" of the Stoics and 
the "pure chance" of the Epicureans. To this end he offers a third al­
ternative, namely a teleological causal "explanation" of human affairs.
Vico wished to recognize some kind of necessity in history, but his view 
is that the necessity in question must always involve man's own choices. 
This must be the case if human history and genuine historical explanation 
is to be possible.
Vico's alternative explanation, which is directly connected with 
his views concerning certainty in history, is that man must be thought of 
as fulfilling a divine providential role, i.e., a purpose. Man's purpose 
on earth is to survive in order that he may pursue the Good. In order for 
him to survive, God has given him free choice such that he (man) may 
choose the most natural and best means to accomplish that end. To accom­
plish the end (i.e., survival and pursuing the Good) necessitates the
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development of his own human nature.®’ Finally, since human nature evolves, 
its development will be viewed as going through "stages." Each stage will 
then be seen as developing from an earlier stage and contributing to the 
development of a later one. The stages seen as a whole (i.e., the ideal 
eternal history) will constitute a unity and in Kantian language will 
". . . be reciprocally cause and effect of each other's form." (CJ 65:373) 
This then is the "teleological notion" of causal necessity working in Vico's 
idea of providence.
Since Vico believes that human choice is free, he believes that 
it is not determined. On the other hand, he does not believe that it is 
merely capricious. Rather, it is influenced by man's commonsense views 
about his "needs" and "utilities" for survival.®® Hence, man's particular 
choices are determined in the sense that he has a purpose to fulfill 
which is to develop his own humanity in order that he may pursue the Good.
In this manner Vico gives a "philosophical" justification, i.e., a "teleo­
logical" causal explanation, to account for why it is that human beings 
exposed to the same historical conditions react in the same ways. It is 
because human beings have a purpose, namely to develop their humanity, 
that they necessarily attempt to survive. Further, their commonsense views 
of their needs and utilities influence their choices as to the various 
means available by which they may promote their own survival. As a re­
sult, various peoples establish the same kinds of institutions under the 
same kinds of conditions to accomplish similar tasks, and this is due 
again to the similar "common sense" attitudes toward their needs and 
utilities.
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Hence, history is this story of Providence guiding man toward his 
humanity. The Epicurean and Stoic accounts of historical causation are 
explicitly rejected by Vico, for they cannot account for the historical 
facts. In their stead Vico offers a "teleological" theory of historical 
causation in order to do justice to the facts.
Implicit in Vico's notion of teleological explanation, i.e., in 
his notion of Providence, is the theoretical desire for history to become 
a certain science. This is to say that teleological explanation, as op­
posed to what may be thought of as the "mechanistic" explanation of the 
Epicureans, makes history a certain science by removing the feature of 
pure contingency from historical events while at the same time attempting 
to avoid an absolute determinism (such as that of the Stoics) .
We might here ask, "How are we to think of certainty, via the no­
tion of teleology, as achievable in historical explanation?" I think im­
plicit in Vico's work is the following answer: to achieve certainty in
historical explanation when that explanation involves a causal analysis, 
is to attempt to eliminate contingency from historical events. That is to 
say, if we find, e.g., that a group at a certain stage of their historical 
development have a certain form of government and religion and if we then 
wish to give a "certain" explanation as to why they have that particular 
kind of government and religion, we should like to be able to show that 
the occurrences of those forms of government and religions were necessary 
stages of the historical development of that society and not merely con­
tingent occurrences.
Now, one way in which we could attempt to eliminate the contin­
gency in our explanation would be to give a "mechanical" causal explanation
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of the occurrences in question. That is to say, we could try to show that 
each event that occurred in the society occurred as the result of a prior 
cause which produced that event as an effect. Therefore, given a whole 
series of events, each will simply be determinable in accordance with some 
mechanical causal law(s) governing the series and the various conditions 
to which those laws apply. Because of these laws, we should thereby be 
able to know for certain why each event occurred as it did and thereby in 
this sense remove the contingency of the events taking place.
But, of course, the real question of contingency has not in this 
way been dealt with. Our problem, Vico would say, is not really the ques­
tion why each particular event occurs; that we know is due to a prior 
cause. Our problem is, rather, why the various series of events, e.g., 
those causing that kind of government and that kind of religion, should 
occur jointly so as to form the character of this particular human society 
at this particular time. Our question then concerns the joint occurrence 
of the various series of events, and a satisfactory answer to this ques­
tion cannot itself consist of mere (mechanical) causal explanations, for 
this would simply push the question back a step further. As Arthur Melnick 
puts it, "What is being called for [is] . . ., that the explanation not 
itself involve unexplained joint occurrences. We are calling for the com­
plete removal of coincidence or accidental collocation.
If, therefore, we wished to explain the structure of a certain 
historical society, we would not be able to eliminate contingency by 
merely giving a mechanical explanation of the particular events that oc­
curred there (which, according to Vico, is what the Epicureans do). On 
the other hand, we could remove contingency by tracing the causes of each
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series back to a first cause such as the Stoics insist upon, but then we 
should still find ourselves involved in the "free will" problem all over 
again.
Hence, Vico sees his only alternative as being to show that the 
society in question necessarily has a purpose immanent in its make-up.
This "purpose" necessitates that the society develop a certain organic 
character, e.g., a Poetic character, or a Religious character, such that 
the very structure of the society causes (teleologically) the various joint 
occurrences in that society, i.e., it causes those particular institutions 
to occur at that time and that place in just that guise (see, e.g., #146-8,
New Science).
It is in this manner that Vico uses the concept of teleology to 
reject the Epicurean notion of chance occurrence and the Spinozistic no­
tion of complete determinism. Societies are to be viewed teleologically 
such that in our attempt to understand their various components we elimi­
nate contingency from our explanations. It is only in this way that his­
tory can become a certain science. Because of its explicit doctrine of chance. 
Epicureanism fails to eliminate contingency. The Stoics eliminate con­
tingency at the cost of sacrificing explanation altogether. Vico elimi­
nates contingency by showing that Providence directs all societies 
(teleologically) to follow a certain "ideal" pattern of development.
Therefore, the joint occurrence of any series of events of a given society 
can be explained with certainty because we have, in Vico’s ideal pattern, 
a model which displays the particular purpose of that society at that point 
in its development. For Vico, there is no alternative to teleological ex­
planation for "scientifically" explaining historical events. This is
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finally to say that there is no other way by which one can make history 
"scientific," i.e., certain and thus intelligible, except by viewing it as 
teleological.
What of Kant? Episteraologically, Kant's concept of teleology 
does not function much differently in his philosophy of history from that 
of Vico in his philosophy of history. For Kant too, teleology is a kind 
of explanatory device which is used to eliminate contingency, thus provid­
ing a necessary unity for the phenomenon in question. History, to be in­
telligible, must have this necessary u n i t y . I t  is worth noting that Kant 
also thought of his use of teleological explanation as a third alternative 
to Epicureanism and Stoicism.The Epicurean doctrine of chance was re­
jected as an unsatisfactory explanation because, Kant tells us, ". . . noth­
ing is explained, not even the illusion in our teleological judgements,
. . The "Stoicism" of Spinoza, which Kant refers to as the system of
fatality, also fails as an explanation, for it fails to explain what it 
itself intends.
It intends to furnish an explanation of the final nexus of natural 
things, . . . and it refers us simply to the unity of the subject 
in which they all inhere. [But] . . . Even if all the things 
were to be united in one simple subject, yet each unity would 
never exhibit a final relation unless these things were under­
stood to be, first, inner effects of the substance as a cause, 
and secondly, effects of it as a cause by virtue of its intelli­
gence. Apart from these formal conditions all unity is mere 
necessity of nature, . .
As we have seen in Chapter IV, it was Kant's view that a philosophy 
of history could be possible only if we could see history to be, in part, 
the result of a "plan of nature." In order to view nature in turn as pro­
viding such a plan, it was necessary to judge nature "reflectively"— which 
meant among other things that we must judge nature teleologically. In
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judging nature teleologically we explained natural phenomena according to 
a conception of ultimate ends. The connection of teleological judgment 
and history was then established by showing that nature must be judged 
teleologically in order to be understood systematically. History, in part, 
is the story of nature's purposeful plan for man; therefore, to have his­
tory requires teleological judgment.
Finally, there is one phenomenon of nature, namely man, whose 
activity, while necessarily being judged teleologically, is yet seen to be 
qualitatively distinct from other merely "natural" phenomena, '’his dis­
tinctness is due to man's uniqueness as a final end, i.e., an end ". . .to 
which entire nature is teleologically subordinated."’"* History then is 
seen to be grounded in the realization of nature's secret plan, and as a 
consequence of this plan it (history) can be certain.
Here we have once again the epistemological move to eliminate con­
tingency in the area of history by offering a teleological explanation of 
historical (and natural) causation. Events in history can be explained 
and various historical facts understood with certainty precisely because 
history is seen not as a result of mere chance nor as absolutely determined 
but rather as a result of a telos in human nature. In a paragraph about 
the French Revolution Kant illustrates his confidence in the plan of na­
ture in conjunction with the movement toward freedom.
Now I claim to be able to predict to the human race--even without 
prophetic insight— according to the aspects and omens of our day, 
the attainment of this goal. That is, I predict its progress 
toward the bettor, which, from now on, turns out to be no longer 
completely retrogressive. For such a phenomenon in human history 
is not to be forgotten, because it has revealed a tendency and 
faculty in human nature for improvement such that no politician, 
affecting wisdom, might have conjured out of the course of things 
hitherto existing, and one which nature and freedom alone, united 
in the human race in conformity with inner principles of right, 
could have promised [my emphases].’^
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It is teleological explanation, therefore, which eliminates 
contingency, on the one hand, without ushering in fatalism on the other. 
Therefore, for Kant (as with Vico, i.e., because of its obvious merits), 
teleological explanation is used to reduce history to a certain unified 
"plan" in the absence of which history could not be made intelligible.^®
It should be noted that the epistemological ground for Kant's 
concept is ultimately judgment. That of Vico's, on the other hand, is 
Providence. In this sense the transcendental turn so fundamental to the 
"Critical" philosophy is entirely foreign to Vico. Vico thought of tele­
ology as simply being manifested in the "facts" of the historical world.
On this issue, i.e., concerning teleology, Vico was decidedly "realist" 
in attitude. Kant, on the other hand, was the radical subjective idealist.
Nevertheless, both Vico and Kant use the notion of teleology in 
history for precisely the same ends, i.e., they use it to show that his­
tory is a necessary unity and can, therefore, be rendered intelligible.
In summary we may list the following points that have come out of 
our comparison in the light of Rotenstreich's paper. (For a similar list 
of points concerning Gadol's paper see p. 9 of this chapter.) First, we 
have found, contrary to Rotenstreich's view, that there is in fact a par­
allel lack of application of the dictum or formula to nature, only when 
nature is seen by both philosophers as a thing-in-itself. When it is not, 
then the parallel lack ends. Kant believes that one can "make" nature 
(i.e., appearance), and therefore, one can have knowledge of it. Vico 
holds that one can only "make" experiments and through that making, gain 
limited, probable knowledge of nature.
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Second, we found, again contrary to Rotenstreich's views, that 
both Vico and Kant draw a sharp distinction between history and nature. 
Third and finally leaving Rotenstreich's paper, in our examination of the 
use made of the concept of teleology in each of these men's philosophy of 
history, we found that both use "teleological explanation" in history to 
give certainty to history in order to render it systematic and, therefore, 
intelligible.
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'"The Idealistic Foundations of Cultural Anthropology: Vico, Kant and 
Cassirer," History of Philosophy Journal 12 (1974 April):207-225 (see 
p. 211). For example, "In Kant the dictum lies at the heart of the 
Copemican revolution he introduced so self-assuredly into metaphysics."
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On the other hand, Kant tells us: ". . . all attempts to extend our knowl­
edge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori . . .
have . . . ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may 
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jects must conform to our knowledge." (Critique of Pure Reason, BXVL)
'IF, p. 217
'IF, p. 211
’IF, p. 214
'IF, p. 215
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"IF, p. 221
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i'"But if for Vico man throughout his history carries out God's design, for 
Kant he becomes the instrument of nature's plan." [IF, p. 221)
i*IF, p. 22.
* ^ Gadol seems to conclude that because of the absence of the phenomenon- 
noumenon distinction in Vico, Vico believed in a "substantival" meta­
physics, i.e., realism. Kant, on the other hand, did not. For example, 
Gadol tells us; "Vico still adhered to this ontic substantival 'Problem- 
stellung.’ He had a realistically and substantivally oriented mind . . ." 
(IF, p. 215)
Kant's genius consists in uncovering what he took to be the fundamental 
defect of all previous efforts, namely the substantival outlook typical 
of common sense which believes that the object of knowledge is what it 
is, and that our cognition of it affects its being in no way." (IB, p. 
217)
Here I think the following three comments are in order: (1) the doctrine
of realism is not a "common sense" doctrine; (2) Kant's doctrine of phen­
omenon -noumenon and his "Copernican revolution" are used to justify, not 
deny, the substance-populated, causally efficacious world of the realist 
that was attacked by Hume. That is to say, the Critical philosophy does
not question that the substantival outlook, or view, of the world is the
correct one (as does, e.g., Hegel). Rather, it seeks (e.g., in the 
"Analogies of Experience") the epistemological grounds on which such a 
view can be justified; (3) Finally, it is commonplace that in The New 
Science Vico's genetic view of "natures," i.e., that nature is equivalent 
to nascence, is incompatible with a substantival (Aristotelian) world­
view, i.e., that a nature is what it is, independent of its genesis.
(See, e.g., #147-8, N.S. and for comparison with Aristotle, see Book Z, 
Metaphysics)
'‘See quotation above.
*®As Flint puts it: "If mathematics were a human creation, divine creation
might well be supposed to resemble it. ..
(a) These [metaphysical] points belong not to the phenomenal but to 
the intelligible world . . .
(b) At the same time, they are real in themselves and objective as
regards finite minds. In this respect they are unlike mathematical
points, which are abstractions . . .
(c) The analogy of metaphysical to mathematical points lies in the 
likeness of the relationship between themselves and their products—  
the worlds generated by or from them." (Flint, p. 119)
*®"Concludiamo infine osservando che non si deve introdurre nella fisica il 
metodo geometrico, ma la diretta dimostrazione sperimentale." (De An- 
tiquissima, Sansoni, p. 124)
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i?IF, p. 211. I might add here that I am well aware of Vico's statement in 
The New Science concerning the philosophers who "waste" their energies 
studying nature, ". , . which, since God made it. He alone knows . . . 
(331)" However, I fail to see how this statement is incompatible with 
the claim in De Antiquissima (Sansoni, p. 82 and p. 124) that man can 
have human knowledge (which means limited, finite, and only probable 
knowledge) of nature. We can have this knowledge once again because we 
"make" the formula, i.e., the experiments, by which knowledge is obtained. 
"By requiring us to hold for true in nature only that the like of which 
we can make experiments, it serves the experimental physics which is now 
being cultivated to the great benefit of mankind." (Fisch's translation 
in "Pragmatism," Vico Symposium, p. 411. Sansoni, p. 130)
*®See, e.g., #349, N.S. ". . . these proofs are of a kind divine and should 
give thee a divine pleasure, since in God knowledge and creation are one 
and the same thing."
:9lF, p. 216.
2*It is quite clear that Gadol thinks that Vico is, by his use of the dictum
in geometry and physics, a sceptic and by his use of the dictum in history,
a dogmatist. For example, he says: " . . .  the sceptics, whether they
come from the empirical camp, like Hume, or the dogmatic one, like Vico 
. . . "  (p. 217).
"Vico asserted the creativity of man and the superiority of historical 
cognition over natural scientific or mathematical knowledge in a purely 
dogmatic fashion ..." (p. 215)
". . . the letter's [Vico's) claim that knowledge of history is possible
is not only indemonstrable, but exemplary of the kind of dogmatism which
Kant meant to overthrow." (p. 217)
^^Autobiography, pp. 155-56).
^^Critique of Pure Reason B87S/A850. Also see, "Its [metaphysics] sole 
preoccupation is wisdom; and it seeks it by the path of science, which, 
once it has been trodden, can never be overgrown, and permits of no 
wandering." (Ibid.)
" . . .  Metaphysics is also the full and complete development of human 
reason." (Ibid.)
^^Critique of Judgement (459).
"^'Eighth Tliesis, On History, lea.
(448).
^®"Vico and Kant," Vico's Science of Humanity, Tagliacozzo and Verene, 
p. 221. From here on referred to as VK.
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*?VK, p. 227.
:»Ibid.
:*VK, p. 229.
:*Ibid.
” VK, p. 230.
:=Ibid., p. 229.
sîtipor Vico, existence is an outcome of the process of emanation, while for 
Kant existence is an involvement in network of relations." (VK, p. 225)
^"VK, p. 240.
^^Critigue of Pure Reason B164. Kant goes on to say that "Things in them­
selves would necessarily, apart from any [human] understanding that knows 
them conform to laws of their own. But appearances are only representa­
tions of things which are unknown as regards what they may be in 
themselves." (B164)
It is clear that Kant thought of his idealism as unique in this respect. 
His was the only idealism that concerned itself with solving the problem 
of how we can have a priori cognition of the "objects" of experience.
All other idealisms failed because they relied on a doctrine of intellec­
tual intuition, e.g., Plato, which tried to account for the necessity in 
knowledge of objects, where objects were thought of as "things in them­
selves." Kant believes he has succeeded, however, where these other 
idealisms have failed, because he alone introduces the doctrine that the 
senses themselves intuit a priori. This idea together with the categories 
account for the necessary knowledge of objects when objects are thought 
of as appearances. (See the very important footnote in the Prolegomena, 
p. 152-53. Cams, edition. Also see pp. 123-4 and 133.)
®^VK, p. 229. ". . .we cannot find in Kant a clear-cut separation be­
tween the rhythm of nature and the rhythm of history." (p. 233)
:?VK, p. 229.
:°VK, p. 235.
"VK, p. 232.
‘“"This is so on the divine level in the total sense: God can know the
world because he created it. Man can know history because he created 
it." (p. 227)
"'VK, p. 232.
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'**"The history of mankind can be seen . . .  as the realization of nature's 
secret plan . . . (Idea for Universal History, p. 21)"
", . .it might be possible to have history with a definie plan for crea­
tures [humans] who have no plan of their own." (Idea, p. 12)
"•^ E.g., "For we do not know nature but as the totality of appearances, i.e., 
of representations in us, . . ." (Prolog., p. 80)
"But when we consider that this nature is not a thing in itself but is 
merely an aggregate of appearances, . . .  we shall not be surprised 
that we can discover it only in the radical faculty of all our knowledge, 
in transcendental apperception . . . "  (A114)
" . . .  the laws of appearances in nature must agree with the understanding 
and its a priori form . . . "  (B164)
Also see A125, A 127, B160, and Prolog. 80-1, and 82.
Conjectural Beginnings of Human History (hereafter called CB), pp. 56-60.
‘*®The four stages are: (1) man's curiosity aroused by his imagination cre­
ates artificial desires (i.e., not natural) for man to pursue; (2) There 
is then a transformation of sexual desire, by a kind of sublimation; (3) 
Next, man's expectation of the future results in his experience of care 
(Sorge), and fear; and (4) Finally, the moral law makes man realize that 
he was the true end of nature.
This point, i.e., Kant's separation of history from nature, is treated by 
Emil Fackenheim's paper "Kant's Concept of History," Kant-Studien 48 (1957): 
381-398. Fackenheim there argues quite cogently that Kant distinguishes 
history from nature. However, He (Fackenheim) concludes as I do not that 
Kant's concept of teleology in history is not actually an "explanatory" 
concept, but rather, one which is used only to show that facts have value. 
Since Fackenheim takes this to be Kant's project in historical construc­
tion, i.e., to show that facts have value, he concludes that Kant does not 
succeed and, therefore, his [Kant's] "entire enterprise lies in shambles."
P. 398. I shall address this point in footnote #76.
“ C^B, pp. 59-60.
“’Ibid.
“®Idea for a Univ. Hist., p. 12.
Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing? 
p. 142.
s*CB, p. 60.
S'VK, p. 235.
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®^Ibid. "Kant differs from Vico because of what may be called the moralistic 
aspect of history."
®^rhe New Science #343.
®"N.S., #129.
s^N.S., #130.
s*N.S., #341.
. . a perpetually changing upward tendency and an equally frequent and 
profound relapse (an eternal oscillation, as it were) amounts to nothing
more than if the subject had remained in the same place standing still."
(An Old Question Raised Again, p. 139.)
®®N.S., #918.
®®These conditions Vico refers to as the "civil disease" of the cities which 
reflective man fell prey to because of his thinking of his own private 
self-interests. Vico distinguishes the two forms of barbarism in the 
following way: "In this way, through long centuries of barbarism, rust
will consume the misbegotten subtleties of malicious wits that have 
turned them into beasts made more inhuman by the barbarism of reflection 
than the first men had been made by the barbarism of sense. For the lat­
ter displayed a generous savagery, against which one could defend oneself 
or take flight or be on one's guard; but the former, with a base savagery,
under soft words and embraces, plots against the life and fortune of
friends and intimates." (1106) N.S.
®®N.S., 1102.
“ Ibid.
“ N.S., #1106.
“ N.S., #1109. See also #129-30 and #340-42.
®‘*It is just such a view that Vico criticizes in #340 as being inconsistent. 
He says: "But to impute conatus to bodies is as much as to impute to them 
freedom to regulate their motions, whereas all bodies are by nature neces­
sary agents. And what the theorists of mechanics call powers, forces, 
conatus, are insensible motions of bodies, by which they approach their 
centers of motion, as modem mechanics has it." (N.S., #340)
“ N.S., #388.
“ N.S., #1109.
®?See #342-44 for the "economy" of civil institutions in its relation to 
man's development and survival.
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®®"Human choice, by its nature most uncertain, is made certain and 
determined by the common sense of men with respect to human needs or 
utilities, which are the two sources of the natural law of the gentes." 
(N.S., #141)
®®Arthur Melnick, Kant's Analogies of Experience (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 124.
’°Thus, for example: ". . . a philosophical attempt to work out a universal 
history according to a natural plan . . . "  (Idea, p. 23)
Once again, I should like to point out my indebtedness to Melnick's argu­
ment in his book Kant's Analogies of Experience. It should be noted, 
however, that Melnick is not at all concerned with history in the sec­
tions on teleological judgment. He is concerned instead with the Second 
Analogy. Nevertheless, I find what he has to say concerning teleologi­
cal judgment directly relevant to history and most illuminating in 
general.
’*"The system of accidentalitg, which is attributable to Epicurus or 
Democritus, is in its literal interpretation, so manifestly absurd that 
it need not detain us. On the other hand, the system of fatality, of 
which Spinoza is the accredited author, although it is to all appearances 
much older, rests upon some thing supersensible . . . Its conception of 
the original being is quite unintelligible." (CJ, pp. 391-2)
And again: "It [i.e., the thesis of Epicurus] denies that this causality
is determined designedly . . . Blind chance is accepted as the explana­
tion . . . Spinoza, as the representative of the other class, seeks to 
release us from any inquiry into the ground of the possibility of ends 
of nature . . . Unity . . .  is ascribed nevertheless to things that we 
represent as outside one another, [as] blind necessity." (CJ, pp. 393-4)
7=CJ, 393.
” lbid.
7*CJ, 436.
^®An Old Question - History, p. 147.
’®"Since the philosopher cannot presuppose any [conscious] individual pur­
pose among men in their great drama, there is no other expedient for him 
except to try to see if he can discover a natural purpose in this idiotic 
course of things human. In keeping with this purpose, it might be pos­
sible to have a history with a definite natural plan for creatures who 
have no plan of their own." (Idea for a Univ. Hist., p. 12)
". . . this idea [i.e., the idea of history written in accordance with a 
plan or purpose] may still serve as a guiding thread for presenting as a 
system, at least in broad outlines, what would otherwise be a planless 
conglomeration of human actions." (Idea, p. 24)
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"This then, is the lesson taught by a philosophical attempt to write the 
most ancient part of human history: contentment with Providence, and
with the course of human affairs, considered as a whole. For this course 
is not a decline from good to evil, but rather a gradual development from 
the worse to the better." (Conjectural Beginnings, p. 68)
Emil Fackenheim, in an excellent article on Kant's philosophy of history, 
"Kant's Concept of History," Kant-Studien 48 (1957):381-398, has argued 
that for Kant "teleology is needed in history, not in order to explain 
historical events, but to show that they have value." (p. 393, foot­
note) While I agree with Professor Fackenheim that Kant wishes to show 
among other things that historical events have value, I disagree with
him over the issue of teleological "explanation."
Fackenheim holds that the teleological concept, as Kant uses it in biology 
as well as history, as " .. . a heuristic, not an explanatory function.
We use it as a mere guide, with the help of which we explain as far as we 
can. And all genuine explanation is mechanical." (p. 390)
" . . .  our purposiveness is a concept necessary to biology, its use does 
not prove the existence of purposiveness in nature. It proves something,
not about nature, but merely about human knowledge. In investigating
certain facts of nature, we must proceed as if a concept necessarily 
formed by us were applicable to nature without." (Ibid.)
My disagreement with Fackenheim rests on the following two points: first,
Kant explicitly says in the Critique of Judgement that of the two types 
of explanation, one is teleological and the other is mechanical.
"All semblance of an antinomy between the maxims of the strictly physical, 
or mechanical, mode of explanation and the teleological, or technical, 
rests therefore, on our confusing a principle of the reflective with one 
of the determinant judgement." (CJ, 389) [my emphasis]
"Thus we should estimate nature on two kinds of principles. The mechani­
cal mode of explanation would not be excluded by the teleological [my 
emphasis] as if the two principles contradicted one another." (CJ, 409) 
See also all of Section 78, CJ 410-415.
Second, if Fackenheim is suggesting by his use of "genuine" above that 
mechanical explanation is genuine whereas teleological explanation is not 
because mechanical explanation is thought to be constitutive of nature 
whereas teleological explanation is not, then I think that he owes us 
quite a bit of argument to establish this point.
So far as I can see, there is no reason to suppose that the mechanical 
method of explanation cannot (like the teleological method of explana­
tion) also be thought of as a principle of reflective (as opposed to de­
terminate) judgment. As Melnick has shown quit? clearly in his book 
Kant's Analogies of Experience, the Second Analogy is compatible with
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the mechanical method of explanation being thought of as a regulative 
principle. This is to say that simply by holding that "all events are 
caused" and in trying to eliminate contingency by tracing the causes of 
an event to a single cause, one has not thereby ruled out the notion that 
■humanism is a regulative principle.
Further, as Kant himself explicitly points out, the mechanical method of 
explanation, and therefore the argument for time-determination in the 
Second Analogy, is compatible with the teleological method of explanation 
in the sense that we can "... subordinate one to the other, namely 
mechanism to designed technique. And on the transcendental principle 
of the finality of nature this may readily be done." (CJ, 414)
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: A DIFFERENCE AND A SIMILARITY
We are now in a position to draw some conclusions concerning the 
parallel development of Vico's and Kant's philosophies of history . We are 
in a position to do this now, for we have come to see how certain epistemo­
logical concepts were used by each philosopher in his respective philosophy 
of history. The basis for each philosophy of history was the particular 
use made of the "maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth and the concept of 
teleological explanation.
We have seen that Vico and Kant by relying upon these two concepts 
came to hold (1) that it was possible to justify historical knowledge, or 
at least our "idea" of history; (2) that history could be viewed with cer­
tainty in that it was a purposeful activity; and (3) that history is the 
story of a unique "self-making," i.e., that of man making himself human.
We also saw that there were at least three similarities to be 
found in the use made by Vico and Kant of these two epistemological concepts. 
First, both philosophers because of their commitments to the above concepts 
held similar views concerning certain other philosophical issues. For ex­
ample, both Vico and Kant developed a certain philosophical notion which 
we have referred to as a "God-man maker's-knowledge analogy" in order bet­
ter to explain how human knowledge is possible. Once they had committed 
themselves to a "maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth, it seemed inevitable
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that they should go on to point out the "limits" of man's knowledge (i.e., 
knowledge which comes about as the result of discursive knowing) by compar­
ing man's "making" with a non-human "unlimited" intellect and its "making" 
(via its intuitive knowing).
This seemed inevitable precisely because once the issue of knowl­
edge was thought of in terras of "making," the question naturally arises as 
to the very best kind of making (i.e., the most perfect attainment of knowl­
edge) that could possibly occur.' Both Vico and Kant took this "best kind" 
of knowledge to be an immediate, intuitive kind of "knowing-making" which 
the human intellect was simply not capable of, in the area of the natural 
sciences at any rate. Second, both philosophers shared the philosophical 
view that Descartes' Cogito was unsuitable for the foundation of the sci­
ences. Once again, this was because of their similar commitments to a 
"maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth. They argued that scepticism is not 
actually refuted as Descartes thought it was simply by showing that we have 
an indubitable awareness of self. The sceptic does not doubt awareness; he 
doubts, instead, that there is knowledge, and both Vico and Kant emphatic­
ally claim that awareness of the self is not knowledge of the self.^ 
Therefore, they argued, Descartes' so-called foundation of knowledge is no 
foundation at all.
Third, Vico and Kant share the important philosophical view that 
nature and history are to be sharply distinguished. They held this view, 
once again, precisely because they saw that the "making" which is involved 
in nature (and thus the knowledge which results therefore) is of a different 
quality from the "making" which is involved in history. For both Vico and 
Kant, knowledge of nature is possible, but the content of that knowledge
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is contingent and void of intrinsic value. Knowledge of history, on the 
other hand, is not only possible, but certain; further, it demonstrates 
that man's activity (when seen historically) has absolute value. To say 
this (i.e., that man's activity seen historically has absolute value) is 
simply another way of saying that Vico and Kant because of their epistemo­
logical commitments share the view (essential to the thesis of historicity) 
that "human being" is a "self-making" process.^
These developments from our perspective now seem rather obvious, 
and I shall, therefore, not dwell on them further, lïhat I should like now 
to do instead is conclude by commenting on what I take to be, on the one 
hand, the fundamental difference between Vico and Kant (which also consti­
tutes their respective unique achievements in the history of philosophy) 
and, on the other hand, what I take to be a fundamental similarity in terms 
of a commitment that each shares. The difference concerns their respective 
epistemologies in relation to nature and history. The shared commitment 
concerns their humanism. I shall begin with the difference.
We have seen in the previous chapters, and especially in Chapter 
V, that Vico and Kant share the notion that knowledge of history is possible 
if and only if we make use of a "maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth to­
gether with the notion of teleological explanation. Further, we saw in 
Chapter V that Gadol and Rotenstreich had overlooked in their respective 
comparisons that Vico did in fact apply his "maker's-knowledge criterion" 
to nature as well as history. We also saw, as they did not, that Kant's 
philosophy of history is grounded in his "maker's-knowledge criterion." 
However, while it is true that Kant grounds history episteraologically by 
the dictum (or formula), the use he makes of it is, unlike Vico's, indirect.
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This is in effect to say that Kant could not see how the dictum could be 
directly used to "make" history, while Vico could not see how it could be
directly used to "make" nature.
I should like to dwell on these differences for a moment, for I
believe that it is precisely here that the fundamental difference in Vico's 
and Kant's philosophies of history occurs. It may help if we state these 
differences positively and negatively. Let us begin with the positive side.
Vico, by directly applying the "maker's-knowledge criterion" to 
history, was able to provide a comprehensive systematic answer to the ques­
tion "how is history possible as a science?" This was possible because 
Vico saw that history is unique in that it is the sole area in which man 
can attain absolutely true and certain knowledge (i.e., this is the sole 
area where verum-factum applies absolutely].^ This is because the historian 
himself is an instance of the subject that he is investigating. He is, 
therefore, at once the composer (i.e., the maker) and (thus) the knower of 
the material which historical knowledge has for its object. Further, being 
a man, he is also history's ultimate object. (The historian, as we've seen, 
is the ultimate composer of history in two different senses. In the first 
sense, it is because he himself is human that the ultimate object of his 
investigations, i.e., the actions of the original historical agents, will 
not be in any sense foreign to him. What he studies is man, of which he 
himself is an instance, thus giving himself a privileged position to study 
the "makings" of the original historical agents. Secondly, he has access 
to certain principles (given to him by Vico's "new science") by which he 
may re-create, i.e., re-make, in their full meaning the thoughts and inten­
tions of the original historical agents by placing them in a wider and more 
intellible context than the original historical agents could have ever been
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aware of themselves. That is to say (in this second sense) that it is the 
historian himself who "makes," i.e., creates, history. Of course, the his­
torian's own "makings" will later become "makings" in the first sense, i.e., 
acts of an original historical agent. The result will be that these acts 
will later have to be "made" (i.e., re-made in the second sense) by another 
historian who will create the context for, say, Vico's New Science.)
It was because of his notion that only a "maker's-knowledge cri­
terion" could justify knowledge and his profound awareness of its remarkable 
applicability to the "historical" world that Vico came to make the revolu­
tionary and exciting contribution to the epistemology of history that con­
stitutes The New Science. Something can be known with certainty only if it 
is "made" and, in the case of man, it is history that fulfills this 
requirement.
What of Kant? We have seen that Kant too believed that knowledge 
could be secured only by the "maker's-knowledge criterion." However, the 
critical philosophy's virtue was that for the first time in the history of 
philosophical thought, it demonstrated in a comprehensive and systematic 
way how a science of nature was possible a priori. Kant's genius lies in 
the fact that he saw that the "maker's-knowledge criterion" could be applied 
to nature (appearance), i.e., to "objects," even on the level of human (i.e., 
intuitively sensible and yet a discursive) understanding. No other phil­
osopher had seriously entertained this profound idealistic possibility.
That Kant was an idealist he never denied. However, the kind of idealism 
he offered he considered revolutionary. He says;
. . . mine is solely designed for the purpose of comprehending 
the possibility of our cognition a priori as to objects of ex­
perience, which is a problem never hitherto solved or even sug­
gested. In this way all mystical idealism falls to the ground 
for (as may be seen already in Plato) it inferred from our
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cognitions a priori (even those of geometry) another intuition 
different from that of the senses (namely, an intellectual in­
tuition) , because it never occurred to any one that the senses 
themselves might intuit a priori.®
Kant held that sensible objects can appear to us intuitively pre­
cisely because we "make" them. This is to say that we supply the forms, 
even on the level of sensible intuition, which allows the "object" to be 
intuited in the first place. We have seen that Kant argued that if the 
object was not "made," it could not be known. Further, we have seen that 
he held that there were only two levels on which the "making" of the ob­
ject could take place, i.e., either the level of sense or the level of in­
tellect. Now, concerning intuition, the view that an object could be 
intuitively "made" on the level of intellect (i.e., man's intellect) Kant 
(as well as Vico) considered absurd. To admit intellectual intuition on 
the part of man would be the same as admitting that simply by thinking ob­
jects man could bring them into existence. Hence, Kant reasoned, intuition 
cannot occur on the level of intellect but must, instead, occur on the 
level of sense. We can intuit sensible objects because we "make" them, 
which is to say we supply the forms (space and time) without which the ob­
ject could not appear.
It was precisely because Kant could see (where others could not) 
that the ''maker's-knowledge criterion" could be directly applied to nature, 
i.e., that the "objects" of nature might be "made" (via sensible intuition 
and discursive categories) in such a way that they accommodate themselves 
to the subject, i.e., to our human cognitive abilities, that he (Kant) could 
make the exciting contribution to an epistemology of nature that constitutes 
the Critique of Pure Reason.
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However, to these positive contributions made by both Vico and 
Kant in their respective uses of the "maker's-knowledge criterion" corres­
pond what may be termed negative limitations. It is clear, e.g., in the 
case of Vico, as we acknowledged in Chapter V, that there is a sense of 
scepticism pervading his treatment of nature vis-à-vis his "maker's-knowledge 
criterion."
Vico simply could not see how the "maker's-knowledge criterion" 
could be applied directly to nature. To apply it directly to nature, he 
thought, would amount to claiming that we in fact have created nature, i.e., 
that we have intellectual intuition of natural objects, and this, he thought, 
was obviously false.® However, we have seen that this was not the case for 
Kant. The reason is that Kant had ingeniously devised a doctrine of "appear­
ance," thereby allowing him direct applicability of the "dictum" to nature. 
Therefore, for Kant we do in fact create nature. This distinction, i.e., 
the one between appearance and reality, I reiterate, was totally foreign to 
Vico's thought. For Vico the ultimate metaphysical ground for our knowl­
edge of nature lies in his rather obscure doctrine of "metaphysical points."’ 
Vico's negative limitation, then, lies in the fact that he could not in a 
satisfactory way apply the "maker's-knowledge criterion" directly to nature. 
That is to say, he could not envisage a full-fledged "Copemical revolution" 
when the "object" of knowledge was the natural world. .
Kant, on the other hand, as Dilthey made clear a half-century 
later, had with the critical philosophy provided an epistemology of nature 
as well as the basis for a science of history. However, that it was not 
Kant but Dilthey who fully realized the critical philosophy's application 
to history is precisely Kant's negative limitation. Kant simply failed to
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see that the "maker's-knowledge criterion" that he had so ingeniously 
applied to the natural world was particularly suitable for a theory of 
Geisteswissenschaften.
Kant never fully realized, then, that history is something unique 
to man in an important epistemological sense and that the knowledge of his­
tory, therefore, would be of a qualitatively different sort from that of 
nature. He never realized this precisely because he never saw exactly how 
the "maker's-knowledge criterion" could be applied uniquely (because of the 
identity of man and the object of study in history which is also man) to 
history. Therefore, Kant's negative limitation was that he could not clearly 
see that the "maker's-knowledge criterion" was particularly suitable for his­
tory, i.e., human activity, which is the "object" in the realm of the 
human spirit. Instead, it was Dilthey, a self-acknowledged Kantian, who 
later extended Kant's principles to the area of history and thereby finally 
pointed to this crucial difference (a difference already pointed out by 
Vico) between nature and history. IVhen speaking of the "human" studies and 
history, Dilthey tells us:
Their range is identical with that of understanding, and under­
standing has the objectifications of life consistently as its 
object. Thus, the range of the human studies is determined by 
the objectification of life in the external world. The human 
spirit can only understand what it has created [my emphasis].
Nature, the object (Gegenstand) of the natural sciences, em* 
braces the reality which has arisen independently of the 
efficacy (wirken) of spirit. Everything on which man has 
actively impressed his stamp forms the object (Gegenstand) 
of the human studies.®
Perhaps the best way finally to state the fundamental difference 
between Vico and Kant on the subject of history is to say that Kant never 
developed an explicit epistemology of history, whereas Vico did. This is
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not to say that Kant did not provide indirectly a basis for an epistemology 
of history. His own work in history shows not only that he did provide 
such a basis but that he was aware that the basis must be gounded epistemo- 
logically in a "maker's-knowledge criterion" of truth.
Further, as we have seen, that basis (although never explicitly 
developed by Kant) directly parallels similar notions that were developed 
by Vico in his new science. It is precisely because of this parallel de­
velopment of Kant's ideas on history with Vico’s that Dilthey's own state­
ments concerning his lifelong project of effecting a "Critique of Historical 
Judgement" sound so completely Vichian. For example, Dilthey tells us 
that:
The first condition for the possibility of a Geschichtswessen- 
schaft [science of history] lies in the consciousness that I 
am myself a historical creature, that the one who examines 
history also makes history (Dilthey, p. 25).%
Thus, although the step to history, via the epistemological com­
mitment to a "maker's-knowledge criterion," was never taken by Kant; it was, 
as Dilthey makes evident, only inches away. For Vico, on the other hand, 
this same step had been taken some sixty years earlier. The fundamental / 
difference between Vico's and Kant's philosophies of history, therefore 
(epistemologically speaking), amounts to the absence in Kant of a direct 
application of the "maker's-knowledge criterion" to history.
This absence of a direct application of the criterion to history 
in Kant represents the "other side" of the same limited use of the criter­
ion which occurred with Vico in the area of nature. The history of phil­
osophy shows that later so-called "idealistic" philosophers could not rest 
with either of these limitations but would, instead, eventually overcome 
them. This is most evident, of course, in the philosophy of Hegel. Hegel,
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though his doctrine of "estrangement," was able to overcome Vico's doubts 
concerning the "making" of nature; yet, at the same time, he (Hegel) could 
resist the trenchant subjectivity involved in Kant's doctrine. Further, 
by applying an objective "maker's-knowledge criterion" to culture, Hegel 
joined Vico in arguing that true objectivity was possible only in the realm 
of the historical (i.e., objective) spirit. Hegel was thus able to over­
come Kant's doubts that history may be merely a subjective enterprise.
This, then, ends our comments on the fundamental differences be­
tween Vico's and Kant's philosophies of history. I should like now to con­
clude this study by commenting upon what I take to be the fundamental 
commitment shared by Vico and Kant in their respective philosophical works 
on history, namely their commitment to humanism.
The idea I should like to develop here is this; ,that from the 
examination of the concept "maker's knowledge" and "teleology" in the 
philosophies of history of Vico and Kant, it becomes apparent that these 
two philosophies of history announce in their own distinctive fashion a 
shared commitment to humanism. We have seen, e.g., that the concept which 
each philosopher had regarded as central to his respective philosophy of 
history was the concept of "self-making." What I should like to point out 
here is that within Vico's and Kant's particular concepts of "self-making" 
in history, there exist certain fundamental ideas which are woven throughout 
their philosophies of history. These fundamental ideas, I believe, are 
precisely those which are essential to the traditional notion of humanism.
It is these "humanistic" theses, therefore, that I wish to draw out of Vico 
and Kant's philosophies of history.
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Let us first of all note, then, what has been traditionally taken 
to be some of the fundamental ideas of humanism and, second, point out how 
Vico and Kant made use of these ideas (not necessarily in any conscious 
manner) via the concept that is central to their respective philosophies of 
history, i.e., "self-making."
The origin of Humanism as an explicit philosophical movement can 
be traced back to the beginnings of the Italian Renaissance and the writ­
ings of Petrarch (1304-74), Humanism's first great representative.'® Gen­
erally speaking, this movement is characterized by its pointed protests 
against an overlogicized, rationalistic view of man and by its appeal for 
a "view" which would emphasize man's moral worth, his value, and his dignity. 
Because of this particular emphasis, the humanist's studies came to be known 
as the "humanities," indicating that they were interested in studying those 
areas that were of particular significance to "human" beings, e.g., morals, 
art, literature, and history.
There are several major ideas and themes that stand out in the 
development of the so-called humanist movement. One such theme is the ex­
altation of freedom found in many humanists' writings. The reason why 
freedom was such an essential idea to humanism was that freedom played an 
important role in justifying other ideas, e.g., those of autonomy and re­
sponsibility. That is to say that if one is to justify the notion that 
"man can, though his own natural gifts, work and transform his world into 
a world of his choosing," one must allow that he (man) has the freedom to 
do so. As Pico della Mirandola has God state it in his Oration on the 
Dignity of Man:
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I have given you, Adam, neither a predetermined place nor a 
particular aspect nor any special prerogatives in order that you 
may take and possess these through your own decision and choice.
The limitations on the nature of other creatures are contained 
within my prescribed laws. You shall determine your own nature 
without constraint from any barrier, by means of the freedom to 
whose power I have entrusted you. I have place you at the cen­
ter of the world so that from that point you might see better 
what is in the world. I have made you neither heavenly nor 
earthly, neither mortal nor immortal so that, like a free and 
sovereign artificer, you might mold and fashion yourself into 
that form you yourself have chosen.
Other particularly humanistic themes concerned nature and culture, 
reason and autonomy, morality and history. It was the humanist ideal that 
man was to achieve his humanity through his natural and social nature. 
Further, nature had in a metaphorical sense "picked man out" from all other 
creatures to develop and inhabit a different world from the merely natural 
one. This "other" world was the "civil world" which, unlike nature, would 
be the locus for culture.
It was this notion of culture which designates among other things 
the proper, human way of developing one's natural talents and capacities 
that was held responsible for the development of man's humanity. To an­
thropomorphize a bit, it was as if nature somehow "knew" that she could 
not develop by herself the full potentialities and capacities in one of her 
creatures (i.e., man), and therefore, she called upon the "civil world" and 
culture to do it for her.
Now it is precisely here that man's reason and self-sufficient 
autonomy is called upon to complete this, his development. Since nature is 
helpless with her merely mechanical causation to effect man's development 
of his full potential and capacities, man is left to develop them himself 
via "a different kind" of causality. In other words man must effect his
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own development independent of and oftentimes in spite of nature. That is 
to say, he must develop himself freely by his own choices, and it is just 
these choices for which he will ultimately be praised or damned. In this 
"civil world" man's choices, being free, will be "moral" choices which means 
that the causality which effects them will have the character of neither 
the absolute necessity of, say the Spinozist nor the "blind chance" of the 
Epicureans. They will, instead, have the character of a higher, moral ne­
cessity, i.e., a moral law, with which man is in tune.
Hence, the object of studies of the humanist becomes not the logi­
cal abstractions of the scholastics nor the investigations of natural causes 
of the empirical scientist but, rather, the moral and historical experience 
of man. With the humanists the notion of freedom becomes centered in man's 
spiritual activity which is itself possible only in a "civil world."
Vico's entire mature work. The New Science, is concerned precisely 
with this "civil world" and these humanistic themes. Further, it is in 
Kant's philosophy of history that we find these identical concerns announced.
Vico, finding himself at the end of a long humanistic tradition 
and in the midst of a new "scholasticism," that of Cartesian science, ac­
tively decided to take up once again the defense of humanism. To show that 
Vico was a defender of humanism and actively committed to its program re­
quires little effort. Indeed, a cursory glance at just one of his works 
would make clear this point. For example, in his seventh inaugural oration. 
On the Study Methods of Our Time (De Mostri) Vico asks the traditional edu­
cator's question: "Which study method is finer and better, ours or the
Ancients?"'^ And, although he gives no explicit answer to this question, 
his comparison and contrast of the methods of the ancients with those of the
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modems clearly turns out to be a vindication of the primacy of the 
historical and social dimension of man. It is, as Elio Gianturco points 
out . . perhaps the most brilliant defense of the humanities ever writ­
ten."*"* However, our explicit concern here is with Vico's commitment to 
humanism as seen in the context of his philosophy of history. Let us look, 
then, for a moment to his notion of "self-making" in history.
We have seen that Vico reacted against Cartesianism epistemologi­
cally (and humanistically) by rejecting the Cartesian "Cogito" as the basis 
of truth and substituting in its stead a "maker's-knowledge criterion." It 
was clear to Vico that one of the consequences of accepting the Cogito and 
the kind of "self-evident" awareness that it was supposed to demonstrate 
was that "scientific" truth would have to be thought of solely in terms of 
that self-evident certainty that is achievable by the Cogito.
As it turns out, the self-evident certainty in question is achiev­
able only in those areas where one can deduce one proposition from another 
such as in mathematics. This, in turn, means that "scientific" truth can 
be legitimately arrived at only if the method used to achieve it is itself 
modeled after the mathematical sciences. It is, of course, precisely here 
that Vico reacts against Cartesianism on humanistic grounds. The Cogito, 
as a basis of scientific truth, clearly repudiates the claim that, e.g., 
history could in any way provide scientific truth. This is because there 
is and can be no clear method of deducing with mathematical rigor how and 
why certain events take place, much less what the correct historical descrip­
tion of them should be. Therefore, there is no way of establishing "his­
torical" truth clearly and distinctly. The same holds for other humanistic 
studies, e.g., art, poetry, and rhetoric. These disciplines must, on
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Cartesian grounds be systematically excluded from the area of "scientific" 
method and, therefore, be denied the ability to demonstrate "scientific” 
truths about man.
It was Vico's view, however, and one of the main theses of human­
ism that;
The fundamentally human element consists in the fact that the 
forms of human behaviour must continually be sought and defined 
anew and are therefore to be discovered in the historical role 
of man [my emphasis] and in the elucidation of that role: it is
history which differentiates the human being from the animal.*®
This is to say that for the humanist (and Vico) one can arrive at the nature 
of a thing scientifically and thus conceive its truth only if one is in a 
position to know its origin, its nascence, i.e., its history. Vico tells 
us quite unabashedly that the nature of things ". . .is nothing but their 
coming into being (nascimento) at certain times and in certain guises."*®
The result is that for the humanists in general and Vico in par­
ticular one can achieve scientific truth of man if one re-creates his his­
tory. In this re-creation one discovers that man's polity, his language, 
poetry, art, myths, and religion all serve as evidence of the particular 
kind of nature man has, or had, at a particular time. Hence, in order to 
discover the nature(s) of man and thus the "truth" about him, one must, of 
necessity, rely upon just those humanistic disciplines, e.g., philology, 
rhetoric, literary criticism, etc., that were systematically excluded by 
Cartesianism. For Vico, therefore, there are two aspects to his reaction 
to Cartesianism: one is an epistemological aspect concerning a criterion
of truth; the other, a call to the defense of humanism against Cartesian 
scholasticism.
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It becomes clear that because of Vico's use of his "maker's-knowledge 
criterion" in the area of history, these two aspects are in essense one. In 
applying the "maker's-knowledge criterion" to geometry, nature, and then 
history, Vico found it necessary to draw a sharp distinction between nature 
and history. The distinction was twofold: on the one hand history is made
completely by man and nature is not; on the other hand, the knowledge gained 
in the area of history demonstrates that man is a self-maker," whereas the 
knowledge gained in the area of nature does not.
History, for Vico, can therefore be known with complete certainty, 
while the essential philosophical fact that one learns in gaining historical 
knowledge is that man is a creature which displays autonomous, moral, purpose­
ful behavior. This is to say for Vico that man is a creature which is 
responsible for his oim development though his oim choices. Further, it is 
primarily through these choices that he has "made" the civil world, and it 
is through his culture that he has maintained it. By both making and main­
taining the civil world, man has made and maintained himself.
History is to be seen, therefore, as a process of self-making, 
and it is precisely this pregnant notion of "self-making" that contains all 
of the seminal ideas of humanism. Autonomy, morality, judgment, reason, 
history, taste— all of these concepts are specifically "humanistic" con­
cepts built into the notion of "self-making." As Gadamer points out when 
speaking of Vico's century;
The idea of self-formation or cultivation (Begriff or Bildung), 
which became supremely important at the time, was perhaps the 
greatest idea of the eighteenth century, and it is this idea 
which is the atmosphere breathed by the sciences of the nine­
teenth century.
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That Vico accepts this notion of "self-forming" or "self-making" 
is obvious enough, but what is less obvious is the manner in which it is 
epistemologically justified by him. From our study we have seen that his­
torical knowledge is justified for Vico by his "maker's-knowledge criterion" 
together with his concept of teleological explanation. It is these epistemic 
concepts that render history a science and in so doing point to a distinc­
tion between history and nature, historical knowledge and natural knowledge. 
In nature things are what they are; God made them, and hence, natural knowl­
edge does not indicate a (human) "self-making." Natural knowledge, there­
fore, in no way justifies a "humanistic" viewpoint. It is in history, not 
nature, that man's nature is found to depend upon his institutions. Further, 
it is in history that man is seen to be the sole author of those institu­
tions. Hence, man's history is the story of his oiim self-making. In this 
manner the notion of "self-making" places Vico squarely in the humanistic 
tradition, and that notion is finally epistemologically justified by his 
"maker's-knowledge criterion."
What of Kant? Here once again we come across the all-important 
distinction between nature and history. Further, Kant's distinction is 
also drawn on the basis of the "maker's-knowledge criterion" (although not 
in the same manner as that of Vico). For Kant, nature (i.e., appearance) 
is "made" by us and, interestingly enough, the knowledge of how it is made, 
Kant holds, results in a kind of "self-knowledge."^® As we have seen, the 
question of an epistemology of history is never explicitly brought up by 
Kant; nevertheless, he does give us a "philosophical sketch" of how he 
thinks history is possible.
269
When we examined Kant's essays in the philosophy of history, we 
found that history is possible only if (1) nature is possible; (2) nature 
is teleological; and (3) man is distinguished from teleological, physical 
nature by the fact that he alone is its "final" end. This amounted to ad­
mitting that man's behaviour is governed by a moral teleology as well as a 
physical teleology. Having seen the manner in which these three things 
(i.e., nature, physical and moral teleology) are epistemologically possible, 
we came to understand both how it is that history is possible and what the 
essence of history is. That is to say, it was Kant's "maker's-knowledge 
criterion" and his concept of teleology (physical and moral) which allowed 
us (1) to "make" and therefore to know nature; (2) to know nature to be à 
teleological whole; and (3) to see history as the story of man as a "final" 
end.
Upon examining the notion of man as a final end, we found that 
Kant meant first that only man is an end in himself because he is the only 
creature capable of "practical" reason.Second, we found that man for 
Kant:
. . . should, by himself, produce everything that goes beyond the 
mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should 
partake of no other happiness of perfection than that which he 
himself, independently of instinct, has created by his own 
reason [my emphasis].  ^°
This is finally to say that history is a kind of demonstration and that
what it demonstrates is the "worth" of man. This worth is not dependent
on what man receives or enjoys Kant tells us.
On the contrary it is the worth which he alone can give to him­
self, and which consists in what he does— in the manner in which 
and the principles upon which he acts in the freedom of his faculty 
of desire, and not as a link in the chain of nature.
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It is because of this distinction between nature and history, so 
sharply drawn, that we can see in Kant's philosophy of history (just as in 
Vico's) a commitment to humanism via the epistemological notion of "self­
making." Once again, involved in this notion are the ideas of freedom, 
autonomy, culture, and morality, i.e., those same notions developed in 
Italian humanism and defended in Vico's philosophy of history.
At first sight, it might strike one as odd that such ideas would 
surface in Kant's philosophy of history. That is, it might be regarded as 
odd because the Enlightenment is normally thought of as, at least in some 
sense, antithetical to such ideas (those above); if so, why should Kant's 
philosophy of history contain them? The program of the Enlightenment 
seemed to suggest that man would establish once and for all the universally 
valid principles for all development and would, in genera], throw out no­
tions such as intuition, genius, spontaneity, etc. He (man) would prefer 
the ideas of reason, common sense, and calculated reflection to the human­
istic notions (mentioned above). Therefore, there seems to be at least one 
straightforward sense in which the spirit of the Enlightenment was anti­
thetical to the basic ideas of humanism, at least when humanism was seen in 
its more Romantic garb. Was this not, after all, the essence of Kant's 
disagreement with Herder's philosophy of history?
While there is a genuine issue here (i.e., the Enlightenment ideas 
and ideals versus those of the Romanticist— Humanist view of man and his­
tory), 1 believe that the apparent inconsistency of Kant (if indeed we think 
of it as being inconsistent) is a positive one. This is because Kant's 
thought because of its wide range often seems at odds with itself while, 
nevertheless, covering and speaking to many important, diverse problems
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(sometimes at the expense of being inconsistent). This may be a bit clearer 
if we take notice of the particular position of his thought in the context 
of 18th-century German thought.
Kant wrote three Critiques, philosophies of history, morals, 
religion, and science, as well as other pieces--which have not been (and 
probably will never be) clearly shown to form one consistent whole. Never­
theless, because of his philosophical interests and deep insight into various 
fields of knowledge and because of his dedication to truth, Kant thought and 
wrote on these subjects with the view to understanding, first, their truth 
and secondly, to making them consistent with his other views. We need but 
consider how artificial the "architectonic" of the third Critique seems 
when justaposed with the sensitive analysis of aesthetic experience that 
one finds there. It is as if in an afterthought Kant made an attempt to 
unify the conclusions there with those of the first and second Critiques.
This is not to say that Kant didn't think of his work as an or­
ganic unity nor to say that he didn't attempt to bridge the theoretical and 
intelligible "worlds" with a book on Judgement. It is to say, rather, that 
Kant was not the kind of philosopher to be tied to a system or a movement 
such as the Enlightenment if it meant sacrificing the particular truths 
of a given area of study. For reasons such as these, 1 do not find it sur­
prising that Kant's philosophy of history manifests ideas that are quite 
appropriate to the study of history as opposed to ideas that, while more 
consistent with the spirit of the Enlightenment, are not appropriate to the 
study of history (e.g., the Enlightenment's interest in mechanism, universal 
laws of nature, etc.). Further and perhaps more important, it should be 
noted that Kant lived at what may be termed the end of the Enlightenment,
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or at least at the end of the radical emphasis on rationalism which
characterized it as a movement. Wieland, Herder, Goethe, Schiller— all of
these thinkers had "dared to know"also, but their inquiry came to involve
a quite different revolution in thinking from that of the rationalists,
particularly in the human sciences. These thinkers had demonstrated, among
other things, that the human sciences are not to be thought of as inferior
to the natural sciences. As Gadamer puts it:
Possessed of the intellectual heritage of German classicism 
they developed the proud awareness of being the true heirs of 
humanism. The period of German classicism had not only brought 
a renewal of literature and aesthetic criticism which moved be­
yond the outmoded ideal of taste of the baroque and the ra­
tionalism of the enlightenment, it had also given to the idea 
of humanity, and to the ideal of enlightened reason, a funda­
mentally new content . . . and thus prepared the ground for 
the growth of the historical sciences in the nineteenth 
century.
It is in the epistemological work of Kant that this ground was 
prepared for these thinkers. More specifically, in his philosophy of his­
tory. It is in this sense that we can appreciate Kant's far-reaching com­
mitment to humanism. With Kant we see once again that a "maker's-knowledge 
criterion" of truth secures knowledge of nature and of history, while draw­
ing an important distinction between them. The knowledge one gains from 
history is, when thought of philosophically, that man is a "final" end and 
that history is the story of his own freedom. History, in other words, is 
the story of man "making" himself free and thus human. It is precisely 
this notion, then, of "self-making" that displays Kant's humanistic com­
mitment. As he himself tells us in the Anthropology:
Man is destined by his reason to live in a society with men and 
in it to cultivate himself, to civilize himself, and to make 
himself moral [my emphasis] by the arts and sciences. No matter 
how strong his animal tendency to yield passively to the attrac­
tions of comfort and well-being, which he calls happiness, he is 
still destined to make himself worthy [my emphasis] of humanity.
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Hence, with Kant as with Vico we find that embedded in his 
philosophy of history (which is ultimately epistemologically grounded by a 
"maker's-knowledge criterion") is the humanistic concept of "self-making."
It is precisely out of this concept that the ideas of Kant's humanism de­
velop, and it is here in his philosophy of history that he is closer in 
spirit to Vico than to the spirit of the Enlightenment.
Let us here conclude our study with this question: "IVhat signif­
icance do Kant's and Vico's epistemologies of history and their correspond­
ing commitments to humanism have for us?" The answer divides itself into 
at least two further questions: first, concerning the philosophy of his­
tory and the other "human" sciences, exactly what epistemological grounds 
will best serve to justify knowledge in these areaS? For example, shall 
our model be the "natural" sciences, or shall we instead seek out different 
grounds? Second, what of humanism? That is to say, ought we to take into 
account a humanistic view of man when we are considering the answer to the 
first question?
I realize that an adequate answer to either of these questions 
would entail an entire work itself. I shall, therefore, offer some opinions 
which, because of time and space, 1 shall not here try to defend in any sys­
tematic way. Nevertheless, 1 hope that this dissertation provides a con­
text within which the opinions that I offer here will seem less arbitrary 
and dogmatic than they would without such a context.
As 1 see it, the question of the appropriate epistemological 
grounds for the "human" sciences lands us squarely in the middle of the de­
bate between so-called "scientific" explanation and "other" kinds of ex­
planation. Concerning this debate, my own view is the following: 1 reject
274
any view that states or implies that causal explanation of human action and 
creation can be reduced in toto to nonmental physiological responses to the 
physical environment. I reject any view that states or implies that all 
human action is only an expression of physical and somatic conditioning which, 
if understood, could prescribe the laws of all human behavior. Finally, I 
reject all views that argue that human action can be "explained" without ref­
erence to the subjectively constituted meanings and values that the actions 
in question have for the agent and other men. I reject these views, first, 
because there is simply no evidence in our lived experience to support them.
But secondly, and perhaps more important, I reject them because they systematic­
ally exclude those things for which there is evidence for in our lived experience.
My point is simply this: if basing the human sciences on the prem­
ises of the natural sciences means that we must adopt any of the three views 
that I have rejected above, then I believe we should throw out the model of
the natural sciences as a ground for the human ones. I believe that our
lives are more subtle than such theories and models allow them to be.
Perhaps here one might object and point out that our argument with
the "natural science model" as a ground for the human sciences is really
pointless. It might be said that we are simply mistaken if we believe that 
a "scientific" model of explanation in the area of human action necessitates 
the kind of "reductionistic materialism" that we have been intimating.
Therefore, by attacking the "scientific" model of explanation as a ground 
for the "human" sciences, we have simply been attacking a man of straw.
To this objection I can only reply that it is not my intention to 
attack a strawroan, and it is not ray intention to here argue that a "natural 
science model" necessitates materialism. I wish only to point out that if 
committing ourselves to the "natural science model" in the area of human 
action commits us to any of the three views that I have rejected above.
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then we should not make the initial commitment. (0£ course, if basing the 
human sciences on the model of the natural sciences does not commit us to 
any of the three views that I have rejected above, it would not necessarily 
follow that the model of the natural sciences should serve as our ground 
for the human ones.)
It is in this light, then, that what Vico and Kant have had to 
say with their "maker*s-knowledge" idea becomes [perhaps urgently] import­
ant. That is to say, it is only when and if we see a need for a different 
ground of "explanation" for the "human" sciences (than the model of the na­
tural sciences) that we can come to appreciate the "maker’s-knowledge" op­
tion provided by Vico and Kant, The need I speak of is a need to 
philosophize once again about our actual lives as they are lived. In my 
view this "need" is apparent today, and I believe, therefore, that we 
should intelligently take into account what Vico and Kant have had to say.
And what of humanism--ought we ever give up its defense? Vico 
and Kant in their philosophies of history (and other writings) emphatically 
answered no. They instead diligently defended the autonomy and responsi­
bility with which man must himself "make" his history and "social world." 
They saw fit to point out that this social world was not to be thought of 
as merely something "natural" or for that matter "divine." It was to be 
thought of as human. They argued that it was man’s world, and in making 
it he makes himself. Hence, their emphasis on what should go into its mak­
ing, i.e., morality, the arts, the sciences. Surely in this time of appar­
ent decadence, of life focused around shopping centers, of conglomerate 
companies determining the fate of peoples in distant lands (I mean in our 
century), surely the ideal possibilities of life which humanism envisages 
are not to be ignored.
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It seems clear that in this century we have lost our historical 
sense. However, we can and should reclaim it. History and our historicity 
are not dead things in a past, gone, forever past. History is our present.
It is history, not nature, which displays our humanity. To take up and 
more importantly to "philosophically" clarify history is necessarily to 
take up and clarify our humanity. This is because the philosophy of his­
tory is essentially about man, his life, and its meaning. AS the great 
Ortega y Gasset has said:
History is the systematic science of that radical reality which is 
my life. It is, then, a science of the present in the most rigor­
ous and actual sense of the word. If it were not a science of the 
present, where would we encounter that past which one can ascribe 
to it as a theme? The opposite interpretation, which is customary, 
is the equivalent to making of the past an abstract, unreal thing 
that remained lifeless just where it happened in time, when the 
past is the live and active force that sustains our today. There 
is no actio in distans. The past is not there, at the date when 
it happened, but here, in me. The past is I— by which I under­
stand, my life.^s
Needless to say, I share the spirit of Ortega's view as do, I 
believe, Vico and Kant. The structure of human life as manifested in time 
and space is thoroughly historical. Our very being vis-à-vis our history 
must be "made." We are all "beings-in-the-making."
I hope this work has been able to suggest in the light of the 
epistemological foundations laid down by Vico and Kant how it is possible 
for us to begin a new philosophical examination of that "radical reality," 
history. The first step is again to think of man as "maker." In so doing, 
we shall also surely once again take up the not-unworthy defense of humanism.
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